

U.S. Agency for International Development

# **STRATEGIC PLAN**

**Bureau for Humanitarian Response**

**August, 1995**

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## INTRODUCTION

The Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR) has a broad mandate within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) that spans the entire continuum from relief to development. It plays a leadership role in key areas ranging from highly operational logistical efforts that respond to the immediate needs of victims of natural disasters and complex emergencies to long term development efforts to strengthen the service delivery and organizational capacity of private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The Bureau manages almost \$1.5 billion in resources annually which derive from a wide range of sources including: DA funds, International Disaster Account Funds, and Title II emergency and development food aid.

This introduction includes three sections. The first of these identifies the Offices that make up BHR and the scope of BHR's Strategic Plan. The second and third describe the process BHR used to prepare this plan and the distinctive features of BHR's programs which have affected the development of the Bureau's strategy.

### A. Scope and Coverage of the BHR Strategic Plan

This document constitutes a Strategic Plan for BHR. The strategic directions set forth in the Plan will guide the Bureau's actions for a five year period beginning in October of 1995. The Plan serves as a governing framework for the Bureau as a whole and describes how its diverse offices contribute to a set of common objectives. For purposes of this Plan, the Bureau is treated as a single "operational unit", with its different offices as component parts. This approach is in line with BHR's "Rightsizing Report" which called for the Bureau to pursue its activities as an integrated whole, instead of managing its portfolio as separate operational activities.

The five programmatic and two support offices for which this Plan serves as a governing document include:

- The **Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)** implements the Agency's disaster preparedness, relief and rehabilitation programs abroad;
- The **Office of Food for Peace (FFP)** coordinates USAID's role in the PL 480 Titles II and III food aid programs and provides support for both emergency relief and development programs;
- The **Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation (PVC)** strengthens the participation of PVOs and, through them, their partner non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in development and serves as a coordination point for the USAID-PVO partnership;
- The **Office of American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA)** provides support to medical and teaching facilities abroad;

- The **Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)**, the Bureau's newest office, was created to develop new approaches to assist countries emerging from crisis to return to development;
- BHR's **Program Planning and Evaluation Office (PPE)**, and
- The Bureau's **Management Office**.

The Bureau's Strategic Plan identifies important Bureau-level objectives that draw upon all of its programs, ranging from disaster relief to food aid, to capacity-building assistance to private voluntary agencies in such areas as microenterprise development, child survival and health and agriculture. The Bureau-level objectives established in this Plan derive from and support Agency-level strategies and objectives, including not only humanitarian assistance, but also USAID's strategies for preservation of the environment, building democracy, reducing world population and protecting human health, and encouraging broad-based economic growth.

In developing its strategic plan, BHR has considered not only the unique characteristics of each of its major programs but also the opportunities it has to integrate these programs with each other and with programs initiated by USAID Missions and other central bureaus. Constructing a plan that encourages programs to be mutually supportive requires careful analysis and judgement. BHR's Strategic Plan represents a major step in this direction. It will serve as the reference point for Office-level efforts to develop detailed action plans, prior to the end of FY 1995, and for coordinating the elements they manage and implementing activities which will help to ensure that the key objectives of this Plan will be achieved.

The contents of this Plan are structured along the lines of the format suggested in the *Agency Directive on Setting and Monitoring Program Strategies, May 1994*:

**Summary Analysis of the Assistance Environment** (Section I). This section identifies significant external trends and conditions affecting Bureau programs, identifies the Bureau's customers and partners, summarizes its constraints and opportunities, summarizes the accountability environment and highlights lessons learned.

**Proposed Strategy, Rationale and Key Assumptions** (Section II). This section provides an overview of the Bureau's strategic planning framework (i.e., the Objective Tree), and discusses each Strategic Objective and the Program Outcomes associated with that Strategic Objective. This section also describes the rationale for the selection of the objective or outcome, identifies key constraints and assumptions, and presents the performance indicators for the Strategic Objectives.

**Bureau Action Plan** (Section III). This section begins with a discussion of key Bureau-wide strategic actions that are central to the effective achievement of the Bureau's Strategic Objectives. Then for each of the Strategic Objectives and related Program Outcomes there is a brief description of the key programs of the different BHR offices that contribute to the objective, a summary of planned new initiatives, and a brief discussion of the resources the Bureau is planning to allocate. This is followed by the

Bureau's plan for completing development of a Program Performance Information System (PPIS) and monitoring and reporting on the progress of the strategy.

**Annexes.** These include an Annex 1 on Program Outcome Indicators, with a more detailed presentation and discussion of the Bureau's proposed performance indicators, Annex 2 which shows resource allocations by office, program and Strategic Objective, and Annex 3 which summarizes the policy guidelines and principles that served as a guiding framework for this Plan.

## **B. The Strategic Planning Process in BHR**

In May, 1994, when USAID issued its *Agency Directive on Setting and Monitoring Program Strategies* to establish a uniform and comprehensive planning process for USAID operating units, it specifically exempted a number of the programs administered by BHR from these requirements, i.e., emergency disaster assistance, emergency food aid and activities undertaken by the Office of Transition Initiatives. These exceptions were made primarily for the following reason:

- *USAID recognizes the inherently unpredictable nature of many of the BHR programs.* Many of the Bureau's humanitarian response efforts are initiated in response to crisis events that are difficult and sometimes impossible to anticipate. The exemption provided for these programs acknowledged that they do not readily lend themselves to the rigor and structure of a strategic planning exercise or the easy establishment of baseline measures and performance indicators.

Nevertheless, BHR senior management decided to initiate a strategic planning process covering the full range of its programs on an experimental basis, with the understanding that the planning methodology and analytical expectations might have to be modified, particularly on the relief side of the spectrum, to reflect the uncertain and volatile context in which the Bureau functions. In making this decision, the Bureau weighed the cost of this undertaking against its potential benefits and determined that a comprehensive, albeit experimental, strategic planning effort was warranted. Several perceptions favored this decision, including a sense among BHR Senior managers that:

- A strategic planning *process* could clarify and deepen an understanding of the Bureau's basic goals and objectives and enhance organizational capacity to work collaboratively.
- There may be valuable, unanticipated benefits from the application of strategic planning to the management of emergency assistance programs *provided* the methodology is approached in a flexible and adaptive manner, adjusted to the unique characteristics of these programs and to the special needs of the managers responsible for their oversight.
- There are important complementarities across BHR program and Office lines that are not currently being taken advantage of. Senior Bureau management believed

that a focused planning effort could identify these linkages and lead to improved program integration.

- There are important internal linkages within the Agency and external relations with a broader community of institutions that warrant clarification in order to improve overall impact and effectiveness.
- A final factor influencing the decision to undertake a comprehensive strategic planning process was the Bureau's need to develop strategic plans for its non-emergency programs that are compatible with, and therefore covered by, the Agency's strategic planning requirements and methods.

BHR was the first central Bureau to apply and adapt the strategic planning principles and the PRISM methodology that are now being used throughout USAID. This process was initiated in January, 1994, with a workshop that introduced planning principles and the PRISM methodology. Following this workshop, Offices undertook initial efforts to apply these principles and methods. Parallel steps at the Bureau-level were initiated a few months later. Generally speaking, the Bureau has used a two-track approach, working on the development of objectives and indicators at both the Bureau and Office-levels in a complementary, iterative manner.

At the Bureau-level, a "Managing for Results" Working Group, comprised in part of Directors from the Offices, was established to oversee the planning process. Assistance was provided to individual offices as they developed their Office-level Objective Trees. Subsequently, a Bureau-level Objective Tree was developed based on the commonalities and linkages across Office-level Objective Trees. This Bureau-level Objective Tree was refined through a process of facilitated discussions involving inter-office teams. The clarity and level of precision regarding strategic purposes and relationships in this Objective Tree were increased gradually. The result reflects core Bureau principles as well as the ideas presented in a series of USAID policy guidelines. These sources and principles are outlined in Annex 3.

Performance indicators for the Bureau's Strategic Objectives and Program Outcomes were also developed as part of this process. While significant progress has been made in this area, it is possible, given the experimental nature of the BHR strategic planning effort described above, that modest adjustments in the content of the Bureau Plan may need to be made as Office-level Strategic Plans are developed and as further refinements are made in indicators and plans for collecting baseline measures.

BHR envisions that the office level strategies will more closely conform to some of the latest Agency guidance on strategic planning for "operating units". The Bureau strategy piece is viewed as the framework for operating unit plans which will more precisely link SOs and office budgeting plans than this strategy and action plan do at the Bureau level. Office level SOs will also be more narrowly defined than those found in this strategy, which need to capture the work of multiple offices.

Despite closer conformance to the guidance, we still anticipate that there will be certain "weak links" between operating unit strategies and Agency guidance since the guidance has been created

primarily for sustainable development purposes. For example, the notion of using the plan for performance based budgeting may not be appropriate for many emergency activities. The extent to which the office strategies can follow Agency guidance will only be fully revealed during the office level strategic planning process.

In addition to developing and refining performance indicators at the Bureau and office levels, the Bureau is developing and will install a Program Performance Information System (*PPIS*) as an important and integral part of the strategic planning process. This system will enable the Bureau to collect, organize and assess indicators of program performance, and provide that information to managers in an efficient and timely manner. The design and basic framework for this system will be completed by September 1995. (*See Section III for a more detailed description of the development and utilization of the Bureau's PPIS.*)

The process BHR used to prepare its Strategic Plan was highly interactive. It encouraged staff participation and ownership of the final product and helped to ensure an appropriate balance between Bureau and Office-level perspectives. External stakeholders were consulted during this process and their inputs have been incorporated into the BHR Strategic Plan. Such consultations included early sessions with the PVO community on objectives and indicators as well as consultations with USAID Mission staff and PVO partners involved in food aid.

### **C. Distinctive Features of BHR Programs Affecting Strategy Development**

BHR's size, diversity and unique program characteristics pose unusual challenges for strategic planning. Of particular importance is the fact that many of the Bureau's humanitarian response efforts are initiated in response to crises that are difficult and sometimes impossible to anticipate. The planning process BHR followed to develop its Strategic Plan made every effort to reflect the unique characteristics of the BHR Bureau. Briefly stated, these include:

- *The breadth and diversity of BHR's portfolio*, which cuts across several Agency-wide objectives as a function of its programs for disaster relief, food aid, and development assistance to private voluntary agencies in such fields as enterprise development, child survival and democratic initiatives.
- *A lack of predictability and a high degree of volatility* with respect to the demands that will be placed on the Bureau in any give year. The need for relief assistance and emergency food aid to victims of natural disasters often arises with little or no warning. Complex emergencies, which emerge more slowly, and can last for years, are no less difficult to address. Volatile political situations add an extremely problematic dimension to BHR's work.
- *Close linkages to international trends and political developments*, e.g., the transitional societies that have emerged in the wake of the Cold War's demise and complex new emergencies stemming from decline of political order in other parts of the world. In recent years, Bureau programs have been on the "cutting edge" of several other important trends including the growing recognition of the contribution that PVOs and NGOs can make to development:

- The fact that, while BHR's operational units have lead Agency responsibility for areas such as disaster relief and Title II food aid, its programs also *support Mission strategies and objectives*, wherever Missions exist, while maintaining the capacity to reach people directly when the need arises. This is particularly evident for OFDA's disaster prevention, mitigation and preparedness programs tied to Mission development programs, PVC's support for U.S. PVOs working with USAID Missions and local NGOs, and Title II development programs where plans and priorities need to be synchronized with the Missions. \*(Note: The idea of strategic support objectives (SSOs), which recognize that the achievement of the objective is accomplished and measured at least in part through field missions, is evolving in the Agency. BHR views itself as having the lead responsibility for the SOs in this strategy and therefore has presented them as SOs rather than SSOs. It will, however, continue to consider how/whether the SSO concept should be incorporated into its strategy over time.)
- *A high degree of dependence on the institutional capacity of intermediaries and cooperating partners* through whom much of the BHR program is implemented. Because so many of the Bureau's programs are implemented through partners, BHR has a very high concern with regard to the organizational competence of these entities and accords appropriate attention to mechanisms that will improve performance.
- *A growing tendency for humanitarian initiatives to depend upon the combined resources of multiple donors.* Humanitarian initiatives are increasingly multilateral and involve exclusive negotiation, coordination and diplomatic consultation designed to ensure equitable burden sharing.
- *The need, often under the pressure of time, for a high level of coordination, collaboration and cooperation with other entities* within the U.S. Government, and other donors, and the private sector, as well as USAID Missions. This places a significant premium on the establishment of coordinating structures and the ability to enunciate clear policy guidance that reflects the input of stakeholders while demanding clear lines of authority and responsibility.
- *Severe and continuing resource constraints on both financial and human resource levels within USAID*, and the foreign operations side of the U.S. Government more broadly. These constraints, which are likely to continue, underscore the need for a more efficient deployment of both humanitarian and development resources.

Taken together, these characteristics imply a need for the Bureau to incorporate both forward thinking and flexibility in its *modus operandi* and in its Strategic Plan.



## SECTION ONE: SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF THE ASSISTANCE ENVIRONMENT

This section discusses the external realities and changing global conditions that have an influence of BHR's strategy and programs. It also defines BHR's customers and the partners with which it works to reach those customers. Opportunities and constraints facing the Bureau, its accountability environment and lessons learned from the past are also examined.

### A. External Realities and Changing Global Conditions

U.S. bilateral assistance programs that span the "relief to development" continuum operate in a world that many acknowledge as becoming increasingly complex. This section examines the changes that are occurring at both ends of that spectrum and the implications such changes have for BHR programs.

#### 1. The Changing Context For Relief Programs

Traditionally, relief programs tended to focus their attention on the consequences of natural disasters. More recently, however, increasing political and military strife have created the need for a new term in disaster relief work, i.e., "complex emergencies." These multifaceted crises can inflict as much if not more damage as any natural disaster. In addition, across the developing world there remain severe pockets of malnutrition, hunger and hunger-related deaths, particularly in Africa and, to a lesser extent, in South Asia, despite dramatic progress in the availability of food.

Although a comprehensive analysis of these developments is beyond the scope of this document, there are several important trends and conditions which have a direct bearing on the strategic directions outlined in this document. These include:

- The failure of traditional bilateral and multilateral solutions to adequately anticipate or prevent the *growing severity and frequency of complex civil emergencies*. These emergencies, which involve a combination of factors including political and often military strife, the breakdown of governance structures, sudden and large migration of refugees, massive deterioration of basic economic and social infrastructures, deterioration of health conditions and the emergence of famine, have required significant increases in U.S. Government intervention and related responses, including the creation of new USAID initiatives to meet the exigencies of transitional societies.
- The growing phenomenon of *countries in transition* which are emerging from crisis and seeking to reestablish progress toward sustainable development. The need for rapid deployment of resources to help to reestablish stability in these transitional situations has become an important foreign policy planning priority as has the early warning of potentially destabilizing events.

- A massive *increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people* is placing an immense financial and administrative burden on the international community. In 1994, there were an estimated 25 to 30 million internally displaced people and 17 million refugees worldwide. Most experts agree that these figures will increase rapidly in coming years as the number of complex emergencies increases. Providing assistance to these groups is often complicated by political factors.
- There is a growing *reliance on the institutional capacity of cooperating international* institutions including the international organizations that comprise the UN system such as the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Red Cross as well as private voluntary organizations that directly provide relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction services. The sharp increase in the number and duration of complex emergencies has placed a severe strain on the capacity of multilateral organizations and non-governmental institutions operating in the international arena.
- Despite the increased institutional *maturity and technical sophistication of American PVOs* and their growing capacity to deliver development services and to work collaboratively with a number of indigenous development institutions, they require significant support to meet the demands created by the need to strengthen those NGOs.
- In a related vein, the *significant growth in the number of indigenous non-governmental organizations*, and the increasing ability of these organizations, plays a central role in the development of the countries in which they are located. There is widespread evidence that societies in which nongovernmental entities are encouraged to pursue democratic and humanitarian ideals are far less prone to seek resolution of political and social issues through conflict, and
- Finally, *economic realities within the donor community* pose challenges to maintaining the unprecedented resource levels for long-term, large-scale emergency relief efforts which have been required over the past several years.

## **2. The Changing Context for Meeting Food Security Needs and Working with PVOs and NGOs**

Two aspects of the changing development context which have particular importance for BHR are (a) the increasing complexity of the food insecurity problems that face developing countries and (b) the increased importance of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and other indigenous non-governmental entities as conduits for, and effective providers of, development assistance across a broad range of subsectors, ranging from health care to small business to democratic initiatives.

Food insecurity problems throughout the developing world are a case in point. The ability of the world to feed itself has improved dramatically over the last three decades. On a global basis,

there is enough food to provide adequate calorie and protein levels for today's population. However, this apparent adequacy is misleading. Poverty and poor food distribution systems leave a significant proportion of the world's population hungry and malnourished. Improvements in local agricultural production, marketing and distribution as well as food aid have a role to play in resolving problems of food insecurity. Yet even as its importance grows, it is becoming increasingly apparent that food aid is not a free resource and that there are budgetary trade-offs between food aid and development assistance resources. The U.S. no longer generates the large agricultural surpluses which made it easy to ensure that food could be used in all of the situations where it might help to resolve problems. Pressure on the availability of food aid resources poses allocation and programming challenges for USAID and its partners.

Changes in the relative importance of government to government programs supported directly by bi-lateral and multilateral donor programs, and the emergence of local as well as international private voluntary organizations as a primary conduit to non-governmental, "grass roots" initiatives and the small scale business sector, pose other challenges for USAID. Working through intermediaries who have their own vision of development and their own approaches for implementing programs is requiring USAID to modify its expectations with respect to specific results and timetables. At the same time, the rapid expansion of the voluntary sector and grass roots organizations is expanding USAID's programmatic reach. Working partnerships with PVOs as well as with other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are helping the Agency to reach directly to population segments that it might not otherwise be able to assist.

## **B. BHR's Customers and Partners**

This section briefly discusses the customers who are served by the programs BHR administers and the partners with whom BHR works in the course of implementing its programs.

### **1. Customers**

From the Bureau's perspective, our customers for humanitarian assistance are disaster victims, especially women and children who suffer most when natural disasters and complex emergencies occur. In times of crisis, BHR reaches people directly with emergency assistance. In such circumstances, the relationship between BHR and its customers is both direct and critically important. Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) fielded by OFDA survey people's needs for assistance and deliver needed medical supplies, food and water.

In addition to emergency relief, BHR's programs for transitions and grassroots development assistance also reach people in need directly. Food aid reaches families that lack an adequate food supply or the means to provide for their basic dietary needs. Malnourished mothers and children benefit directly from food aid programs. Local voluntary organizations and other "grass roots" organizations that are integral to the relief and development process are also important customers for BHR and its partners, as are the members of the local communities served by PVO/NGO development programs.

## 2. Partners

The range of partners with which BHR works as it delivers assistance along the relief to development continuum is extensive. In brief, BHR's partners include:

- **Other bureaus within USAID as well as USAID Missions.** On dealing with disasters, as well as in efforts to strengthen and expand the capacity of voluntary agencies to work on a wide variety of development problems, BHR works closely with regional bureaus and USAID Missions. Across the full range of BHR's programs, it is essential that centrally funded interventions are complementary to and support Mission programs. At the policy level, BHR considers both PPC and the Global bureau to be important partners. Working together, these three bureaus can do much to ensure that USAID's responses to emergency needs as well as longer-term development problems are appropriate from a legislative as well as policy perspective.
- **Host Governments.** When disaster strikes, BHR must have close working relations with host government personnel, which are normally already developed by OFDA's Regional Advisors. Effective partnerships help speed and direct the flow of assistance. BHR works to build the foundation for such partnerships through its disaster preparedness efforts and through food aid and voluntary organization programs it undertakes in collaboration with USAID Missions.
- **Private Voluntary Organizations.** Whether local, U.S., or European-based, these organizations are particularly important partners in virtually all of BHR's programs. PVOs are actively involved in the delivery of emergency and development assistance. They help to ensure that food aid programs have positive developmental outcomes. Their work also draws BHR into the mainstream of development initiatives dealing with primary health care, environmental protection, small business development, the expansion of opportunities for women to participate in and benefit from development progress, and democratic initiatives.
- **Other U.S. Government Agencies.** On the relief side, BHR's relations with the State Department are critical. In most situations, the focal point for a coordinated U.S. assistance effort is our Ambassador to the country in crisis. In addition to the State Department, the Department of Defense (DOD) often plays a critical role in disaster assistance. Transporting supplies is a traditional DOD role. With the emergence of complex emergencies stemming from political chaos, its role has expanded. On the development side as well as the relief side, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) is an important partner. Food aid flows through the collaborative efforts of USDA and BHR.
- **Other Donor Organizations.** United Nations operational agencies and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Organization for Migration offer vast and significant resources for humanitarian responses. OFDA and Food for Peace often work

through UNHCR, WFP, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), ICRC and UNICEF to meet outstanding food and non-food requirements of humanitarian interventions. In the emerging world in which long term, seemingly intractable civil conflict situations jeopardize entire societies, the role of the UN Security Council, the UN's Peacekeeping Operation and the IFRC are becoming necessary emergency adjuncts to DHA.

## **C. Opportunities and Constraints**

This section highlights some of the opportunities and constraints that arise out of the dynamic global and Agency context in which BHR operates.

### **1. Opportunities for BHR**

Four aspects of the context in which USAID is currently operating can be viewed as opportunities. While they derive from and relate to serious problems, approaches that are both appropriate and effective can make a difference.

*The first opportunity that BHR perceives arises from the recognition within USAID, and in Congress, that we have not been dealing as effectively as we need to with countries that are in a transitional situation.* This is true regardless of whether the transition a country is making is a post-disaster transition to normalcy and further development or a societal transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Countries in either type of situation can benefit from appropriate assistance as they undergo these transformations. Because of this recognition, BHR was charged with establishing a new Office of Transition Initiatives to develop new approaches for these situations.

*A second, and related opportunity lies in the expansion and strengthening of the voluntary sector, both U.S. PVOs and NGOs in the countries in which USAID works.* This expansion is opening new opportunities for BHR and other USAID bureaus to reach important population subgroups and assist them with an extraordinarily wide range of endeavors. For USAID, the opportunity created by this situation depends on how these new resources are used. While not neglecting its long term commitment to U.S. PVOs or the partnerships these PVOs have developed with European and local NGOs, BHR, under the Agency's New Partnerships Initiative, expects to work more closely with local NGOs. Through these arrangements, BHR hopes to be able to help countries to make important strides toward the development of a strong enabling environment in which sustainable development can occur.

*The third opportunity BHR sees derives from a growing recognition of the critical importance of disaster preparedness and early warning systems.* Given what has already been learned from the development of early warning systems for spotting natural disasters and lessening their negative impact, there is great potential for expanding these concepts and skills. There is more to be done with respect to bringing all nations to a high level of preparedness in terms of natural disasters. There is also a great deal to be learned about how prevention can be applied to alleviate the effects of complex political emergencies. In an exploratory fashion, the term "preventive diplomacy" is already being used. The challenge for USAID and its partners lies in

making that concept operational and transferable from situation to situation, just as has been done for natural disaster prevention and preparedness.

*The final opportunity that BHR perceives stems from the Agency's realization that if we are going to be effective in our efforts to span the relief to development continuum, we have to do a better job of integrating our development and humanitarian assistance resources.* In some cases, countries require both relief and development resources simultaneously, demonstrating the non-linear nature of the continuum and highlighting one of the many reasons why more relief/development integrated planning is needed. The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) is one of the most tangible examples of this new awareness. New initiatives such as GHAI provide opportunities for BHR to work with other USAID Bureaus and its many other partners to find new and better ways to couple humanitarian assistance efforts with development programs.

## **2. Constraints**

BHR's ability to operate effectively and take advantage of opportunities is constrained by several factors. These include:

- BHR is increasingly dealing with complex emergencies that have important political dimensions and which require extensive coordination, with more and different types of actors, than do natural disasters. More problematic, however, is that fact that no agreement exists about signals or criteria to use to decide when the job has been completed, i.e., when we can say that a complex emergency has been brought to a satisfactory end.
- The single largest portion of the resources BHR administers is food aid. While this resource has its strengths, it is an imperfect resource. It is easy to lose; perishable, and not perfectly fungible. The food aid component of BHR's resource base creates an appearance of flexibility when, in practical terms, this is not necessarily the case.
- BHR does most of its work through intermediaries. In many ways, this is the strength of the Bureau. However, it is also true that the diverse private and international organizations with which USAID deals, through roughly 800 different grant arrangements, all have their own purposes and agendas. These, in turn, must be coordinated with the agendas of USAID Missions and BHR itself. Management control, under these circumstances, is collegial rather than directive.
- With respect to complex emergencies, there has been such a rapid growth that BHR's voluntary agency partners have not been able to keep up in all areas. Even where they have the skills, they are being asked to apply them in more situations than they are accustomed to addressing simultaneously. BHR is working with its intermediaries on strategies for stretching their capacity to meet important new needs, but gaps remain.

- BHR administers almost \$1.5 billion annually, or roughly 1/4 of USAID's total resources. It is doing so at a ratio of staff per dollar that is much lower than the ratios found in USAID Missions and other parts of the Agency. For example, some BHR staff are individually responsible for the management of more than \$50 million in programs, whereas a USAID Mission may have 20 more U.S direct hire (USDH) staff to manage a similar level of resources. This resource imbalance places a strain on BHR operations.

## **D. The Accountability Environment**

BHR's accountability environment is challenging given the nature of its mandate. Although the Bureau is properly attentive to accountability requirements for all of its programs, there are two areas of special concern for the Bureau: 1) food aid issues; and 2) disaster assistance activities.

### **1. Food Aid Issues:**

FFP delivers its Title II assistance through PVOs, recipient government agencies, UN agencies and international organizations (IOs). In FY 94 the FFP Office obligated over \$1.2 billion in commodity and cash assistance. In absolute dollar terms FFP's activities merit management's special attention. Add to this dollar figure the local currency generations and the complications of delivering food aid assistance to remote regions of the world and it is clear that food aid represents an area of special concern for the Bureau and the Agency.

In its July 1993, report the GAO identified a number of weaknesses involving USAID's management of Title II and III food aid programs. These weaknesses included USAID's lack of criteria and guidance for implementing food aid programs, USAID's inability to demonstrate the impact of food aid on food security, and USAID's failure to ensure accountability for food aid resources.

According to GAO, one of the major impediments to greater USAID accountability for its food aid programs was the absence of a clear policy as to how Title II and III assistance is to be used to enhance food security. In February 1995, USAID addressed this concern by issuing a food aid and food security policy. This policy, among other things, clarifies and provides guidance on: 1) allocating food aid to countries most in need; 2) enhancing agricultural productivity and improving household nutrition; 3) integrating food aid to a greater extent with other USAID resources; and 4) strengthening USAID's cooperating partners, such as PVOs and the World Food Program (WFP). The issuance of the food aid and food security policy has paved the way for tighter accountability standards for mission monitoring of food aid programs.

Current Agency guidance makes it clear that Mission Directors are accountable for ensuring that food programs are adequately monitored. USAID plans to place increased emphasis on the importance of this responsibility.

Another area of vulnerability is the World Food Program (WFP) which receives over \$600 million annually from a wide variety of organizations in the U.S. Government. USAID is the largest donor and the lead agency for WFP. In its January 1994 report, GAO concluded that tons

of U.S. commodities donated to WFP were stolen or mishandled, and that inadequate accountability over the donations by WFP contributed to these losses. The Bureau has been working in close coordination with WFP, other donors, and USAID/FM to improve WFP's accountability systems for food aid. WFP has proposed an \$18 million dollar financial and administrative management improvement project which when implemented will address all of the GAO findings.

## **2. Disaster/Emergency Assistance Activities:**

In FY94 the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) obligated over \$200 million in International Disaster Assistance funding. Since Food Aid is often an integral part of its operations, OFDA in conjunction with FFP carries the management burden of the Agency's disaster assistance activities. Not unlike FFP, OFDA's operations are worldwide and are not specific to any particular region or mission.

Given the absolute dollar value of disaster assistance and the exposure resulting from its worldwide operations, disaster assistance also represents an area of special concern for the Agency. Therefore, BHR has recommended that as part of its FY96 performance audit plan and its 5-year performance audit strategy the IG formally establish a Disaster Assistance Specialist (DAS) position within IG/A/PSA. The DAS in conjunction with OFDA would identify disaster assistance performance issues whether worldwide, regional or specific to USAID/W.

## **E. Lessons Learned**

Over the years, USAID has learned a great deal about the provision of disaster relief and food aid, and how to work in partnership with a substantial number of U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) as well as with non-governmental organizations that operate in the countries USAID assists. Key lessons learned from the Bureau's experience are highlighted below:

- It is important to recognize that there is a balance that needs to be achieved between the provision of short-term humanitarian assistance and longer-term investment in sustainable development. The Agency needs to develop its programmatic processes to the point where it can more accurately assess these trade-offs.

With specific reference to humanitarian assistance:

- It is important for USAID to *manage the delivery of humanitarian assistance in ways that do not undermine prospects for long term development*. Food aid in particular must be managed in a way that does not inhibit local agricultural production, and create dependency rather than progress.
- *Positioning of appropriately skilled and equipped staff* at the sites of complex emergencies and natural disasters is essential for effective relief intervention.



- *Early detection of and intervention in incipient disasters* not only saves many lives but also reduces the need for scarce -- and more costly -- relief resources. *Prevention, mitigation and preparedness (PMP)* can make the difference between dissolution of the fabric of an affected community and the effective reconstitution of the development process and continued progress toward democratically achieved goals. Development planning without regard to natural or man-made hazards poses unnecessary potential for disaster vulnerability and resultant developmental failure.
- Effective *strategic and logistical planning* by both emergency and development practitioners is requisite to the achievement of humanitarian assistance objectives. *Resources* for fulfilling the objectives *must be commensurate with the attainment of long-term reconstruction and development goals*. Only by collaborative planning and resource allocation throughout the continuum from relief to development (with relief and development-type activities often needed simultaneously) can effective use of both emergency and development assistance be assured. *Consistent evaluation* of the progress of interventions is required to ensure the desired outcomes.
- Coordination and concomitant *access to information* are critical to the effective implementation of emergency response programs. The U.S. Government's policy of sharing communications and information technology has been effective in enhancing the reporting capacities of international organizations and others, although much greater emphasis is necessary to achieve widespread, sustained benefits. BHR's utilization of state-of-the-art technology in field and headquarters applications has vastly increased the efficiency of relief operations.
- *Participation by the affected community* in both planning and implementation of recovery activities is important to success and sustainability.
- To insure the positive and sustainable outcome of complex conflict situations in which security is an issue it is *necessary to closely coordinate the goals of peacekeeping activities with those of the relief interventions*. This in turn requires collaborative planning on the parts of USG agencies, international organizations and other donors.
- Success in most relief and transition activities is dependent on the *effective response capacity of the USAIDs and embassies*, which in turn is dependent on adequate anticipation of events and operational preparedness in the field.

On the development side, BHR has also learned a number of important lessons. With respect to its efforts to strengthen PVOs and NGOs that are working on long term development problems, BHR has learned that:

- *Investments in capacity-building* to improve PVO and NGO planning and management systems, as well as technical capability, enhances replicability and

the “scaling up” of successful sustainable development programs initiated at a “grass roots” level.

- *The support of sectoral and other PVO and NGO networks* fosters heightened capacity in a cost-effective manner.
- *Strengthened cooperatives and credit unions* can contribute to technology transfer, capital formation, infrastructure development, financing and marketing.

Lessons learned concerning food aid have been accumulated over a number of years. While familiar to those who work directly with this program, BHR hopes to make these lessons more widely known. Among the important understandings developed in this area are the fact that:

- *Food aid can enhance the effectiveness of other development programs* such as nutrition education, family planning, child survival and community development. This can be accomplished through direct feeding programs as well as through programs that “monetize” food aid to generate local currency.
- In most cases, *food aid requires complementary investments* to achieve maximum impact, and USAID Missions and PVOs need to ensure that those resources will be available as food aid is delivered.

ASHA’s experience with medical and educational institutions abroad has also generated useful lessons:

- *Investments in education*, in affiliation with U.S. institutions, pays off not only through improvements in a country’s academic, technical and professional skill base but also in terms of a country’s future leadership.
- *Strategic planning* is a tool that is just as valuable to BHR’s partner institutions as it is for BHR itself. Investments in strategic planning in the organizations with which BHR works pays off.

## SECTION TWO: PROPOSED STRATEGY, RATIONALE AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS

### A. Overall Bureau Framework

The Bureau's strategic framework of objectives is presented in Figure 1. This figure includes an overall Mission Statement for the Bureau as well as its Objective Tree.

#### 1. Bureau Mission Statement

BHR's Mission Statement serves as the foundation for the extraordinary range of activities in which the Bureau engages. While each Office in BHR has a unique role to play, they also share a common focus. The BHR Mission Statement expresses that common focus.

Mission Statement: *The Mission of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response is to Protect Vulnerable Groups and Accelerate the Transition from Relief into Development.*

Responding to disasters, emergencies, civil collapse, and persistent underdevelopment and poverty, BHR's approach deals with short-term humanitarian concerns, medium-term issues of stability and transition and formulates longer-term investments in sustainable development that will protect the most vulnerable groups in society over time. BHR's policy is designed to address particularly critical problems along the relief to development continuum, and in so doing, to help nations move progressively away from crisis and toward sustainable development. This applies:

- In the case of a natural disaster that damages the human and physical infrastructure of a society;
- With respect to protracted complex emergencies that erode the fabric of governance and destroy the systems and institutions of economic and social order. In the case of fragile transitional societies emerging from sustained periods of crisis;
- In efforts to deal with poor agricultural productivity and low nutritional levels in order to alleviate hunger, or
- When strengthening a nascent private non-governmental organization (NGO) sector to deliver emergency and development services and as an integral component of a well functioning civil society.



## 2. Bureau Goals

BHR has established two distinct goals to which the work carried out by various Offices within the Bureau contributes. These two goals are:

- Bureau Goals:
- *Lives and Property Saved and Suffering Reduced, and*
  - *Increased Food Security and Participation by Vulnerable Populations in Sustainable Development.*

BHR's two goals realistically mirror the diversity of the Bureau's operations while at the same time supporting the integrity and distinctiveness of the Bureau's principal program categories.

- *Saving lives and reducing suffering and loss of property* is central to the Agency's humanitarian assistance goal for which BHR assumes leadership responsibility. This goal in turn is integral to the process of promoting sustainable development. Humanitarian emergencies are proliferating around the world. They have become more complex, more frequent and widespread, longer lasting and more dangerous. They are diverting countries from a development path and eroding years of effort and investment. The provision of humanitarian assistance stabilizes nations that have experienced famine or disaster or the breakdown of governance and civil order and it can serve as a critical measure to help societies recover to the point where they can again address the larger issues of development.
- *Increasing food security and participation by vulnerable populations in sustainable development* has been adopted as a Bureau goal because of the legislative mandate that food aid programs should contribute to food security. The Bureau has adopted participation by vulnerable populations in sustainable development as a second dimension of its goal because of our special ability to reach these populations through our PVO and NGO partners. This goal is directly related to progress in the Agency's other four areas of concentration: the environment; economic growth; population and health; and democracy.

In setting these two goals, BHR acknowledges both its own role, in addressing needs for relief assistance as well as long term development problems, and its collaboration with USAID Missions. As a central bureau, BHR has leadership responsibilities and programs resources through its offices in each of the substantive areas in which it engages. As a partner, BHR participates in Mission-initiated programs that envision, in site specific ways the exact role that food aid, emergency assistance, or voluntary organizations can play in the long term development of a country, as well as during short term emergencies.

### 3. Relationship to Agency Goals

In 1994, USAID outlined five Goals for the Agency in *Strategies for Sustainable Development*, a document that serves as the USAID's "Mission Statement." Its focus is on:

- o Protecting the environment;*
- o Building democracy,*
- o Stabilizing world population growth and protecting human health,*
- o Encouraging broad-based economic growth, and*
- o Providing humanitarian assistance and aiding post-crisis transitions.*

Because of the scope of BHR's work, the Bureau's Goals relate to all five of these Agency-wide Goals.

As the Agency's lead bureau for humanitarian assistance, BHR's Goal of *lives and property saved and suffering reduced* is virtually synonymous with the Agency's humanitarian assistance Goal.

Through its second Goal, linked to food security and sustainable development, the Bureau is also making important contributions to each of the other four development assistance objectives that make up the Agency's Strategy for Sustainable Development. In this regard, aspects of the Bureau program that address food insecurity, help to strengthen the capacity of PVOs and NGOs, and support schools and other institutions abroad are particularly important:

- Food security is critical to the achievement of USAID's five Goals: Hunger and food insecurity contribute to political instability; exacerbate environmental degradation; create migration pressures and displaced populations; jeopardize child survival and maternal health; and impede sustainable development. Steps taken to address food insecurity thus contribute to the achievement of the Agency's Goals.
- PVOs and NGOs have long been involved in efforts to address both the humanitarian assistance and long-term development problems with which BHR is concerned. Efforts to strengthen their capacity contribute to the achievement of all five of USAID's goals. BHR directly supports PVO programs in Agency priority areas, such as child survival, microenterprise development, population and health and the environment.
- Schools, libraries and hospitals overseas which prepare leaders, promote openness, exercise influence in promoting democratic practices have important effects on the

capacity of the host countries with which USAID works. This in turn helps host countries to pursue the kinds of goals USAID has set forth in its *Strategies for Sustainable Development*.

#### 4. Goal - Level Indicators

Establishing meaningful performance indicators at the Goal level is always difficult. In the case of humanitarian assistance, this is particularly challenging. In development programs, USAID often focuses on dimensions of people's lives, or economic situations, that are visibly deteriorating or improving. Humanitarian assistance programs, on the other hand, often describe success in terms of what did *not* occur, e.g. buildings that did not collapse. Valid indicators of such effects are extremely difficult to develop. In order to tackle this difficult task BHR has worked with CDIE to develop an initial set of four indicators.

<b><i>BHR GOALS:</i></b>	<b><i>INDICATOR:</i></b>
<i>Lives and property saved and suffering reduced</i>	<i>Deaths averted</i>
	<i>Percent at-risk population served in selected emergencies</i>
	<i>Property damage averted</i>
<i>Increased food security and participation by vulnerable populations in sustainable development</i>	<i>Ratio of the prices of food stuffs to basic wages</i>

On the emergency side of the Bureau's operations, BHR proposes to assess the Goal of **lives and property saved and suffering reduced** by measuring deaths and property damage averted and by the percent of at-risk populations served by emergency assistance. As noted above, deaths and property damage averted are measures of what did not occur, rather than measures of things that did occur. These two conceptually difficult measures have, however, been applied in a preliminary way by USAID and other organizations that provide humanitarian assistance. USAID's experience was acquired through a case study carried out by an independent contractor during the crisis in Somalia that attempted to quantify deaths and damage averted, and may lead to a more universal methodology for this purpose. BHR's work with these humanitarian assistance indicators will build upon this base of experience.

Measurement against the indicator "percent of at-risk population served in selected emergencies" is conceptually more straight-forward. Nevertheless, BHR anticipates that it too will be challenging to apply, in part because the nature of the at risk population changes depending on the type of emergency.

With respect to BHR's food security goal, BHR intends to use an economic indicator relating the prices for food stuffs to basic wages to assess change. This is a general

measure of food security. The main components of food security, which are really the focus of USAID's Food Security Policy, are agricultural productivity and household nutrition. The indicator makes the following hypothesis. As ag productivity increases, basic wages (incomes) increase and the prices of food stuffs decrease. As household nutrition improves employment of household members increases and basic wages also increase.

The following challenges exist with respect to measuring performance in terms of each of these indicators:

- *The collection of data on these indicators must be Agency-wide.* Some of these indicators are relevant for missions in countries suffering from disaster. This is particularly true for the Food Security indicator which should be measured by missions and regional bureaus as part of economic growth and nutrition.
- *The methodologies referred to above that were developed on the Somalia experience and which measure deaths and property damage averted need to be developed further.* Their practical value across the range of emergency situations BHR addresses must still be determined.

## **5. Five Strategic Objectives**

The Bureau has identified the five Strategic Objectives (SOs) which appear on the following page.

These five Strategic Objectives constitute the core of the Bureau's Strategic Plan. In each instance, the Bureau believes it can accomplish significant and measurable progress toward achievement of these objectives at current resource levels.

These Strategic Objectives are discussed individually and in some detail below. Their generic and common attributes include:

- They are directly related to the Bureau's *mission* of accelerating progress toward sustainable development and together deal with the principal structural, institutional and conditional impediments to development progress.
- They represent various aspects of the *relief to development continuum*: disaster relief, stabilizing societies in transition, strengthening institutional capacity, and addressing the root causes of food insecurity. In this important sense they are dynamic and horizontally interactive so that progress in one Strategic Objective has resonating consequences in others.
- They are articulated at the Bureau level because each Strategic Objective cuts across at least two offices within the Bureau and acts, with deliberate intent, as a unifying mechanism to encourage inter-Office collaboration.



- |         |   |
|---------|---|
| SO # 1: | <i>Critical Needs of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations Met</i>   |
| SO # 2: | <i>Minimize the Effects of Disasters and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies</i>   |
| SO # 3: | <i>Strengthened Capability of PVO and NGO Community and International Organizations to Deliver Development and Emergency Services</i>                             |
| SO # 4: | <i>Sustainable Improvements in Household Nutrition and Agricultural Productivity for Vulnerable Groups reached by USAID Food Aid Programs</i>                     |
| SO # 5: | <i>BHR More Effectively Influences Agency Integration of Food Security, Disaster Relief and PVO/NGO Collaboration in Strategic Planning for Country Programs.</i> |

- All five Strategic Objectives are individually and in varying degrees, related to progress toward achievement of both Bureau goals: Lives and Property Saved and Suffering Reduced and Increased Food Security and Participation by vulnerable Populations in Sustainable Development. These Strategic Objectives relate closely in some cases to Strategic Objectives adopted by the Missions. They have been adopted by BHR as objectives for the Bureau because these are areas in which the Bureau has a leadership role for the Agency and in some cases covers countries in which USAID does not have a Mission. While many parts of the Agency are engaged in these areas, BHR has the operational units with the primary responsibility and resources for these subject areas. The Bureau also provides technical support to field Missions in these areas. BHR will work to ensure that there is a mutually supportive relationship between these Bureau Objectives and Strategic Objectives at the Mission level whenever appropriate.

## **B. Description of Specific Strategic Objectives**

This section presents the rationale for each of BHR's Strategic Objectives and examines their relationship to Bureau and Agency goals. Subsections which treat each BHR Strategic Objective also present the Program Outcomes that must be achieved. In this section, performance indicators are presented at the Strategic Objective level as are the key constraints and assumptions that affect its achievement. *Annex 1 provides information on the way in which BHR will pursue performance measurement at the Program Outcome level.*

## 1. Strategic Objective #1

<b>SO # 1:</b> <i>Critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations met</i>
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### a. Rationale

As the Agency's lead bureau for humanitarian assistance, one of BHR's most important objectives is to try to ensure that the critical needs of people involved in natural disasters and complex emergencies are effectively met. BHR defines the term "critical needs" using five categories: (1) shelter, (2) food, including food assistance as well as agricultural inputs; (3) water and sanitation; (4) medical and nutritional needs, and (5) energy. The specific needs that must be met, however, vary from situation to situation.

Meeting the critical needs of population subgroups that are particularly vulnerable, or at risk, is far more difficult in complex emergency situations than in natural disasters since complex emergencies have political and military dimensions. Insecurity affects safe passage for relief personnel and commodities which, in turn, greatly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of assistance delivery as well as the ability to fully account for goods and services provided. This is a problem for USAID's DOD and UN partners as well. The vulnerable population, which is always situationally defined, is often displaced and not stationary which hinders the planning and delivery of humanitarian assistance. The size of the vulnerable population itself can change on a daily basis. The lack of viable social and economic structures results in a vacuum in which the coordination of humanitarian assistance is very difficult. Complex emergencies can last for years, placing a major burden on BHR's humanitarian assistance resources.

In addition to the emergency situations which arise from natural and complex disasters, the FAO has designated 44 countries to have critical food security problems. If this trend continues, the number of chronically under-nourished in sub-Saharan Africa alone will nearly double, rising from 180 to 300 million in the next 14 years and precipitating the need for emergency relief on a massive scale into the next millennium. Instances of food insecurity increase both the vulnerability and the instability of the populations affected by them.

The costs of providing humanitarian assistance are rising. In 1993 the global cost of emergency relief was in excess of \$6 billion with the United States contributing \$1.5 billion or roughly 4 times the base levels of the 1980s. With costs rising, and the length of many emergencies increasing, it is important for BHR to target its assistance and to meet the critical needs of the population subgroups who are most "at risk" as efficiently as possible. It is also increasingly important for BHR to work more effectively with its partners to address humanitarian assistance needs.

It should be noted that other Bureaus engage in humanitarian assistance-related activities. While most regional Bureaus rely on BHR for leadership, funding and management oversight for the majority of relief activities, they do expend resources on activities that address recovery and rehabilitation needs. (Indeed, the lines between relief, rehabilitation and recovery are often blurred and funding source does not always dictate the nature of the activity undertaken.) In a unique arrangement, the Europe/NIS (ENI) Bureau has entered into an MOU with BHR that transfers all responsibilities for responding to complex emergencies in the NIS to that Bureau. BHR only handles natural disasters in the NIS region. There is lively discussion within the Agency about how long term, multi-year complex emergencies should be handled and some have asked if there is any "value added" to regional Bureau management of long term relief programs. The two "models" (ENI vs. other Bureau approaches) discussed above provide a starting point for that debate.

This SO does not address the humanitarian assistance or recovery strategies of the other Bureaus (and in the case of ENI, the relief to restructuring concept which differs from the relief to development continuum concept outlined in this paper.) However, all of these programs work in a complementary way to achieve the Agency's overall humanitarian assistance goals. Unified planning at an early stage in a complex emergency is important to decide on resource allocation from various Agency sources.

#### **b. Linkage to Agency Goals**

Humanitarian relief is integral to sustainable development. By meeting the critical needs of vulnerable groups when a disaster strikes, BHR, through the Offices of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace, can ameliorate the human and economic loss, accelerate the return to normalcy and increase the chances for sustainable long term development. Appropriate emergency relief, coupled where possible with development assistance programs, can help not only to save lives and alleviate suffering but also to initiate the process of rehabilitation and speed the return to continued development.

Meeting critical emergency needs is a precondition to effective progress in the Agency's priority areas

- *Environment:* At risk and migratory populations can have a devastating environmental impact that can damage the resource base and aggravate the carrying capacity of the land. And often the need for relief assistance is in part a by-product of poverty related degradation of natural resources such as desertification and deforestation.
- *Democracy:* Basic institutions of civil governance cannot function effectively during disaster and crisis and support for democratic institutions is difficult if not impossible to develop during periods of civil instability and transition.

- *Health and Population:* Natural disasters and complex emergencies have an obvious direct impact on health conditions and on the health and medical infrastructure of the society.
- *Economic Growth:* Provision of minimal food, shelter and medical needs is essential if those groups affected by disaster are to begin to reenter the mainstream of economic life.

**c. Program Outcomes**

The Bureau has identified two Program Outcomes that are necessary to the achievement of this Strategic Objective. These are:

**(1) Timely, Effective and Targeted Emergency Relief.**

OFDA and Food for Peace each provide emergency relief in response to quick onset natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. Quick response has been the hallmark of BHR's emergency assistance and streamlining provision of services continues to be a priority. Effective assistance is particularly dependent on having a field presence which can correctly identify the needs and orchestrate the response under very difficult circumstances. The third element of BHR's relief operations is tailoring responses to the magnitude of the need: economic, social, and political.

Complex emergencies pose special problems in this regard. These situations also call for timely, effective and targeted responses but with some differences from the natural disasters. They require a field presence of experienced personnel with a sophisticated understanding of underlying social, political and economic conditions. They require an even closer than normal degree of coordination with on-going or planned development assistance efforts, including the establishment of effective donor coordinating mechanisms that function at the senior policy level. Support of the international community and a willingness to intervene is also essential in complex emergency situations.

In most disaster and emergency response situations, USAID is one of several entities attempting to save lives and return conditions to normalcy. While USAID, through OFDA and FFP, has a clear lead role, effectiveness is highly dependent on smooth coordination:

- Within USAID and between BHR/OFDA and the Missions and Regional Bureaus.
- Between USAID, State, Defense (particularly in the case of complex emergencies where civil strife may require a military intervention), Agriculture (with respect to food provided under Title II) and other USG agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control (CD), U.S. Public Health,

U.S. Forest Services, U.S. Geological Survey and NASA with regard to technical expertise.

- With international organizations including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, UNHCR, the World Food Program and other UN agencies.
- With the private voluntary agencies that manage programs and directly provide assistance to vulnerable groups.

Because coordination is critically important, BHR/OFDA has established the following guidelines:

- *Ultimate responsibility for protection against natural and man made disasters lies within the society itself. Coordination with local government, or with a local coordinating body in the absence of a recognized local government, is essential to an effective intervention and a quick return to development.*
- *USAID recognizes the skills of PVOs, encourages them to assume greater responsibility and supports such efforts through grants for strengthening and operational support.*
- *It is U.S. Government policy to encourage other donors, including the UN system, to contribute their fair share of the relief burden.*

## **(2) Appropriate and Effective Rehabilitation**

USAID also seeks to help affected populations return to social and economic development in the aftermath of disasters through rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is the first post-crisis stage in an effort to move toward sustainable development. This is accomplished by delivering relief to the point where populations will not easily slide back into disaster situations and by support for mitigation practices which help populations obtain a minimal basis for earning their livelihood. Rehabilitation has been secondary in priority to relief but addressed to the extent possible within resource constraints. As the Agency increasingly focuses on the relief to development continuum, and as BHR continues efforts to better link relief, mitigation and development, rehabilitation will play an important role. In this context, BHR is emphasizing to its partners that donor coordination during the rehabilitation phase of recovery is just as important as it is during an emergency.

### **d. Performance Indicators**

BHR has chosen to measure the strategic objective of meeting the critical needs of vulnerable populations with one impact level indicator.

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE #1:</b>	<b>INDICATOR:</b>
<i>Critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations met</i>	<i>Percent vulnerable population with critical emergency needs met</i>

As stated in the rationale above, BHR/OFDA uses situation-specific information to determine how many of the five categories of "critical needs" (i.e., shelter, food, water/sanitation, medical/nutrition, and energy) require attention as a result of a natural disaster or in response to effects of a complex emergency. Vulnerable groups to be targeted for assistance are also defined on a situation-specific basis. As a result, BHR's performance indicator, the "percentage of the vulnerable population with critical emergency needs met," must also be conceptualized in situation-specific terms.

Under these circumstances, BHR's ability to measure its performance depends heavily on the clarity with which both "critical needs" and "vulnerable groups" are defined, at the outset, for each natural disaster or complex emergency BHR addresses. Once these terms are operationally defined for specific situations, BHR can measure whether specific "critical needs" were successfully addressed for specific "vulnerable groups" in those situations. The task of defining what constitute "critical needs" and "vulnerable groups" for specific disasters falls primarily to OFDA which assesses these situations and, issues a Disaster Declaration which, among other things, provides these definitions.

Management tools such as checklists and "exit strategies," which characterize the level of normalcy that must be achieved before assistance is terminated, are also being examined by the Bureau to determine their utility for assessing performance in terms of SO # 1 on the kind of situation-specific basis on which it must, necessarily, be judged.

As an example of this kind of Bureau examination, during a recent Agency-wide workshop exploring core indicators for humanitarian response and in reference to SO # 1, the following criteria for exit from a natural disaster were formulated:

- Acceptable level of mortality rate
- Acceptable nutritional status
- Acceptable level of caloric intake
- Reduction of disease incidence to an acceptable level
- Acceptable amounts of potable water and
- Minimum shelter needs met

#### **e. Key Constraints and Assumptions**

This section examines the constraints and assumptions that affect BHR's ability to achieve Strategic Objective #1.

## **(1) Constraints**

There are six key constraints on the capacity of BHR to meet critical needs as a consequence of a natural disaster or complex emergency. These concern:

- The capacity to predict or anticipate a disaster or civil emergency before it occurs and to take preemptive steps to ameliorate the effects.
- The availability of properly trained and equipped personnel with sufficient experience for deployment to the field.
- The availability of adequate financial and Title II emergency food resources to meet emergency needs.
- The effectiveness of three sets of coordinating mechanisms: those internal to USAID; those internal to the U.S. Government; and those involving cooperating international organizations and other donors.
- The institutional and logistical capacity of cooperating institutions, particularly international organizations and private voluntary organizations.
- The high rate of staff turnover in BHR/OFDA and the inordinate amount of time needed to recruit and train new staff. The lack of sufficient staff in BHR/FFP.

## **(2) Assumptions**

With respect to achieving this SO, BHR assumes that:

- The U.S. Government will continue to give priority to emergency response.
- Complex emergencies will not proliferate at an increasing rate.
- Even so, the "pyramiding" of requirements in known emergencies will demand growing resources at least in the short run.
- There will be equitable burden sharing with other donors.

## 2. Strategic Objective #2

**SO # 2:**     *Minimize the Effects of Disasters and stabilize selected vulnerable and transitional societies*

### a. Rationale

This Strategic Objective links BHR's existing commitment to prevention, mitigation and preparedness to its new, high-priority objective to assist countries emerging from crisis to return to sustainable development. It encompasses key segments of the relief to development continuum.

- Recently, the vital importance of prevention and early warning have been recognized by the USAID Administrator, other agency heads and the President of the United States. In order to stem the increasing tide of complex emergencies modest investments in prevention can result in major savings in humanitarian assistance.
- In the post-Cold War era, there are an increasing number of countries that are emerging from crisis. Assistance to societies in transition is a segment of the spectrum that USAID has come to recognize as critical and heretofore inadequately addressed by either traditional development assistance or humanitarian assistance programs.

With respect to the second element of this objective, initial efforts are being undertaken on an experimental basis by the new Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). OFDA has managed an extremely effective Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness (PMP) program for several years, with many notable examples of success in terms of natural disasters. Situations entailing negotiated settlements of protracted conflicts and where political transformation ranks particularly high among U.S. foreign policy goals are prime candidates for BHR involvement. Frequently, such transitions share common elements, including:

- Humanitarian concerns;
- Disrupted economies and damaged infrastructures;
- Heavily militarized societies;
- An imperative to return home dislocated populations, including demobilized soldiers;
- Ambitious plans for swiftly erecting democratic institutions; and
- Urgent appeals for international support.



Principal efforts include: rapid assessments of a transition situation; implementation of programs in response to urgent short-term needs; and facilitation of a coordinated U.S. Government and international donor response. Initial services will be concentrated in the following areas:

- Reestablishment of the rule of law, including local security and mechanisms for resolving disputes peacefully;
- Restoration of political and social infrastructure, including local government bodies responsible for providing social services; and
- Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, including employment, housing and retraining programs.

OTI involvement in a country is generally expected to be short-term. In some instances, specific political developments--such as constitution drafting, a national referendum or an election--may signal the end of OTI's role. In instances where the political institution building that OTI initiates carries forward into the future, OTI will strive to transfer full responsibility for programs to a mission or regional bureau within a fixed time period.

#### **b. Linkage to Agency Goals**

This Strategic Objective is designed to assist countries that are at risk or emerging from crises and return them to a path of sustainable development. It is designed to deal with dynamic country situations that fall between the need for long term development assistance on the one hand and short term emergency relief on the other. It is predicated on the fact that priority countries in transition are immensely vulnerable and that a special type of fast, direct assistance for acute needs can be effective in strengthening the likelihood of long term stability. Success with respect to this Strategic Objective also contributes to the achievement of other Agency goals.

- *Democracy:* Assistance to transitional societies is designed to strengthen the long term prospects for democracy by encouraging stability and normalcy and the assistance itself can frequently include interventions that are designed to strengthen those institutions and practices pivotal to the establishment of representative government.
- *Economic Growth:* Social and political stability, the reduction of civil strife, the emergence of participatory government and the strengthening of the civil society are important preconditions to healthy economic activity and the functioning of open market systems.

#### **c. Program Outcomes**

The Bureau has identified four Program Outcomes that are critical to progress toward this Strategic Objective. These are:

**(1) Improved Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness (PMP) for Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters.**

BHR can mitigate and prepare for the damaging results of complex emergencies and natural disasters for vulnerable populations. BHR, primarily through OFDA, has initiated a number of programs that focus on prevention, maintenance and preparedness. All of these programs seek to put countries “ahead of the curve” with respect to disasters and, as a result, to reduce their impact, making it significantly less than might have been the case had preventive and anticipatory actions not been taken. Disasters that would have taken a lesser toll if, for example, adequate building codes and standards were enforced in earthquake prone areas, have raised concerns about prevention and preparedness to the highest levels in many countries, including our own. Resources spent on prevention, mitigation and preparedness help to lower the amount that must be spent on disaster assistance. The Africa Bureau’s Famine Early Warning Project tracks famine conditions and provides info on food needs and vulnerability assessing which are critical to implementation of BHR’s PMP activities in Africa. We seek to expand and strengthen these kinds of linkages within the Agency on PMP activities.

**(2) Enhancing Security**

For societies undergoing civil turmoil and/or societies which have recently suffered from emergencies to the extent that civil order has been impeded, BHR carries out programs which are aimed at providing personal security. These are the most immediately steps necessary for the reestablishment of civil order and minimal conditions for viability. These include demobilization of combatants, demining and policing.

**(3) Reconstituting Political and Social Institutions**

Once personal security has been reestablished for transitional and vulnerable populations the next step in returning society to viability --the ability for society to sustain its own life -- is the reestablishment of civil institutions. Through OTI and FFP Title II, BHR focuses on the local level and carries out programs directed at cooperatives, village committees, municipalities and other local organs that can provide basic services. OTI and FFP seek to revive the capacity of local institutions to perform by implementing small scale activities which themselves serve immediate needs.

**(4) Reestablishing Basic Services**

Once the institutional capacity of local bodies has been resuscitated and personal security insured, BHR carries out activities designed to help reestablish local basic services on an on-going basis. Food for work, maternal child health care, and school feeding programs have frequently been used to stimulate this process.

**d. Performance Indicators**

BHR intends to monitor its performance in achieving stability in transitional societies using three indicators.

<b><i>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE TWO:</i></b>	<b><i>INDICATORS:</i></b>
<i>Minimize the effects of disasters and stabilize selected vulnerable and transitional societies</i>	<i>Progressive shift in the ratio of humanitarian to development assistance in transitional situations in which BHR intervenes</i>  <i>Progress in relation to exit criteria established for specific transitional situations in connection with BHR intervention</i>  <i>Time and resources required to return to normalcy in the wake of a natural disaster in comparison to established norms or "best case" scenarios.</i>

- The first of these indicators measures BHR performance by the logical consequences of success: a reduction of U.S. humanitarian assistance in relation to USAID funded development assistance, in percentage terms, in those transitional societies where BHR is working.
- The second indicator BHR has chosen is more directly related to the actions BHR takes to stabilize transitional situations. BHR/OTI is exploring the utility of checklists and "exit strategies" for defining when withdrawal from a situation would be appropriate. Exit strategies of this sort are used by the U.S. military's peacekeeping forces for similar purposes. To clarify the exit criteria that will be explored, during the recent Humanitarian Response core indicator workshop referred to above, the following exit criteria for transitional situations, whether natural disasters or complex emergencies, were identified:

Natural Disasters

Functioning families  
Community activities  
Return to livelihoods  
Restoration of lifeline infrastructure  
Demand for and provision of credit  
Reduced child mortality  
Reasonable market prices

Complex Emergencies

Existence of an accepted governing group  
Reduction in displaced persons populations  
General economic activity at the local level  
Rehabilitation of basic services  
Perception/sense of personal security  
Reduced political violence  
Functioning self-sufficient civic organizations

- The final indicator in this group is designed to help BHR track the effectiveness of prevention, mitigation and preparedness programs. Where these programs are in operation, BHR anticipates that the level of physical destruction, loss of life and the cost of returning to normalcy will all be lower than in comparable situations where no effort was made to minimize the effects of natural disasters. The indicator also focuses on the fact that less time should be required to return to the status quo when PMP programs are in place. BHR will explore further the utility of norms or "best case" scenarios in connection with this indicator.

## **e. Key Constraints and Assumptions**

This section describes the key constraints and assumptions that affect BHR's ability to achieve Strategic Objective #2.

### **(1) Constraints**

Key constraints to BHR's capacity to achieve this Strategic Objective include:

- The manifest difficulties and uncertainties of working effectively in a highly volatile and complex situation involving social, economic and political turmoil. Resistance and unwillingness of governments to invest in disaster planning, preparedness and mitigation programs can exacerbate such situations.
- Attitudinal resistance to the integration of relief and disaster preparedness considerations into the formulation of long term development strategies, wherever it is encountered.
- Less than satisfactory U.S. Government coordinating mechanisms designed to surface critical policy issues and force clear and prompt articulation of Strategic Objectives can constrain progress.
- The limited capacity and inflexibility of the multilateral donor system to respond appropriately to complex transitional situations as they unfold is another constraint BHR faces.
- With respect to USAID's Transition Initiative:
  - Limited case-specific experience and little prior opportunity to identify optimal intervention strategies as a consequence of the newness of the Transition Initiative are constraints to effective action.
  - The newness and small size of the Transition Initiative together with budget limitations and limited staff constitute other important constraints.

-- Inadequate intrabureau and interbureau coordination.

## (2) Assumptions

Continued progress toward achievement of Strategic Objective #2 assumes:

- Improved U.S. Government coordinating mechanisms pursuant to recommendations set forth in Presidential Review Directive #50.
- Sustained investment in analytical capacity to provide an experiential base to better inform decision making.
- Agency commitment to continue the Transition Initiative and provide the resources required to OTI and other parts of the Agency involved in this effort.

## 3. Strategic Objective #3

**SO # 3:**    *Strengthened capacity of PVO and NGO community and international organizations to deliver emergency and development services*

### a. Rationale

While the voluntary sector has traditionally played an important role in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the extent of PVO and NGO involvement in a wide range of long-term development initiatives is just beginning to be understood and valued at its full worth. Similarly UN organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP) and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have become vital partners in USAID's humanitarian and development efforts. Both domestically and overseas, the number of voluntary organizations, and their strength relative to other organizations involved in these kinds of work, is growing. Many of these organizations are involved in the direct delivery of goods and services. USAID Missions often use voluntary organizations to implement programs which USAID, or the voluntary organizations themselves, design. In the face of complex emergencies and requests for assistance in such fields as food security, governance and democracy, microenterprise and child survival, the demands for assistance from the voluntary sector are significant. In order to meet these challenges, PVOs and NGOs need to expand their capacity to serve ever larger populations and to do so even as they are building new skills.

BHR efforts to strengthen the Agency's PVO and NGOs partners enhances their capability to implement programs in USAID's priority areas. In BHR's view, there are also important derivative benefits to a stronger and more capable PVO/NGO community, including:

- Leveraging of additional resources for development.
- The strengthening of the independent voluntary sector as a key component to the establishment of civil societies.
- Focus of the development effort on the lives of people and on the strengthening of grassroots political and economic institutions.

These benefits, as well as the basic need for improved PVO and NGO capacity underlie the Agency's decision to concentrate resources allocated to BHR for the voluntary sector on capacity building. Strengthening the capacity of BHR's PVO and NGO partners is a theme that cuts across and unifies the work of PVC and ASHA as well as OFDA, FFP and OTI.

Increased PVO/NGO capability is critical to progress toward the Bureau's goals for a number of reasons. For example, improved capability of PVOs, NGOs and international organizations will contribute to the Bureau goal of *Lives and Property Saved and Suffering Reduced* by:

- Increasing institutional capacity to predict, prepare for and mitigate the consequences of natural and man made disasters as well as the ability to intervene constructively and function in complex emergencies and transitional situations.
- Helping to strengthen the civil institutional structure of a society, thereby enhancing the probability of political stability and progress toward representative democracy and ameliorating the likelihood and severity of complex emergency situations.
- Improved capability of the PVO/NGO Community and International Organizations will contribute to the Bureau goal of Increased Food Security and Participation by Vulnerable Populations in Sustainable Development by: Improving the overall humanitarian response capacity through the private voluntary relief community and international organizations, and improving the capacity of local NGOs to manage and deliver development services and to act as catalysts of positive policy change. PVOs and NGOs, more than any other type of organization, help to reach vulnerable populations and involve them in the development process.

#### **b. Linkage to Agency Goals**

U.S. and European private voluntary organizations and indigenous non-governmental organizations are central to the process of sustainable development both because they are capable of implementing programs in a cost-effective manner and because they promote those conditions of openness, participation and pluralism which are fundamental to successful development progress.

Central to USAID's strategy for Sustainable Development is the concept of broad based participation in political and economic life and the building of effective indigenous institutions that are transparent, accountable, responsive and capable of managing change. Strengthened PVO/NGO capability will:

- Improve the speed and effectiveness of the humanitarian response capability of the international donor community and the in-country capacity of local humanitarian agencies.
- Strengthen the prospects for people centered development and an appropriate focus on community based solutions to social, economic and environmental problems.
- Support the growth and vitality of the private sector as an engine of economic growth and as a repository of the principles of democratic pluralism.
- Strengthen those institutions critical to a functioning civil society.
- Provide technical expertise on a wide range of developmentally important interventions.

The strengthened capacity of the international system, especially the UN, to galvanize, organize and manage the delivery of emergency relief services is critical because it is a function that necessitates central oversight and unified coordination beyond the capacity and role of bilateral donors. There have been a number of recent constructive efforts to rationalize and better organize roles and responsibilities within the UN humanitarian structure but more needs to be done.

Progress with respect to the achievement of Strategic Objective # 3 contributes to the achievement of Agency goals in virtually all its key sectors:

- *Environment:* Strengthened NGO capacity is critically important because environmental solutions begin at the local level. USAID's environmental assistance programs are designed to empower individuals and communities to address and deal with those local issues that link to larger global concerns and to partner with American PVOs to draw on their technical expertise and extensive experience.
- *Democracy:* A viable and functioning NGO sector sustains and promotes effective representative institutions and American PVOs can be active partners in direct interventions that promote democratic processes.
- *Health and Population:* Effective health and population programs must be responsive to needs and problems that are defined locally and that actively involve female and male clients, providers and indigenous experts in their conception, design and operation. This relies heavily on the capacity to encourage the development and involvement of indigenous PVOs and NGOs.

- *Economic Growth:* Strengthened PVO/NGO capacity is central to the expansion of access and opportunity within a society through the promotion of microenterprise and small business and the building of human skills and capacities. In addition, many NGO's are directly involved in production and marketing, particularly in the agricultural sector, and can be excellent vehicles for technology transfer.
- *Food Security:* Strengthened PVO/NGO capacity to address critical food insecurity issues in agricultural production and improved household nutrition is key to the resolution of food security issues.

### c. **Program Outcomes**

The Bureau has identified two Program Outcomes that are necessary to the achievement of this Strategic Objective. These are:

#### **(1) Increased Capability of Individual PVOs, NGOs and IOs.**

Strengthened *individual* capability is a prerequisite to strengthened capacity of the community of PVOs/NGOs, UN entities and international organizations. Strengthened individual capacity will be assessed through technical capacity, planning systems and administrative systems including such aspects as:

- Professionalizing PVO management systems and technical backstopping of field programs, replicating proven approaches and expanding into new areas, undertaking innovative projects all of which help PVOs and their NGO and local institutional partners to move into the next stage of organizational maturity.
- Strengthening executive, managerial capacity in the areas of strategic positioning, long-range planning, organizational development and problem solving.
- Developing performance standards in priority disaster sectors and improving coordination of response mechanisms to minimize redundancies, ensure complementary approaches, and maximize use of local resources.

#### **(2) Strengthened USAID/PVO/NGO and IO Partnerships**

USAID and the PVO/NGO community share many important values and goals and have worked closely and constructively together to achieve mutually agreed outcomes. At the same time, their motivations, interests and responsibilities are not identical. At the heart of an effective and strengthened partnership is the capacity to balance respect for the principles of privateness and independence with the maintenance of clear, results-oriented standards of accountability. The concept of partnership emphasizes independent progress toward mutually defined goals



through the sharing of resources, risks and comparative advantage. USAID has committed to this partnership through the PVO Partnership Initiative (April 1995) and Section III talks about strengthening efforts underway.

The partnership with UN entities such as the World Food Program and other international organizations has been long and productive as well. At this time, there is no corporate partnership with international organizations as there is with the PVO community, but there is increasing recognition that the individual relationships are building toward change. For example WFP is a critical partner for USAID's humanitarian assistance and development programs and USAID is now working closely with WFP on joint strategic planning and strengthening of WFP management and financial systems.

**d. Performance Indicators**

BHR has selected three indicators at the Strategic Objective level to measure strengthened capacity of the PVO/NGO/IO community to deliver development and emergency services. The first, in three parts, implicitly defines effective capacity building in terms of improved services delivered. The second and third indicators purport to measure organizational capacity directly.

While some observers believe that BHR should "graduate" PVOs once a certain measure of institutional strengthening has been attained, BHR views institutional strengthening as an evolving process that involves long term and dynamic relationships with PVOs. As Agency priorities evolve and change it requires different levels of PVO support. Institutional capacity in one area should not prelude aid to a PVO for institutional strengthening in another. BHR recognizes the differences of approach within the Agency on this subject and will continue its dialogue with all interested parties. Regardless of the approach selected, the organizational Development Index (see also p. 40) will be an important tool in defining how we measure "strengthened capacity!"

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE THREE:</b>	<b>INDICATORS:</b>
<i>Strengthened capacity of PVO &amp; NGO community and international organizations to deliver development and emergency services</i>	<i>Impact of services delivered in core sectors:</i>  <i>Child Survival</i>  <i>Micro-enterprise Sector</i>  <i>Environment Sector</i>  <i>Percentage ASHA grantees showing measurable improvement in meeting ASHA requirements for sponsors of local institutions</i>  <i>PVO scores on Organizational Development Index</i>

BHR recognizes that one measure of increased capacity is improved service delivery, i.e. the technical capacity of BHR grantees. For this reason the Bureau has chosen to identify general service impact indicators in the three core sectors of PVC as one reflection of increased technical capacity. The principal challenge in developing these indicators is finding a core measure for each sector which is general enough, on the one hand, to include the variety of activities carried out in each sector and, on the other, precise enough to actually measure performance on a meaningful level. Another challenge is reaching agreement on the indicators with the PVO community active in each sector.

ASHA also contributes to Strategic Objective Three. Although ASHA provides "bricks and mortar" as distinct from the training and TA of other BHR programs, the primary objective of its assistance is increased capacity in management systems and strategic planning, particularly in their role as sponsors for local organizations to which they direct ASHA funds. All funding requests from ASHA grantees are judged according to how they have improved in these areas since the last funding request. The current system for scoring and ranking ASHA grantees is designed to ascertain how well grantees are performing, or are likely to perform, in their sponsorship role.

An *Organizational Development Index* is being developed by BHR/PVC which will encompass three dimensions of organization strength: technical, planning and management capacity. PVC, in coordination with FFP, OFDA and ASHA, will design an instrument and index scale which can be used to assess the relevant strengths of PVO grantees. BHR believes that this will serve as a third indicator of strengthened capacity.

In measuring organizational development there are several difficulties. One of the challenges in developing any composite measure of institutional capacity is its general appropriateness: does it really measure what we understand as institutional capacity. Another serious challenge is the comparability of the index for different organizations or between organizations in different regions and sectors. Another is identification of the

components of organizational development on which the various parts of BHR can reach general agreement. Several months have been spent reaching consensus on the components within PVC. Over the coming months other offices will be drawn into the development of the Index. There are at least two projects currently underway in PVC -- the GEM initiative which is focused on institutional capacity building and an upcoming PVO strengthening project designed to develop technical capacity in cost recovery methods for not-for-profit organizations - which can add to the conceptual growth of the Index.

**e. Key Constraints and Assumptions**

There are a number of key constraints and assumptions that affect the achievement of Strategic Objective #3.

**(1) Constraints**

Key constraints to BHR's capacity to strengthen the capability of the community of PVOs, NGOs and international organizations include:

- Limited direct access to local NGOs and a limited understanding of the dynamics and institutional attributes of the NGO sectors where USAID is working.
- Limited understanding of the mechanisms that are needed to strengthen organizational capability.
- Limited ability to affect the in-country operating environment.

**(2) Assumptions**

Progress in strengthening PVO/NGO and IO capability will hinge on assumptions that are somewhat different for PVOs than they are for NGOs or IOs. These differences arise as a function of the fact that, at least historically, BHR has tended to deal directly with PVOs and indirectly with NGOs. Looking forward, BHR anticipates that this distinction will be less important, as BHR works with Missions and more NGOs on a direct basis. With respect to international organizations such as WFP, BHR has also taken steps to engage more closely and directly on program policy and operational issues. Nevertheless, the distinctions indicated below with respect to types of organizations and the assumptions BHR makes concerning them remain important:

With respect to PVOs, BHR assumes:

- Continuation of the PVO community's commitment to a strong and constructive partnership relation.
- Improved understanding of the components of institutional capability.

- USAID registration, grantmaking and accountability requirements and USAID reduction in staff will not deter new and smaller PVOs from becoming involved in disaster and development programs.
- Continued USAID Mission work to promote an enabling environment for improved PVO operations.

With respect to NGOs, BHR assumes:

- Continued policy priority on the increasingly important role of NGOs.
- Willingness and interest of American PVOs to strengthen local partnership relations and place growing reliance on local institutions.
- A deeper understanding of the institutional dynamics of emerging and growing NGO communities.

With respect to International Organizations, including the UN, BHR assumes:

- A close, collaborative working relationship with State and a continued commitment to a U.S. leadership role.
- A deeper understanding of the functioning of the international agencies as a basis for informed recommendations.
- A continued U.S. commitment to work with the UN system on humanitarian activities.

#### 4. Strategic Objective #4

**SO # 4:** *Sustained improvements in household nutrition and agricultural productivity for vulnerable groups served by USAID food aid programs*

##### a. Rationale

This Strategic Objective is directly linked to the BHR goal that focuses on *increased food security*. This Strategic Objective was specifically identified for food aid development programs (primarily Title II) because food is the primary resource managed by the Bureau, and because USAID needs to show a demonstrable impact of our food aid programs on food security.

USAID's 1992 definition of food security identifies three variables that are central to the attainment of food security; namely: food availability, food access, and food utilization. Improvements in agricultural productivity contribute to improved food access and

availability, while improvements in household nutrition are closely linked to improved food utilization.

Strategic Objective #4 reflects the new Agency Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper which calls for a more effective and efficient use of our food aid resources to achieve food security. The Policy Paper directs that Title II programs will focus on improving household nutrition, especially in children and young mothers, and on alleviating the causes of hunger, especially by increasing agricultural productivity. Agricultural productivity and improved household nutrition were highlighted for special emphasis because these are both areas to which our Title II food programs can directly contribute. By identifying *sustained improvements in agricultural productivity and household nutrition* as the Bureau's Strategic Objective for food aid programs, BHR now has a management tool it can use to help focus food programs on the areas outlined in USAID's Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper, and to measure their impact through common performance indicators.

This Strategic Objective includes an important reference to "sustained improvements" in agricultural productivity and household nutrition because BHR seeks to promote improvements that are sustainable after food aid programs end. BHR wants to avoid creating dependence and to create, instead, lasting improvements in policies, infrastructure, and local capacity that will enable local populations to sustain the improvements they have made after USAID leaves. The Strategic Objective specifically targets "vulnerable groups" because BHR seeks to ensure that its food aid programs are targeted to those countries and populations with the greatest food insecurity, and that, within these groups, food aid benefits those members who are the most vulnerable, particularly the mothers and children under five.

BHR recognizes that the causes of food insecurity are complex and cannot be addressed by food aid programs alone. Furthermore, experience has shown that food aid is most effective when used in conjunction with complementary programs. BHR's Strategic Objective with respect to food security is global and supportive in nature. In addition to BHR's Strategic Objective in this area, Agency policy encourages Missions to develop Strategic Objectives related to food security. BHR has already begun to work with Missions and its PVO partners to facilitate development of appropriate food security related strategic objectives at the country level.

To help ensure the overall success of Agency efforts to achieve sustained improvements in household nutrition and agricultural productivity, BHR will work closely with the USAID Missions PVO partners and host country governments to promote the active integration of food aid with other resources and programs. An integrated approach is a prerequisite to meaningful progress towards Strategic Objectives that focus on food security.

## **b. Linkage to Agency Goals**

Helping countries to achieve sustainable development is the surest way to eliminate the chronic poverty which is the root cause of food insecurity. Hunger is a result of poverty which in turn is a function of low levels of broad based economic growth. Sustainable development improves the economic well-being of the poor and reduces food insecurity by increasing the availability of food, access to food and utilization of food. Improved nutrition and agricultural productivity are directly linked to increased food security, which in turn will encourage more active participation of the poor in the process of sustainable development.

In addition to the contributions that food aid makes to the humanitarian assistance goal of USAID's Sustainable Development strategy, this BHR Strategic Objective also contributes to the achievement of other Agency goals.

- *Environment:* Hunger results from environmental degradation. Food insecurity drives the exploitation of marginal lands, the misuse of water supplies, the exhaustion of soils and deforestation. Steps take to reduce food insecurity also address these problems.
- *Democracy:* The pursuit of democracy is hampered when basic human needs are lacking. Conversely, democratic governments tend to be more responsive to the basic needs of their people.
- *Health and Population:* Hunger is exacerbated by lack of access to basic MCH care and family planning services. World population is growing by 100 million per year, straining the productive capacity of agriculture. Hunger contributes poor maternal health and high rates of infant mortality, which in turn drives higher birth rates.
- *Economic Growth:* Hunger prevents people from being economic participants in their society. Conversely, increased agricultural productivity plays an important role in alleviating hunger and in broad based economic growth.

## **c. Program Outcomes**

The Bureau has identified five Program Outcomes that are critical to progress toward this Strategic Objective. These are:

### **(1) Sufficient Health, Nutrition, Water, and Sanitation Infrastructure Available to Target Groups**

Adequate water and sanitation systems, and appropriate physical infrastructure for the delivery of health and nutrition services are critical to achieve sustained improvements in household nutrition. Without this infrastructure any improvements in household nutrition achieved in the short-term will be

jeopardized by the continued risk of diseases and will be very difficult to sustain over the long-term. Therefore BHR intends to try to ensure adequate health, nutrition, water, and sanitation infrastructure for the populations it serves through its Title II food programs. Title II Food aid programs will directly contribute to the strengthening of this infrastructure through food for work projects and monetization programs. BHR recognizes that it will need to collaborate with the development programs of the USAID Missions and with host country governments to be fully successful in achieving this program outcome.

**(2) Related Preventive/Curative Services Available to Target Groups**

Just as health infrastructure strengthening is necessary for achieving the Strategic Objective, delivery of essential health services such as immunization and maternal and child health services are complementary to the provision of food aid. Many of USAID's Title II programs already include a strong MCH component, where food aid is coupled with health and nutrition education and other preventative health services. In others, such as the Government of India's Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) program, Title II food aid serves as the cornerstone of a comprehensive primary health care and nutrition delivery system. Recognizing the critical importance of integrating food aid with health and nutrition services, BHR's FFP office plans to work with its PVO/NGO and IO partners USAID Missions and Host country governments to achieve this linkage in more of its programs. Title II programs can provide direct support or improve preventive/curative services through monetization programs, and food programs will be used as a vehicle to promote increased utilization of existing health services by the beneficiary population.

**(3) Improved Agricultural Infrastructure for Target Groups**

Improving the agricultural infrastructure is important for bring about sustained improvements in agricultural productivity. For example, in many parts of the world where USAID works agricultural productivity is seriously constrained by lack of adequate storage facilities and poor or nonexistent farm to market roads. BHR/FFP plans to utilize Title II food for work programs to improve farm to market roads and storage facilities in areas where this is a major constraint. Agricultural productivity is seriously handicapped by severe erosion and water runoff, and deforestation. Title II programs, through food for work, will promote terracing and reforestation where these can have a significant impact on agricultural productivity. Finally, in areas where water is scarce, irrigation systems can increase agricultural productivity many times over and BHR/FP plans to give a priority to supporting the development of small scale, community managed irrigation systems through Food For Work and related monetization programs. Increased emphasis will also be given to use of Title III resources to support his outcome.

**(4) Improved Use of Agricultural Inputs by Targeted Groups**

The provision of improved agricultural technologies including better use of agricultural inputs by targeted groups, together with improved agricultural infrastructure, will contribute to the achievement of sustained improvement in agricultural productivity. Where appropriate, BHR/FFP plans to promote improved access to inputs such as seeds, tools and fertilizers where appropriate through monetization programs, and to support training efforts. In order to achieve this outcome FFP will pursue increased linkages with USAID Mission programs host country government agricultural training and extension programs. Policy reforms through Title III (such as privatization of fertilizer production and marketing) will also contribute to this outcome.

**(5) Food Aid Programs Focused on Food Deficit Countries and Most Food Insecure Groups**

The Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper calls for improving targeting of Food Aid resources to countries that need food the most and where food security is the greatest. This is clearly an important outcome to improve the impact of food aid on food insecurity. As a result BHR plans to target an increasing share of Title II and particularly Title III resources on the most food insecure countries many of which are in Africa and South Asia. Food security profiles will also be prepared for priority countries to improve the targeting of food aid programs to the most food insecure regions of these countries. FFP also plans to improve the targeting of food aid, and related services, to reach the most vulnerable groups within the impact areas, such as the pregnant women and children under five.

**d. Performance Indicators**

BHR has identified four performance indicators that can be used to measure progress in relation to Strategic Objective #4.

<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE FOUR:</b>	<b>INDICATORS:</b>
<i>Sustained improvement in household nutrition and ag productivity for vulnerable groups served by USAID food aid programs</i>	<i>Food insecure population as a percent of total population</i>  <i>Proportion of household income needed to access sufficient foods to meet dietary needs for a healthy life</i>  <i>Percent food insecure population which has its temporary food needs met by USAID food aid programs</i>  <i>Nutrition index, i.e. coverage, growth faltering, immunization, and child feeding</i>



Several of the indicators used to measure Strategic Objective #4 are designed to track the provision of food aid to food insecure populations. The development of appropriate indicators in this area is extremely complex and BHR is currently working with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the IMPACT Project and CDIE on this issue.

The first indicator BHR is exploring provides information on the scale of the food insecurity problem. Food insecure populations are defined as people that do not have access to sufficient foods to meet their dietary needs for a healthy life. Conceptually, this population is measured using techniques for determining the proportion of the populations that do not have the means to acquire a minimally acceptable amount of food. USAID has already applied such measures, e.g., market basket studies in Costa Rica and other studies. BHR will work with PVOs and NGOs who are trying to acquire this kind of information.

Whereas the first indicator deals in absolute terms with whether households can obtain enough food, this indicator looks at the proportion of household resources required to do that. Household income needed for minimum food needs is a proxy indicator for food consumption. As the relative amount of income needed for food rises, food consumption falls indicating an increase in the size of the food insecure population. The use of the indicator of household income here is not to suggest that BHR will attempt to lower food insecurity by increasing household incomes. Rather household income is tracked in order to monitor food security.

The third indicator focuses on the effectiveness of USAID food aid programs in reaching their target population. Assuming that this population has been defined, as outlined for the first indicator above, this involves tracking USAID success in reaching vulnerable populations with food. This is an important indicator for describing the Food for Peace Program within BHR.

Sustained improvements in household nutrition and agricultural productivity will be reflected in the reduction of the food insecure population, an increase in the percent of food insecure population which has its temporary food needs met by food aid programs, and a decrease in the amount of household income needed to access food.

Food aid not only makes a direct contribution to household nutrition, it also acts as a catalyst for other health services by encouraging demand for these services. Use of health services has been shown to decrease if food aid is withdrawn. Therefore, there is an indirect and significant impact of food aid on nutrition. In settings where health care is being provided as well as food, BHR will demonstrate an impact on nutrition among vulnerable groups along four dimensions:

- Coverage, i.e., the number of pregnant or lactating women and children under two years of age;

- Growth faltering, i.e., the percent of children under two years of age falling within acceptable standard deviations of normal weight/height for age growth monitoring;
- Immunization rates for women and children under one year of age, and
- Child feeding as measured by the age at which complementary solid foods are introduced, and the percent of women who breastfeed within the first eight hours following childbirth.

#### e. **Key Constraints and Assumptions**

This section examines the key constraints and assumptions that affect the achievement of Strategic Objective #4.

##### (1) **Constraints**

There are numerous difficulties and constraints on efforts to increase agricultural productivity and household nutrition levels through Title II. These include:

- *Variation and complexity of individual country circumstances.* The design of appropriate intervention strategies requires extensive experience and a solid understanding of local needs, markets and production and distribution practices. Food issues are inherently complex because of the wide range of intervening variables, the social and political sensitivity of the subject and the vertical linkage to national, regional and ultimately global structures and trends. FFP is encouraging USAID's PVO IO and other partners to collaborate in the drafting of national food security assessments to better understand and address constraints to food security in each country context.
- *Understanding the special attributes of food aid.* The role of food aid in promoting food security must be carefully designed. It is essential to both understand the food security problem and to identify the food insecure population which U.S. assistance is designed to benefit.
- *The danger of disincentives.* Food aid must be managed to support local agricultural production. This may require special efforts to utilize local markets and careful timing of deliveries to avoid depressing prices and discouraging local production.
- *The implementing capacity of USAID's PVO partners.* BHR is committed to bringing the food aid program into a managing for results system that will focus on achievements rather than inputs and to leave routine management of the program to its PVO partners. This will require continued capacity building for PVOs, local NGOs and the World Food Program.

- *Budgetary limitations and inflexibilities that divert food aid resources planned for development to meet the needs of complex emergencies.*

## (2) Assumptions

In relation to this Strategic Objective, BHR is assuming:

- The commitment of the Agency's PVO partners to focus food aid resources on these key areas, to target their resources more effectively on vulnerable groups, and to focus on outcomes and results rather than inputs.
- Adequate food aid resources and budget flexibility so that emergency food aid needs can be met without jeopardizing food aid development programs. Continuation of the Title III program is also critical given its important role in policy reform.
- Effective coordination between USAID/W, PVO partners, USAID Missions, and host country governments in the planning and implementation of food aid programs. This is vital for the effective integration of food aid and other development resources, and long-term sustainability.

## 5. Strategic Objective #5

**SO # 5:** *BHR more effectively influences Agency integrating of food security, disaster relief and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs*

### a. Rationale

This is a Strategic Objective that is critical to progress toward the Bureau's other four Strategic Objectives. The effective integration of BHR priority concerns such as food aid, disaster relief and PVO/NGO/IO collaboration into Agency policies and strategic planning has been highlighted and given prominence as a separate Strategic Objective for several reasons.

- First, even though these are explicit Agency priorities, in the past they have not always received priority attention by the Agency's development planners and implementers. Historically there has been a "divide" between the Agency's development programs and practitioners and its humanitarian assistance programs. Disaster relief, food aid programs and PVO/NGO activities have often been poorly integrated with the Agency's planning and implementation processes.
- Recently there has developed a much greater appreciation of the need to integrate the Agency's development and humanitarian assistance resources more effectively for greater efficiency and impact, to help prevent disasters, and to help speed the

transition from relief to development. Over the last year and a half, senior BHR managers have devoted much of their time and attention to working closely with PPC and the other Bureaus to codify the importance of this integration of resources in a series of Agency strategies, strategic planning implementation guidelines and policy papers. However, much work remains to be done to achieve integration in the Agency's regional and country strategic plans and program implementation.

- Another important reason this Strategic Objective was adopted is that the ability of the Bureau to pursue and accomplish its Strategic Objectives is dependent on effective operational coordination with the Agency's overseas missions. The importance of effective cooperation is evident in disaster planning and in-country preparedness for disasters and emergencies. It is useful for gaining a better understanding of deteriorating conditions that may lead to a protracted complex emergency. Coordination helps in the design and implementation of stabilizing interventions in transitional societies where a USAID mission is present. It also helps in the design of Title II food programs where understanding of local conditions and effective integration with development resources is critical to success. Finally, it helps to ensure a complementarity between BHR's central support to PVOs and mission interests and priorities.
- BHR also sees this Strategic Objective as vital because of the increasing frequency, complexity and high cost of humanitarian interventions and recognition that USAID must better coordinate and integrate its limited and shrinking resources if it is to respond appropriately to these situations. There is now keen Agency interest in creating "unified (intra-Agency) and "joint" (inter-Agency) strategies for countries which receive funding from many different USAID and/or other USG sources. This process moves beyond the normal exchange of information to strategic planning and document drafting across Bureaus and Agencies. This SO highlights our critical role in this new process. The existence of this Strategic Objective will contribute to a recognition of the growing importance of technical issues and technical competence in dealing with disasters, complex emergencies, difficult transitional situations and long term development objectives that require specialized expertise. It also highlights the growing importance of improved USG interagency coordination where USAID's development competence and overseas presence provides an essential source of information and informed judgment.

**b. Linkage to Bureau and Agency Goals**

This Strategic Objective is closely linked to the humanitarian assistance and other goals of USAID's Sustainable Development strategy through a supportive relationship. It is designed to help the Bureau achieve those objectives for which it has preeminent responsibility as well as substantive technical capacity.

**c. Program Outcomes**

The Bureau has identified two specific program outcomes that are necessary to significant progress toward this Strategic Objective:

**(1) BHR Priority Areas Accurately Reflect Overall Agency Policy and Planning**

The Agency's policies and procedural guidelines explicitly address the priority areas that concern BHR and highlight the importance of integrating humanitarian assistance, PVO development programs, and Title II development programs with other development assistance activities. Humanitarian assistance is accorded equal recognition and importance as the Agency's other four priority areas in the Agency strategies and implementing guidelines. Significant progress toward this outcome has already been achieved through the issuance of the Humanitarian Assistance Strategy and Strategic Planning guidelines. BHR also seeks USAID's adoption of key policies of interest to the Bureau through special policy papers where necessary, such as the Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper, and the PVO Policy Paper. BHR will continue to influence and help articulate Agency policy and planning in areas of the Bureau's priority concern through analysis, studies, evaluations, and the preparation of inputs to draft policy statements.

**(2) Involvement in Regional Bureau/Mission Strategic Planning Processes**

BHR needs to make an active effort to become more directly engaged in regional and mission planning in order to help operationalize the planning guidelines with respect to humanitarian assistance, PVO programs and Title II development programs. This will ensure effective integration of these resources with other development assistance programs as well as provide active coordination in working out problems and constraints. BHR seeks to work closely and collaboratively with the Missions, AID/W Geographic Bureaus in joint strategic planning exercises in an increasing number of countries where BHR has large investments. BHR also plans to promote integrated planning through other fora such as the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, conferences and workshops.

**d. Performance Indicators**

Four Strategic Objective indicators have been identified for measuring progress in relation to Strategic Objective #5.

**c. Indicators**

<b><i>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE FIVE:</i></b>	<b><i>INDICATORS:</i></b>
<i>BHR more effectively influences Agency integration of food security, disaster relief and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs</i>	<i>Percent of USAID and/or countries incorporating natural disaster vulnerability in their country strategies and programs</i>  <i>Percent mission/bureau budgets implemented through PVOs and NGOs</i>  <i>Percent missions including food security objectives in their country plans and programs</i>  <i>Percentage of Mission portfolios, in dollar terms, linked to food security objectives</i>

Within the areas which are of priority concern for BHR, certain significant policies, guidelines and practices have been developed. Significant and recent examples include but are not limited to the Food Security Policy, and the USAID/PVO Policy Guidance and Operations Guidelines and the New Partnerships Initiative. The Office of Transition Initiatives although new is already developing and implementing principles to guide USAID in special transition situations. PVC has accumulated extensive experience working with PVOs and NGOs in development assistance in child survival, microenterprise development and the environment. It is the purpose of BHR to promote and effect the incorporation of these policies, guidelines and practices into Mission analysis and, if appropriate, into Mission strategic plans and results packages. BHR recognizes that food security objectives are not appropriate in all Missions. However, where such objectives are appropriate, BHR hopes to see them reflected.

The Bureau plans to review its progress in achieving integration of its priority areas of responsibility with Mission programs by looking directly at Mission strategic plans and budgets and assessing the degree to which these reflect consideration of priority BHR concerns. This should be relatively easy to monitor in collaboration with CDIE which already conducts analyses of country strategic plans to see how they reflect USAID priority areas in general.

With respect to the collection of data on these indicators, BHR will encourage Missions that have food security programs to use these core indicators. Where they do so we will rely upon data collected by Missions. Where Mission are not doing this, BHR will work with PVO and NGO partners to apply data collection strategies that are conceptually consistent with what Missions are doing elsewhere.

## **e. Key Constraints and Assumptions**

### **(1) Constraints**

There are several constraints on the ability of BHR to more effectively integrate Bureau concerns in the country planning process, although none of these is insurmountable:

- Staffing constraints and the inevitable tendency for real world crises to take precedence over planning and analysis.
- Limited number of studies, evaluations and baseline material as a basis for analysis and the issuance of technical guidance.
- Imperfect internal Bureau planning mechanisms and information systems which do not fully integrate Bureau activities or gather data and information across Bureau lines in a comprehensive manner
- Residual (and diminishing) Agency attitudes of benign neglect toward food aid and increased recognition of the importance of disasters, complex emergency and transitional situations.
- Residual (and diminishing) Agency resistance to the manifest institutional strengths and technical capacities of PVOs and to indigenous NGOs.
- Limited interest on the part of some USAID missions in actively working with and through local NGOs. (Often manifest in a narrow mission definition of Agency priorities.)
- Key BHR resources such as food aid and International Disaster Account funds often have separate requirements and regulations, and different programming cycles from DA funds, and are poorly understood by most of USAID's development professionals

### **(2) Assumptions**

The Bureau's effort to integrate its substantive concerns into country strategic planning will be supported by the policy units within USAID, particularly PPC. To that end, BHR assumes that:

- PPC will take a more active role in promoting the integration of these priority areas into AID/W and Mission analysis and planning;
- BHR will be welcome as an active player, along with Global and the Geographic Bureaus, in joint strategic planning exercises with USAID Missions.

### SECTION THREE: BUREAU ACTION PLAN

The preceding sections of the BHR Strategic Plan have provided the background to the development of the Plan, discussed key relevant factors in the assistance environment, and described the Bureau's Goals, objectives and program outcomes, constraints and key assumptions. This section describes key programs and Bureau-wide actions that BHR plans to carry out in order to achieve its objectives. Resource requirements and plans to monitor, evaluate and report on progress towards its objectives are also discussed.

The Action Plan presented in this section provides the broad parameters for Bureau activity over the period from 1995 to 1999. Further steps will be taken to operationalize the cross-Office thinking expressed in this document and more detailed Office-level Action Plans will be developed by September 1995 to indicate how Offices will work singly and in collaboration to achieve the objectives described herein. Additional work will also be undertaken over the Summer to refine the indicators presented in this Plan and to examine the data sources that support those indicators.

The Action Plan discussed in this section consists of four key parts:

- **Bureau-wide Strategic Actions** This describes a set of key crosscutting themes and recommended actions that BHR should pursue in order to function more effectively as a Bureau and to make progress towards its objectives and goals.
- **Key Programs by Strategic Objective** This describes *for each Strategic Objective* key programs of the different offices that contribute to the objective, important planned initiatives, and resource requirements by Strategic Objective.
- **Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Plan** This describes the Bureau's plans and progress to date in developing a Program Performance Information System (PPIS), including plans for data collection, analysis and reporting.
- **Overview of Bureau Resource Requirements** This section highlights key issues and requirements that have a bearing on the implementation of this Strategic Plan. (Note: the detailed budget and narrative will be distributed separately.)

#### A. Bureau-wide Strategic Actions

The preceding has delineated a framework of goals and objectives that the Bureau will pursue and that will guide Bureau priorities during the planning period. Four critical crosscutting issues that derive from the context in which the Bureau is functioning and from the constraints and key assumptions are pertinent to the achievement of Strategic Objectives and Program Outcomes. These issues provide a guiding framework for important actions that the Bureau will need to pursue in order to move progressively toward its goals and objectives.



## 1. Better Program Integration

A repeated theme throughout this Plan is the necessity for better program integration in order to maximize the impact of the limited resources available to the Bureau and take advantage of the abundant synergies that characterize the development process. This effort is important because it counteracts bureaucratic pressures which tend to work against integration and program quality. It is also consistent with one of the key thrusts of Agency reengineering. Integration will be pursued:

- Within the Bureau and between program categories and Office boundaries.
- Between the Agency's development resources and its humanitarian resources.
- With respect to combining and jointly programming food resources and dollar resources.
- Between centrally programmed funds and Mission resources, which includes the improved integration between BHR and Global, particularly in relation to Mission programs.
- With regard to human resources as well as dollar resources.

Critical to program integration is a process of *joint, integrated planning* of which this document is an initial, important step. In order to facilitate this process BHR is establishing inter-office Strategic Objectives teams for each of the five Bureau level Strategic Objectives. These will include PVO partners and virtual members from the Missions where appropriate. Bureau has already participated in a highly effective joint planning process for the Horn of Africa. Although still in its initial phases, the Horn of Africa approach may be a useful model for other situations involving a large number of participants.

"Unified" planning (which examines all resources flowing into a country) should also be utilized at the country level where there is a strong duality of development and humanitarian concerns. In these difficult situations it is *not* enough for the Bureau to be in the reactive position of commenting on an already formulated development strategy. For effective program integration to occur, the Bureau needs to be involved in the planning process substantively, in detail and on the ground. This, of necessity, involves the design of a team approach to country planning, a technique successfully used in private industry which is now strongly advocated by Agency re-engineering. Joint Strategic Objective teams with participation by BHR, the Missions and PVO partners should be an effective vehicle for joint planning and program integration. Effective team planning requires careful attention to skill composition, a distance from regular responsibilities and, most importantly, a willingness to cooperate across bureaucratic affiliations.

## **2. Improved External Coordination**

Perhaps more than any other Bureau in USAID, BHR has heavy and diverse external coordinating responsibilities involving relations with a broad number of U.S. Government agencies, international organizations, private voluntary groups, recipient countries and other bilateral donors that are involved in emergency relief and development operations. These responsibilities consume considerable time and energy of senior management. The liaison and coordination task has increased significantly in recent years as a consequence of the growing number and complexity of international crises. This is likely to continue in the near future in part because of the concerns and recommendations raised in PRD 50. Smoother and more effective coordination requires:

- A comprehensive understanding of the substantive issues and the needs and interests of collaborating institutions;
- The design and availability of coordination models that can be deployed in template fashion;
- Mechanisms for elevating and resolving policy issues in a timely manner when they arise;
- A sharply delineated allocation of roles and responsibilities to avoid ambiguity;
- Adequate staff resources to provide analytical support to senior decision makers.

Progress in these areas will require considerable analytical effort and a willingness to accord high priority to strengthening the Bureau's institutional outreach capacity.

## **3. Strengthened Policy Analysis**

The Bureau is increasingly dealing with complex analytical issues that cut across a broad spectrum of concerns involving such matters as:

- The inherent nature of the development process;
- The relationship between development and political, social and economic change;
- Issues of human rights and civil liberties;
- The role of the military, civil conflict and dispute resolution;
- The role of food aid in achieving food security; and
- The attributes of institutional capacity and the components that enable it to develop.

In addition to being substantively challenging, these issues tend to involve external relations with other USG agencies, with international organizations and with private voluntary agencies. Given the importance, complexity and frequency of these issues, BHR is increasing its strategic analytical capacity through a variety of mechanisms that include: augmented analytical staff; more frequent deployment of policy planning teams; the establishment of standing inter-office committees to address perennial policy issues; inter-office Strategic Objective Teams to coordinate Bureau activities and performance monitoring and other innovative mechanisms. Efforts of this nature will derive from BHR's programmatic and technical responsibilities and will not duplicate the policy role of PPC.

#### **4. A Focus on Capacity Building**

BHR operates primarily through partners such as PVOs, NGOs and IOs which are vital partners in the Bureau's development and humanitarian assistance programs. A vital concern of the Bureau is the institutional and technical capacity of these organizations and their ability to deliver development and emergency services efficiently and with minimal oversight. The importance of capacity building has been recently underscored by the New Partnerships Initiative and its emphasis on strengthening civil societies in developing countries by providing greater support for indigenous NGOs through partnerships with U.S. organizations. All of the Bureau's offices currently engage in some form of capacity building, ranging from technical workshops to grants for institutional strengthening. These interventions are designed to enhance progress toward Office goals and objectives and are well justified on that basis.

At the same time, there are important opportunities to better coordinate these diverse efforts and to pool the wealth of experience that has developed over the years. There is a considerable amount that can be learned about those attributes associated with institutional vitality and the types of things that should be done to ensure healthy and resilient organizations.

#### **B. Key Program Descriptions by Strategic Objective**

This section provides a detailed view of the on-going programs and new BHR initiatives that support the achievement of each of the Bureau's Strategic Objectives. Resource requirements are also presented in this section. Figure 2 shows how BHR's offices will contribute to the achievement of Bureau objectives.

##### **1. Strategic Objective # 1: *Critical Needs Met of Targeted Vulnerable Groups in Emergency Situations***

###### **a. Key Programs**

Meeting critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations is an objective towards which **BHR/OFDA** and **BHR/FFP** take the lead for the Bureau.

## Figure 2

**BHR/PVC** programs indirectly support this SO while BHR/PPE provides program, policy and evaluation support to all of these offices to further their work in this SO.

**(1) BHR/OFDA**

Within OFDA, the **Disaster Response Division (DRD)** is the principle unit responsible for addressing this SO through timely, effective and targeted emergency relief, (Program Outcome One). Some DRD activities, as well as activities of the **Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation Division (PMP)** also supports this SO through provision of timely, effective, rehabilitation assistance (Program Outcome Two) which help populations obtain a minimal basis for earning their livelihoods. The Operational Support and Program Support Divisions are intimately involved in providing essential functions of logistics, telecommunications, information and administrative actions. BHR/OFDA spent some \$200 million in FY 1994 to respond to approximately 60 declared disasters world wide and implemented approximately 150 new grants and 150 grant amendments. (In recent years, the eight to ten countries facing complex disasters, e.g., Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Bosnia, Northern Iraq, have absorbed as much as 75% of the funds available to OFDA.)

OFDA grants are usually executed with PVOs/NGOs, UN agencies and other international organizations. Typical goods and services provided under these grants include support for water and sanitation activities and medical and health programs; the local purchase of food and purchase of blended foods for supplemental and therapeutic feeding programs; the provision of seeds and tools; and emergency airlifts for rapid delivery of relief resources. OFDA also manages five stockpiles around the world which contain plastic sheeting, tents, water containers, and blankets used to respond to disasters.

OFDA also responds to emergencies through conducting assessments and the deployment of **Disaster Assistance Response Teams, (DARTs)**. OFDA's Regional Advisors frequently make initial assessments, advise on whether a DART is needed and assist in the coordination of the DART. DARTs deploy teams of people to an emergency site to conduct updated assessments, provide rapid transfer of critical information to policy makers, effect rapid funding for relief activities, and, in some cases, actually implement relief activities, (e.g., distribution of plastic sheeting.) In the last two years, BHR/OFDA has supported more than ten DARTs and has provided support in seven additional countries through OFDA field representation.

**(2) BHR/FFP**

FFP resources are channeled through international organizations, primarily the UN World Food Program, and PVOs/NGOs and include not only provision of food aid but provision of shipping and internal storage and transport costs, as well.

The emergency division within FFP uses its **Title II emergency food aid resources** to meet the critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations. In USG responses to large-scale, complex emergencies, food aid usually comprises the largest share of resources allocated. FFP allocation of Title II food aid for emergencies (versus its "regular" Title II used for development activities) has grown steadily. FY 1993 Title II budget allocations for emergency interventions were \$397 million; allocations grew to \$494 million in FY 1994. Title II resources are used by the Bureau for both relief and rehabilitation purposes, thus contributing to both program outcomes one and two for this SO.

**(3) BHR/PVC**

PVC's primary objective is to increase the capability of USAID's PVO partners to deliver sustainable services. Achievement of its capacity building objectives (through programs described in more detail under SO 3 of this Action Plan) has an impact on this SO to the extent that PVOs with which it works are implementing disaster relief as well as development activities.

**b. New Initiatives**

Several initiatives have been launched at the Bureau and Office levels to improve impact and efficiency.

**(1) Bureau Level**

The Bureau is taking an active leading role in the Agency's new **Greater Horn of Africa Initiative**, a U.S.-led effort to plan and galvanize a coordinated and effective multi-donor response to the root causes of the crises in the Horn aimed at transitioning from long-term emergency response to rehabilitation and development. This initiative suggests a possible model for a coordinated approach to other similar highly complex and protracted emergency situations.

The Bureau has also initiated an effort which brings all of its offices together for joint reviews of complex emergencies. This helps to ensure that the individual efforts of different offices are better coordinated and have a better chance of achieving Bureau objectives in this area. In addition, both FFP and OFDA have taken recent steps to strengthen their planning and evaluation capacity and improve their management information systems.

**(2) BHR/OFDA**

Performance standards in OFDA's priority sectors (water, sanitation, health, nutrition and shelter) are being developed to ensure a higher level of and more uniform performance by OFDA and its cooperating partners.

OFDA has undertaken a reorganization to improve its overall efficiency and effectiveness. This includes dividing its Operational Support Division and creating an additional Program Support Division. This separation of functions will lead to better services. In addition, a planning function has been added to the PMP Division. OFDA is developing a plan and the technical facilities to deploy and sustain five DART teams simultaneously. This strategy will permit enhanced and earlier decision-making and should help OFDA better tailor its response to field driven needs.

OFDA is also developing individual country profiles for complex disasters and entrance and exit criteria for OFDA response programs and DARTs. These efforts collectively should make a substantial contribution toward achieving greater control over the resources dedicated to disaster response.

OFDA is studying the feasibility of putting in place an Indefinite Quantity type contract that will provide a vehicle for immediate response, augmenting OFDA's options for disaster response.

A series of efforts to maximize the development impact of emergency assistance including: the integration of preparedness and mitigation expertise into the disaster assessment process; training and the provision of technical services to implementing PVOs and NGOs; and assistance to cooperating sponsors to focus their programs more clearly on food security objectives.

### **(3) BHR/FFP**

FFP has developed a new Title II project design and review process aimed at reducing paperwork and improving Monitoring and evaluation systems. Highlights of this new approach are:

- Title II Development Project proposals (DPPs) will be approved on a multi-year basis, eliminating the need to submit annual updates for approval. An annual action plan (AP) will combine the previously required multi-year operational plan update and annual progress report (APR);
- Grants under section 202(e) of PL 480 will also be approved on a multi-year basis;
- A standardized annual approval and procurement schedule (AAPS) will replace the Annual Estimate of Requirement form, will be available as a computer macro and will include an annual procurement schedule and an annual Bellmon amendment certification;
- A mid-project presentation by the cooperating sponsor is required;

- An external impact evaluation of the project is required no later than the second quarter of the final year of the project.
- FFP is currently designing a new system to streamline the documentation of emergency fund programs.

Other FFP initiatives discussed under Strategic Objective # 4 also contribute to this effort.

## c. Resources

The primary responsibility for the attainment of this Strategic Objective lies with OFDA and FFP. Consistent with this charge the vast majority of the funding for this Strategic Objective comes from two sources, International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and PL 480. The importance given this Strategic Objective is reflected in the resources allocated to its achievement. Nearly 70% of the Bureau's budget (\$789 million in FY 95 and \$754 million in FY 96) is dedicated annually to meeting the critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situations. In addition to IDA funding OFDA has borrowing authority which it has found necessary to use in recent years to meet its emergency program needs.

## 2. Strategic Objective #2: *Minimize the Effects of Disasters and Stabilize Selected Vulnerable and Transitional Societies*

### a. Key Programs

Minimizing the effects of disasters and stabilizing selected vulnerable and transitional societies is an objective which **BHR/OTI, BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP** programs directly support. Some BHR/PVC and BHR/ASHA programs indirectly contribute to this SO while BHR/PPE provides program, policy and evaluation support to all of these offices to further their work in this SO. The SO also benefits from **BHR/ASHA** program contributions to leadership development and outreach from strong institutions in affected countries.

#### (1) **BHR/OFDA**

Within OFDA, the PMP Division spends approximately \$10 million annually to implement disaster preparedness, mitigation and prevention activities to improve countries' ability to face complex or natural disasters, (Program Outcome One for this SO.) Food production, shelter and the health/industry sectors are high priority areas for PMP activities and include such interventions as: helping prevent crop destruction from insect infestations, supplying seeds and tools to reduce vulnerability to famine, improving the construction of low income housing with disaster resistant materials and building methods, and the development of hazard mitigation projects in urban areas threatened by industrial accidents and hazardous



materials disposal. In-country training for disaster preparedness is also part of the PMP program.

**(2) BHR/OTI**

This is a young office that represents a USAID initiative to assist countries in transition to establish new political and economic institutions which are essential to recovery from complex emergencies. Limited in staff and resources, it plans to focus its activities in just a few countries. Beginning its programs in FY 94, OTI is now working in Haiti, Angola, and Rwanda. It is assessing a possible role in Eritrea. Its activities include the revitalization of local government, and the demobilization and reintegration of former members of the Haitian armed forces; support to the UN in Angola to boost its capacity to prepare demobilization and reintegration programs for soldiers; and in Rwanda, the financing of human rights monitors. OTI expects that its programs will eventually phase out or over to a more traditional development assistance program in a comparatively short period.

**(3) BHR/PVC**

PVC's primary objective is to increase the capability of USAID's PVO partners to deliver sustainable services. Achievement of its capacity building objectives (described in more detail under SO three of this Action Plan) can have an impact on this SO to the extent that PVOs with which it works are implementing programs in "transitional" societies. For example, PVO partners such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services and World Vision, which PVC has helped to strengthen, are all implementing major programs to assist with the re-establishment of basic services and achievement of a successful transition in Haiti.

**(4) BHR/ASHA**

Through leadership development and helping strong local institutions to be more influential, ASHA is contributing to the foundation for disaster preparedness and prevention programs as well as for transition initiatives. Medical institutions supported by ASHA are also important in both of these situations. For example, hospital outreach programs supported by ASHA are contributing to the transition in Haiti through human resource development and the provision of much needed basic services. Leadership development efforts also have a potential bearing on efforts to avoid complex emergencies, through the exposure they provide to the concepts that underlie a civil society.

**(5) BHR/FFP**

FFP works closely with OFDA, OTI, other donors and its PVO and NGO partners to utilize its food aid in a preventive manner and to support post-crisis transitions in countries like Haiti and Angola. On the continuum from "relief to development," there are a number of practical steps which FFP is taking with its partner PVOs, NGOs and IOs. First, FFP is actively supporting its partners efforts to strengthen their capacity to undertake country-level, operational food aid strategies that integrate program interventions rather than depend upon an *ad hoc* project by project approach. Second, FFP is encouraging its partners to enhance their capability to undertake sub-national level vulnerability mapping to provide a common basis for joint analysis and action to target food aid more effectively in emergencies and to support "relief to development" transitions.

The World Food Program's Mozambique rehabilitation project is an example on the relief to development continuum of a project that BHR/FFP would like to see widely replicated. The project targets those who are the most food insecure. It was designed in cooperation with the World Bank. NGOs are involved as partners in project implementation. Improved but appropriate building technology is being used and there is an emphasis on World Food Program (WFP) procurement of food locally whenever possible -- to avoid having food aid serve as a disincentive to local producers. Another successful intervention has occurred in Cambodia where "free handouts are minimized in favor of the adoption of more selective interventions that no longer distinguish between repatriates, internally displaced people and vulnerable groups. Using poverty mapping, the poorest communities and people are selected and are encouraged to identify and implement activities that will best support them in the longer term."

## **b. New Initiatives**

Bureau and Office-level initiatives contribute to the achievement of this SO.

### **(1) Bureau-Level**

The Bureau is now pursuing integrated strategic planning covering several Offices, i.e., OTI, OFDA, FFP to develop new Transition Initiatives in countries like Angola.

### **(2) BHR/OFDA**

In order to enhance BHR's ability to better anticipate disasters and better plan for their needs, OFDA is creating a program planning position that will provide overall direction to long-term strategic planning efforts and a contingency planning position responsible for developing a methodology and procedures for contingency planning, especially for complex emergencies.

OFDA is also undertaking several efforts designed to better integrate prevention, mitigation and preparedness programs into BHR/OFDA's field activities including,

a plan to integrate PMP expertise into disaster assessments and DARTs and developing criteria to determine the relative effectiveness, including cost, of various response interventions.

In order to provide more timely and effective administrative support to its activities, OFDA has created a Program Support Division by separating out certain activities from its Operational Support Division.

To reduce the demands on the office's resources in responding to complex emergencies, OFDA is also exploring ways to expand OFDA and NGO expertise in conflict mitigation.

**c. Resources**

This Strategic Objective clearly falls within the purview of OTI and to a lesser extent OFDA. In keeping with its stated mission, each year OTI dedicates its full annual resources to this Strategic Objective. In a similar manner OFDA's Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness (PMP) Division also contributes its full annual budget to this Strategic Objective.

Both OTI and PMP are funded from the IDA account. OFDA also applies about \$3.8 million of DOD reimbursement to this objective. Approximately 3.5% to 4.0% of the Bureau's total annual resources are dedicated to SO #2. The Agency will need to provide additional resources to OTI in FY 1997 for successful achievement of this Strategic Objective.

**3. Strategic Objective #3: *Strengthened Capability of PVO & NGO Community and International Organizations to Deliver Development and Emergency Services***

**a. Key Programs**

Within the Bureau, primary responsibility for the achievement of this Strategic Objective lies with BHR/PVC. **BHR/OFDA, BHR/FFP and BHR/ASHA** also make some contributions to this SO.

**(1) BHR/PVC**

The **Matching Grants Program** assists PVOs in addressing USAID development priorities, e.g., microenterprise, environment, etc. PVO grants are matched dollar for dollar by participating PVOs and are used to develop their organizational capacity by improving their technical management and planning systems, replicate successfully programs, and expand into new sectors or initiate innovative actions. ACCION International is a good example of such a project. Through its Matching Grant, ACCION's Bolivian affiliate, PRODEM, received capacity building

assistance to begin its transformation into a financial institution, BancoSol, the first commercial bank for microenterprise lending in Bolivia.

The **Child Survival Grants Program** works with PVOs engaged in primary health care. Matched by a 25% contribution, these grants significantly impact the health status of mothers and children living in targeted areas in developing countries. The Save the Children Child Survival Grant is a good example of PVC's efforts in this area. The program focuses on a few interventions, such as oral rehydration therapy (ORT) and immunizations which have a high potential for saving lives, e.g., during the Bangladesh flood of 1992 not one child died of diarrhea in the project area as a result of the timely administration of ORT. Capacity building at the local level is a prime component of these grants.

**Cooperative Development Grants.** CDOs provide support to U.S. cooperative development organizations to enable them to help create or support cooperative movements in developing countries and the new democracies. These grants are designed to strengthen and expand the capacity of the U.S. organizations to work internationally, allowing them to provide TA aimed at capacity building of local cooperatives and credit unions.

PVC's **Farmer-to-Farmer Program**, funded principally through the resources of PL-480, defrays the costs of providing direct agricultural TA through U.S. volunteers to farmers, farmer organizations and agribusiness in LDCs, new democracies, and the NIS.

## **(2) BHR/OFDA**

OFDA contributes to this objective through its cooperative relationship with the PVO/NGO/IO community. The relationship is based on the role played by this community in delivering emergency relief to at-risk populations targeted by OFDA. Specifically, OFDA holds conferences and workshops with PVOs to explain and refine OFDA program objectives and programs so as to insure that the PVOs are working on the same track with OFDA. OFDA also funds a cooperative agreement with Inter-Action, the PVO membership organization, to better coordinate OFDA/PVO projects and to communicate OFDA needs. OFDA also provides capacity building assistance and staff support as well as program assistance to the UN Department of Humanitarian Assistance.

## **(3) BHR/FFP**

For FFP, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) including U.S.-based private voluntary agencies, UN and international organizations (IOs) possess unique skills and contacts: they are FFP's natural partners in developmental and emergency food aid interventions. Although Title II food can be provided directly to governments in emergency situations, the prime instrument used by FFP in both emergency and developmental Title II food assistance is the nongovernmental

sector. In Title III programs, FFP has encouraged USAID Missions to devote at least 10 percent of local currencies generated to support NGOs working on developmental food security-oriented projects.

FFP engages closely with its PVO and NGO partners, and international organizations to strengthen their capacity to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate Title II food programs. For example, FFP is currently working closely with the World Food Program (WFP) to strengthen its financial management and accounting systems and will soon host a strategic planning workshop for WFP senior management.

**The 202(e) and ISG Programs** are designed to encourage cooperating sponsors to improve country program capabilities to use Title II food as a resource to achieve food security; better the accounting principles of Title II commodities; and enhance the management skills of staff involved in Title II programs.

**(4) BHR/ASHA**

ASHA is doing pioneering work with organizations it supports, some of which are voluntary organizations, using foundation-like techniques for stimulating institutions to mature and to improve the skills and quality of their staff and Board members. Some of these efforts involve the introduction of strategic planning and resource mobilization concepts. Further, ASHA is taking an innovative forward look upon revenue generation, market niche and long term asset growth to help institutions be more self-reliant.

**b. New Initiatives**

Bureau and Office-level initiatives will support this SO.

**(1) Bureau-level**

BHR is playing a key role in the Agency's **New Partnerships Initiative** which is designed to provide a framework that will build local economic, political and social capacity so developing countries can take full responsibility for their own future well-being. A key component involves increased effort to strengthen civil societies in the developing countries by providing greater support for indigenous NGOs through partnerships with U.S. PVOs. The initiative builds on a number of recent reforms in Agency planning, contracting and implementation procedures designed to facilitate USAID's relationship with the PVO and NGO communities. An effort will be made to improve the overall capacity of NGOs to plan, manage and evaluate through the provision of training and technical assistance in such areas as: strategic planning and management; financial management and accounting; advocacy; board strengthening and internal governance.

USAID's **Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA)** and its subcommittees will continue to play an active role in focusing Agency policy issues in strategic areas, and over the coming months will direct its attention to specific examples of the USAID/PVO partnership in practice, particularly at the USAID Mission level.

**(2) BHR/PVC**

PVC's plans for the next three years will emphasize each of its program thrusts, focussing continued attention on its major child survival and matching grants programs. Emphasis will also be directed at increasing the scope and effectiveness of PVO/NGOs collaboration to obtain measurable improvements in strategic planning and management capabilities through PVC's **Global Excellence in Management (GEM) Program**. The office also will support a consortium designed to strengthen PVOs' capability to incorporate sustainability approaches and cost-recovery methodologies into their specific programs.

PVC programs will place increased priority on U.S. PVOs working with NGOs and increasing the capacity of their NGO partners. PVC will ensure that its grant program RFAs are revised as necessary to reflect consistency with BHR Strategic Objectives.

PVC will increase its emphasis on activities aimed improvements in PVO/NGO strategic planning and management capability, as well as their technical capacity.

**(3) BHR/FFP**

FFP plans to give greater attention and to allocate more resources to strengthening the program development and management capacity of USAID's food aid partners: PVOs, the World Food Program and local NGOs. USAID is committed to bringing food aid programs into a "managing for results" system in order to help ensure the greatest possible impact from scarce food aid resources. USAID intends to assist its partners to move in this direction. As USAID and its partners reach agreement on the objectives and results intended and are confident of the basic soundness of program plans, it should be possible for USAID to leave routine oversight of implementation of food aid programs to these partners. To reach this objective, it will be important for food aid proposals to demonstrate the same analytical rigor required of dollar funded programs. It will require considerable capacity building.

**c. Resources**

The Bureau's lead offices for the strengthening of PVOs and NGOs are PVC, ASHA and FFP via its institutional support grants and 202(e) programs. For FY 95 the Bureau has allocated \$100 million to this objective and plans to apply \$80 million to this purpose in FY 96. Additional resources will be required for PVC

in FY 1997 to support the New Partnerships Initiative. These programs represent approximately 8% of the Bureau's annual resources and all funding is from DA except for the Farmer to Farmer and the 202(e) programs which are funded out of PL-480. For a detailed breakout of annual resource allocations for each office by division and/or program see Annex 2.

**4. Strategic Objective #4: *Sustained Improvements in Household Nutrition and Agricultural Productivity for Vulnerable Groups Served by USAID Food Aid Programs***

**a. Key Programs**

The lead role with respect to this Strategic Objective is played by **BHR/FFP**. **BHR/PVC** also supports the achievement of this SO through its farmer-to-farmer program.

**(1) BHR/FFP**

Over the next three years, FFP plans to strengthen and support the bureau's efforts to maintain sustained improvements in household nutrition and agricultural productivity for targeted vulnerable groups primarily through focussed Title II development food aid programs.

Implementation of the new Food Security Policy Guidance as well as Title II program criteria focused specifically on children and mothers, and on alleviating hunger through increased agricultural productivity are ways in which FFP proposes to support this particular BHR objective. FFP's Title II Food for Work (FFW) and Maternal Child Health (MCH) programs attack problems associated with lack of food security such as poor production, infrastructure, income, and health/nutrition education.

FFP also plans to work very closely with the USAID Missions to ensure adoption of appropriate food security related strategic objectives at the country level and good integration of food aid and development assistance resources. FFP plans to participate with its PVO partners and Mission personnel on country-level S.O. teams to develop appropriate objectives and integrated program plans that are consistent with BHR's Strategic Objective #4.

Key program activities FFP proposes to undertake over the next three years include the organization of a collaborative meeting with the European Union and Canada for the identification of generic food aid indicators and uniform criteria on impact assessment. Inclusion of performance indicators in a December 1995 WFP committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes Agenda is also planned.

Work on refining FFP's monitoring and evaluation plan to coincide with the bureau's strategic plan and requirements under the Agency's re-engineering exercise are also underway.

**(2) BHR/PVC**

PVC's Farmer-to-Farmer Program is aimed at sustained improvements in agricultural productivity and the efficiency of food production systems. The program supports organizations that provide direct assistance to achieve these objectives.

**b. New Initiatives**

Agency and Office-level initiatives support the achievement of this SO.

**(1) BHR/PPE**

PPE contributes to this objective through the development of appropriate policies. For example, PPE played a leadership role in the drafting of USAID's new Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper.

**(2) BHR/FFP**

A new Title II project design and project review process was issued as part of the FY 1996 Title II guidance (see also pp. 60-61). A Food Aid Monitoring and Evaluation plan has been put in place. FFP is working with Food Aid Management (FAM), Management Systems International (MSI) and the PVOs to refine a "core" set of Title II performance indicators.

FFP has also taken various actions to:

- Increase the awareness of the use of food aid as a quality resource through a 40th Anniversary Conference on PL 480 promoting awareness of food aid and issues of program design and strategic direction;
- Establish a more efficient and effective management system for the agency's food aid programs including:
  - A 10 day basic food aid officers staff development and training course as an on going event;
  - A one day review of WFP's financial management for major donors in Brussels on December 1, 1994 to discuss WFP's concrete next steps required immediately to establish more effective accountability procedures and the estimated cost associated with enactment of these reforms;
  - The Greater Horn of Africa Food Security Workshop in Addis Ababa in March 1995.



- Implementation of 11 of 13 recommendations of the 1993 GAO audit as per the GAO March 1995 report entitled "Foreign Aid - Actions Taken to Improve Food Aid Management";
- Introduce a new Title II project design and project review process with the following components:
  - Title II Development Project Proposals (DPPs) will be approved on a multi-year basis. An annual action plan (AP) will combine the previously required multi-year operational plan update and annual progress report (APR).
  - Grants under section 202(e) of PL 480 will also be approved on a multi-year basis;
  - A standardized annual approval and procurement schedule (AAPS) will replace the Annual Estimate of Requirements form. This will be available as a computer macro and will include an annual procurement schedule and an annual Bellmon amendment certification;
  - A mid-project presentation by the cooperating sponsor is required,
  - An external impact evaluation of the project is required no later than the second quarter of the final year of the project.
- Redefine and focus food security Strategic Objectives, including the FFP Strategic Retreat and the USAID/PVO Strategic Retreat

**c. Resources**

This Strategic Objective is clearly the bailiwick of FFP and its funding from PL-480 is consistent with its purpose. This objective is second on the list of resource allocations for the Bureau. The only Strategic Objective receiving more funding is SO #1 with its emergency relief programs. Approximately 19% to 20% of the Bureau's annual budget is contributed towards the nutrition/agricultural productivity objective (approximately \$247 million in FY 95 and \$190 million in FY 96).

5. **Strategic Objective #5:** *BHR More Effectively Influences Agency Integration of Food Security, Disaster Relief, and PVO/NGO Collaboration in Strategic Planning for Country Programs*

a. **Key Programs**

The integration of BHR priorities such as food security, disaster relief and PVO/NGO collaboration with country strategic plans is an objective towards which the **BHR Front Office** and the Office of Program Planning and Evaluation (**BHR/PPE**) play a central role, but which also directly involves all BHR offices.

(1) **BHR/PPE**

PPE activities which contribute to this include analyses, studies, evaluations, preparation of draft policy statements, and active dialogue with PPC and the other Bureau on Policy issues. BHR/PPE plays a particularly important role in relation to Program Outcome No.1: BHR Priority Areas Accurately Reflect Overall Agency Policy and Planning. PPE has taken a leadership role in the drafting of key agency policy documents articulating policy principles of importance to BHR, and promoting increased integration of BHRs programs with the rest of the Agency. These include policy and planning directives such as the Humanitarian Assistance Strategy, Annex to the Strategic Planning Implementation Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance, PRD 50 and the Food Aid and Food Security Policy Paper.

PPE conducts analysis on policy concepts such as the *Relief to Development Continuum* which have important implications for the integration of BHR and other Agency resources. It also develops policy analysis tools, such as the Food Aid and Food Security Analysis System (FAFSAS), to better understand how BHR resources can best be coupled with other Development assistance resources for maximum impact. PPE coordinates key evaluations for the Bureau and collaborates with CDIE on policy studies to assess the impact of the Bureau's programs and make policy recommendations. Finally, PPE coordinates BHR inputs to the review of Agency strategies in other areas, and country program strategies and implementation plans to try to ensure that BHR programs and priorities are adequately reflected.

(2) **BHR/PVC**

PVC's grant programs, its information and support function, and its liaison and outreach functions all contribute directly to program outcomes under this Strategic Objective.

PVC helps to integrate PVOs into USAID Mission and Regional Bureau strategies through the direct participation of Missions and Regional bureaus in reviewing guidelines for PVC grant proposals and review of the PVO submissions. In

addition, PVC is actively engaged in the development of new policies affecting PVOs, both directly and through its support role with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (ACVFA). The Committee serves as a direct link between USAID and the private voluntary sector and provides non-governmental guidance to USAID and other U.S. Government agencies on those aspects of foreign assistance pertaining to PVOs. The current advisory committee appointed by Administrator Atwood has committed itself to a proactive and highly constructive role in advancing the USAID/PVO partnership and has influenced agency policy in key areas including procurement reforms. PVC's Information and Program Support Division provides services of broad benefit Agency-wide as well as to the overall PVO community, including registration of PVOs with USAID, the development of PVO executive contact lists and other information concerning the programs of PVOs with which USAID works, and support for PVO program evaluation and other technical assistance. These services result in a large database of PVO information that is shared widely, both informally and through various publications, and also informs BHR's discussion, within the Agency and in other fora, of PVO issues. PVC also works closely with PPC staff in the preparation of all policy guidance on USAID/PVO collaboration.

**(3) BHR/FFP**

FFP plays a strong advocacy role for better integration of food aid and other development assistance resources. Recent USAID evaluations have shown that food aid assistance is most effective where it is integrated with other USAID resources and programs. FFP promotes this integration by promoting active Mission and Geographic Bureau involvement in the review and approval of Title II programs, and by participating in the review of Country program strategies to ensure Missions with large food aid programs incorporate food security objectives in their strategic plans. As noted earlier, FFP also plans to participate with Missions and PVO partners on country-level Strategic Objective teams. The FFP office is also aggressively promoting the theme of better integration of Title II and DA resources through many different Fora ranging from the World Food Day Conference, and 50th anniversary celebration to the major food aid and food security conference it sponsored in Addis Ababa in March.

**(4) BHR/OFDA**

OFDA works in close consultation with other USAID regional bureaus, USAID field missions, the State Department and other relevant USG agencies as it plans its disaster relief interventions and its exit strategies from countries. It solicits field and regional Bureau comments and clearances for activities prior to authorization of funding for projects where USAID field missions are present. In a number of countries, close collaboration has resulted in a smooth transfer of activities from OFDA to the field missions, as programs transition from the relief to recovery mode. These successes serve as models for future strategic planning at the country level. OFDA has also begun to participate in regional bureau-led

program strategy reviews to try to assure that disaster issues are incorporated into country development strategies.

OFDA's provision of USAID Mission-based disaster specialists to manage Mission disaster portfolios, its dispatching of assessment and DART teams to emergency sites and its placement of disaster and PMP regional advisors around the world all serve to provide key information/communication functions between disaster and development specialists in-the country, within the Agency and between USAID and PVOs. Almost all of BHR/OFDA's work is implemented through the PVO/NGO community and the office meets regularly with grantees as well as the PVO consortium Interaction, which it supports financially. BHR/OFDA assures that the perspective of its implementing partners is known and considered during the Agency's strategic planning process.

**(5) BHR/OTI**

As a small new program operating with limited resources, OTI works closely with counterparts in the geographic bureau for the design of its programs, when it is working in countries such as Haiti where the Agency has USAID Missions. OTI must actively promote such coordination and integration since its interventions are of short duration and must be carefully linked with Mission programs for successful phase out.

**(6) BHR/ASHA**

BHR/ASHA, in a few instances, is collaborating with Regional Bureaus to build local institutions and support programs in countries where the institutions are significant contributors to the Mission's country strategy. Examples include: Lebanon, Bulgaria, Armenia, Haiti and Zaire.

**b. New Initiatives**

The discussion of Bureau-wide Strategic Actions at the beginning of Section Three called for a number of steps that the Bureau should take to promote better program integration and strengthened policy analysis which will directly contribute to the achievement of this objective.

In addition, there are a number of specific initiatives that the Bureau already has underway or plans to start in the near future which will help to promote better integration of BHR priorities with Agency programs.

- *Close collaboration with the new Humanitarian Assistance unit in PPC.* BHR/PPE has actively sought increased direct involvement of PPC in policy issues relevant to BHR. With the creation of a new Humanitarian Assistance Unit in PPC, PPE plans to forge a more effective partnership with PPC for policy formulation and implementation.

- *Continued close collaboration with the Africa Bureau, PPC and Global on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.* Since the inception of GHAI, BHR has worked closely with the Africa Bureau and other Bureaus on this key initiative. BHR sees this as an unusual opportunity to put its policy principles into action, and to promote creative new approaches to integrating food security, disaster prevention and relief and PVO/NGO collaboration into regional and country Mission programs in the Region. The Bureau will continue to give this initiative a high priority, playing an active role at all levels, including design of the new Horn of Africa Support Project (HASP).
- *Additional Food Aid and Food Security Workshops with Missions and PVOs, as a follow on to the successful GHAI workshop.* Since the food aid and food security workshop held in Addis Ababa in March, 1995 proved to be such a success in bringing together representatives from AID/W Bureaus, Senior Mission management, PVOs and other donor organizations together to focus on ways to increase integration of food aid resources and DA development funded programs to promote food security, BHR plans to hold similar workshops in the other Regions, beginning with LAC in September, 1995.
- *Development of a new integrated Bureau information system.* BHR is now close to completing a new information system that will integrate information about the programs of the Bureau's different offices. This will permit the Bureau for the first time to have a complete view of all its current and planned activities by country, and give it an important tool for joint strategic planning with the Geographic Bureaus and Missions.
- *Identify high priority countries for "unified" and joint strategic planning and develop new mechanisms for the different offices in the Bureau to work together on strategic planning with the Missions.* In the past, the individual Bureau offices have often worked independently with other Bureaus and Missions, and PVO partners in planning their programs. BHR is now moving to identify a few high priority countries, where multiple offices in the Bureau make significant investments, and to create a mechanism for the different offices to work together with the Missions on strategic planning. In addition, significant "unified" strategic planning sessions are underway for a few transition countries that receive funding from different Agency accounts and have extremely small or no Mission staff (eg. Rwanda/Burundi).
- *Strengthen the Bureau's policy analysis and evaluation capacity through new contractors.* BHR plans to address the constraint of inadequate resources for policy analysis and evaluation in part through the hiring of additional contractors. For example, a major contract is being competed to

provide additional technical and financial resources for the evaluation of the Bureau's disaster relief activities.

- *Pursue the new PVO Partnership Initiative.* Through its leadership in USAID's new Partnership Initiative and other activities, BHR will work to stimulate and facilitate a more active partnership between the Agency and the PVOs and Agency wide adoption of new policies and operating procedures for the PVOS. The recently approved new PVO policy paper, prepared by PPC in close collaboration with PVC and others, calls for much more active collaboration between the PVOs and the Missions in strategic planning, and BHR will pursue implementation of these guidelines in the period ahead.

### **c. Resources**

The office with primary responsibility for this Strategic Objective is PPE. While resource allocations for this SO are minimal in comparison with the other Bureau objectives, its importance to the Bureau's success should not be underestimated. This Strategic Objective is fully funded from DA monies and is achieved through PD&S and with OE-funded staff. Additional PD&S resources for FY 1997 will be required for the achievement of this objective. The annual budget is well under one half of one percent of the total Bureau budget.

## **C. Performance Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Plan**

This sections presents the background on BHR's efforts to develop a program performance information system. A description of how the system will operate is also provided.

### **1. Background**

In order to monitor performance, improve program integration, strengthen policy analysis and collaborate more effectively both within the Agency and externally, managers need pertinent, digestible and credible information in a timely manner. The Bureau's current information system is a compilation of existing Office systems established to meet the legitimate needs of these independent entities. BHR will develop a Program Performance Information System (PPIS) which will continue to meet the separate needs of the Offices while simultaneously supporting the strategic needs of BHR management. BHR currently has a buy-in to the PRISM Project to help with the development of the system. The preliminary design of the PPIS, not including automation, will completed by August, the final design by September, 1995 and the design of the automation of the PPIS will be completed by January, 1996.

BHR's PPIS will be a holistic approach to getting, analyzing and using information for decision making and reporting purposes. The monitoring component involves data collection, processing, and analysis of specified results-oriented indicators of change, usually on an annual basis. These indicators track information on what is happening, but

do not provide information on why or why not the expected change is occurring. Evaluations are undertaken of the entire program or specific strategies in order to determine the efficacy of program strategies and/or the significance of program outcomes and impacts for addressing development problems. Evaluations may a) question the strategic plan and critical assumptions; b) determine why or how the Strategic Objectives and program outcomes were or were not achieved; c) identify unintended effects; d) focus on the soundness of the hypotheses contained in the plan; and e) assess the extent to which unforeseen variables are impeding progress.

The monitoring component of the PPIS will help BHR staff make decisions to improve program performance and effectiveness. It will allow BHR to decide what effect or impact its programs are having on vulnerable groups, and it will also ensure accountability to all stakeholders in BHR's programs. The evaluation component will measure the extent to which objectives have been accomplished and what these accomplishments mean to vulnerable populations.

## **2. Description of the PPIS**

The PPIS will be built upon three levels of data collection and analysis: 1) the field level which involves the BHR grantees and implementers who collect the information; 2) the BHR Offices, specifically the program officers, who control data collection, disassemble Bureau-level information needs from the individual grantee reports; and 3) PPE which assembles the work of the BHR offices, collects information on performance indicators for Strategic Objective Five and reports changes on indicators at the goal-level. At the mid-term and final points of a project, grantees will participate in evaluation studies. At various points throughout the implementation of a program, the respective BHR Offices may call for special studies and evaluations to examine more closely issues of programmatic impact, sustainability, and strategic planning. BHR may also conduct bureau-level special studies to establish baseline information of relevance to all the Offices, to examine issues of resource allocation with respect to the Bureau strategic plan, and to assess other factors mentioned above.

- **Data Collection** The principal sources of information for the PPIS will be the BHR grantees and contractors. The respective Offices in BHR will incorporate the Bureau-level information needs into their existing information systems which already produce project monitoring and reporting data. In some cases, this will mean only systematizing what grantees are already doing. In other cases, it may mean developing instruments to collect new information. Grantees will submit annual reports at the end of each fiscal year to BHR program officers, incorporating the new or revised information.
- **Controlling and Assembling the Data** The Offices will be responsible for ensuring that their respective grantees comply with the information requirements, and that information is comparable, grantees use standardized instruments, and methodologically sound procedures are used to collect the information. Upon receipt of the grantee reports, Program Officers will identify the information

needed for Bureau-level reporting. The Program Officers will provide the PPE/PPIS office with contextual information to assist in analyzing and interpreting the information.

- **Analyzing the Data** It will be the responsibility of the yet-to-be created PPE/PPIS office to assemble and review the information received from each Office, and aggregate the information corresponding to the indicators in the BHR strategic plan. The PPE/PPIS Office will also be responsible for aggregating information for the indices and Exit Checklist used in Strategic Objectives Two, Three and Four. It will be the responsibility of this office insure coordination with the various BHR offices responsible for collecting data and clarify the meaning of data and data aggregation techniques used by the offices. This coordination and clarity of understanding is necessary in correctly analyzing the data from a Bureau-wide performance perspective. Additional contract staff may be necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the PPE/PPIS Office.
- **Presenting the Data** PPE will be responsible for assembling the information needed for Strategic Objective Five. In addition, PPE will report on progress toward the achievement of the BHR goals. PPE will also analyze the work of the Task Forces to address cross-cutting issues such as doublecounting, aggregation, and the like. PPE will present the results of the BHR PPIS plan to PPC on an annual basis.
- **Strategic Objective Teams** BHR will form Strategic Objective Teams for all five of its SOs. The primary role of the SO teams will be to insure inter-office coordination, understanding and agreement regarding performance monitoring and evaluation of each SO. The SO teams will be composed of representatives from each office which contributes an SO. The office which has primary coverage under each particular SO will be given responsibility for the execution of that SO team's duties. The teams for each SO will be headed by the following offices:

Strategic Objective One	OFDA
Strategic Objective Two	OTI
Strategic Objective Three	PVC
Strategic Objective Four	FFP
Strategic Objective Five	PPE

The S.O. groups will play important roles in each step of data gathering, analysis and presentation as well as for monitoring and evaluation findings. They will be particularly important in the development of data gathering methods, interpretation of data and findings, coordination with PVOs and other implementing agencies, and reporting from and to USAID bureaus and missions.



### 3. Development of the PPIS

Development of the PPIS will be carried out in four broad categories of work: indicator development; data collection; reporting; and automation. These phases of work will be inter-related and not linear, i.e. there will be continual refinement of each piece based on the development of others. This iterative process is also necessary since the PPIS is at the bureau-level, requiring analysis and design work at various organizational levels. Finally, the entire PPIS system will be developed in coordination with BHR's implementing PVOs, again requiring iterative refinement.

- **Indicator Development** The first phase in indicator development has been completed with the formulation of this Strategic Plan. As has been described above, the indicators presented here represent the bureau's best judgement as to performance information it will require. It is based on an assessment of information needs at the bureau-level, given BHR's mission, goals and objectives. This phase will be followed by two further phases of work: study of existing data collection systems in the BHR offices and programs and consensus building on established indicators with BHR's implementing PVOs, NGOs and international organizations. This phase of work will result in the final refinement of BHR indicators.
- **Data Collection** The data collection design stage of PPIS development will entail three fundamental phases: standardization of data collection methods for existing data; conceptual development of indices and data gathering instruments for new data; and identification and resolution of data aggregation issues. Under standardization, guidelines will be designed and prepared for all implementing PVOs and other entities. The purpose of the guidelines will be to provide a clear understanding and definition of all performance data required and to insure comparability of data. There will be special guidelines and training given for the gathering of new information and sometimes formulated in composite indices. Such as the yet-to-be developed Organizational Development Index, the Nutrition Index and the Exit Strategy Checklist. These composite indices will have to be developed and, once conceptualized, data gathering instruments will be developed. Finally, since data will be percolating up from the grass roots level, ways of aggregating data at ever higher levels will be studied, developed and agreed upon.
- **Reporting** Design of the reporting methods for the PPIS will involve three basic stages: analysis of existing reporting (local/mission/program and office); information needs assessment, (programs/offices/bureau); and PVO consensus building. Much of the understanding of existing reporting systems necessary for the development of a bureau-wide system will have been carried out in earlier study of office data gathering systems. However, there will be aspects of reporting that were not covered and others, such as PVO field - headquarters systems, that may not have been covered. The purpose of a thorough needs assessment study is to establish a proper understanding of who should get what information and at what intervals. Finally, once again the PVO community that

BHR works with will have to be consulted so as to build their consensus with the reporting system. They, after all, will be doing most of the work to make it run.

- **Automation** The automation of the PPIS will be carried out in four stages of work: study of existing automation, particularly among the PVOs; design of the system and its software; consensus building among the BHR offices and implementing PVOs; and the testing of the system.

## **D. Overview of Bureau Resource Requirements**

### Overview of Bureau Resource Requirements

In preparing this strategic plan BHR conducted an analysis of the resources required for each of the five strategic objectives, for the three year period between FY 95 and FY 97. This included a review of current resource levels and future needs from each of the three major sources of funding that support the Bureau's Programs: Development Assistance (DA), P.L. 480, and International Development Assistance (IDA). The Bureau developed an integrated budget which analyzed the resource needs by program, by office, and by strategic objectives. As part of this process, the Bureau analyzed how the resources of each office should be allocated in relation to the Bureau's five strategic objectives. The illustrative Table in Annex 2 indicates the format that was used to prepare this integrated budget.

The budget for the Strategic Plan is now being revised and updated to reflect the different planning levels requested by the FY 97 BBS guidance. It will be made available in the near future for review along with the rest of the Strategic Plan.

## **ANNEX 1**

### **PROGRAM OUTCOME INDICATORS**

## ANNEX 1

### PROGRAM OUTCOME INDICATORS

#### Strategic Objective One

*Critical needs of targeted  
vulnerable groups in emergency situations met*

A composite chart for Strategic Objective One is shown on the following page.

#### Program Outcome 1.1

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 1.1</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Timely, effective and targeted emergency relief</i>	<i>Average response time</i>
	<i>Degree of focus in identification of assisted vulnerable groups by critical need</i>
	<i>Time between funding requests from PVOs for emergency relief programs and OFDA obligation dates</i>

#### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

One way in which BHR will insure that critical needs of vulnerable populations are met is by providing timely, effective and targeted emergency relief. Timeliness is understood, first, as the time it takes OFDA to provide relief goods and services. This is measured from the time that a decision is made to provide assistance to the time assistance reaches the country. Delivery of goods from the port of entry to the disaster sites is in the hands of implementing agencies and therefore beyond the manageable interests of OFDA. Timeliness is also measured as the amount of time it takes USAID to process PVO requests for funding from receipt of proposal to obligation date.

To measure success of a strategy, program or activity in targeting vulnerable people and in ensuring effective delivery of resources (which are related variables) several submeasures could be isolated based on the specific nature of the response: reduced rate of malnutrition in health/nutrition programs; percent of vulnerable group covered by vaccinations in EPI programs; percent of group receiving seeds/tools in agriculture programs; reduced rate of diarrheal diseases among vulnerable groups in health/water/sanitation programs. The indicator is stated broadly so as to encompass the variety of sectors and types of assistance OFDA provides. Such lower-level measures would be used in monitoring relief assistance but would add up to the higher level of more focused disaster assistance delivered.

## Program Outcome 1.2

<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 1.2</b>	<b>INDICATORS:</b>
<i>Timely and effective rehabilitation</i>	<i>Percent vulnerable population assured with basic productive capacity in sync with agricultural cycle</i>
	<i>Time between funding requests from PVOs for rehabilitation programs and OFDA obligation data</i>
	<i>Percent resources channeled through indigenous organizations</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

BHR considers that emergency situations require not only relief supplies and activities but also rehabilitation services. These are provided by OFDA as well as OTI. Rehabilitation for vulnerable populations will be timely and effective.

Timeliness is measured in a similar fashion as that described above for emergency relief goods and services: The speed with which BHR, whether through OFDA or OTI, processes PVO proposals for rehabilitation from receipt to obligation of funds.

Effectiveness of rehabilitation services is measured as the percent of the vulnerable population provided with the necessary agricultural productive capacity, including seeds and tools, fertilizer, well drilling, and other inputs, in time with the appropriate stages of the agricultural cycle, i.e. planting, cultivation and harvesting. The indicator, therefore, measures not only effectiveness but also an aspect of timeliness.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. ONE**

OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE		BASELINE DATA MOST RECENT	
			YES	NO	YEAR	VALUE
<b>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. ONE:</b> Critical needs met of targeted vulnerable groups in emergency situation	% vulnerable population with critical emergency needs met	Implementing PVO records			FY94	
	Time between funding requests from PVOs for emergency relief and OFDA obligation dates	Grantee proposals			FY94	
		OFDA obligating dates			FY94	
		After Action Reports			FY94	
	Degree of focus in identification of assisted vulnerable groups by critical needs	OFDA and implementing PVO records and evaluations				
<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 1.2:</b> Timely and effective rehabilitation	Time between funding requests for rehabilitation programs and OFDA obligation dates	Grantee rehabilitation proposals			FY94	
		OFDA obligating dates			FY94	
	% vulnerable population assured with basic productive capacity in sync with agricultural cycle	PVO annual reports				
	% resources channeled through indigenous organizations	PVO annual reports				

## Strategic Objective Two

*Minimize the effects of disasters and  
to stabilize selected vulnerable and  
transitional societies*

A composite chart for Strategic Objective Two is shown on the following page.

### Program Outcome 2.1

<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.1:</b>	<b>INDICATORS:</b>
<i>Improved PMP for complex emergencies and natural disasters</i>	<i>PMP programs in place in the most disaster-prone countries</i>
	<i>Percent of early warning systems' recommendations resulting in preventative or mitigative actions taken</i>
	<i>Reduction in the percent of vulnerable population affected by disaster</i>
	<i>Percent countries previously requiring donor assistance to respond to emergencies that require fewer or no donor resources for new emergencies</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

Prevention, mitigation and preparedness (PMP) are the three categories of activities by which BHR attempts to reduce the effects of disasters. Although PMP activities primarily relate natural disasters, they are included under Strategic Objective Two because very often complex emergencies involve slow on-set natural disasters such as drought and famine and because societies sometimes react in the the same ways to complex emergencies as they do to natural disasters, e.g. mass migration.

Through OFDA, BHR carries out PMP activities in vulnerable geographic areas in several program areas including TA and training for emergency preparedness, early warning systems, and housing and infrastructure mitigation. Progress on this program outcome will count the PMP programs which are in place in the most disaster-prone countries. Where possible, OFDA will expand the measure to include the vulnerable populations addressed by these programs.

The second indicator for achieving PO 2.1 measures the extent to which actions recommended by early warning systems have been actually carried out. As was described above, one of the PMP activities OFDA undertakes is the development and installation of early warning systems in vulnerable areas. These systems vary from seismic and meteorological monitoring to less sophisticated forms of draught and famine early warning. But what is most important about

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. TWO**

OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE		BASELINE DATA	
			YES	NO	MOST RECENT YEAR	RECENT VALUE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. TWO: Minimize the effects of disasters and stabilize selected vulnerable and transitional societies	Progressive shift in the ratio of humanitarian to development assistance in transitional situations in which BHR intervenes	UNHCR records USAID budget: Categories of appropriations	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Progress in relation to exit criteria established for specific transitional situations in connection with BHR interventions	Dept. of Defense Checklist International Organizations Implementing PVO records Rapid Rural Appraisals	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	Time and resources required to return to normalcy in the wake of a natural disaster in comparison to established norms or "best case" scenarios	ex post evaluation studies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.1: Improved PMP for complex emergencies and natural disasters	Number PMP programs in place in disaster-prone countries	OFDA and implementing PVO records and evaluations	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	% of early warning systems' recommendations resulting in preventative or mitigative actions taken	OFDA and implementing PVO records and evaluations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	Reduction in the percent of vulnerable targeted population affected by disaster	OFDA and implementing PVO records and evaluations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	% countries previously requiring donor assistance to respond to emergencies that require fewer resources for new emergencies	OFDA and implementing PVO records and evaluations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.2: Secure environment for civilians	Number of demobilized soldiers and combatants enrolled in reintegration training programs	OTI and implementing PVO records	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	Per capita human rights violations	Human rights organization records	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	Miles of primary, secondary and tertiary roads made accessible	OTI and implementing PVO records	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	Other donor commitment to demining	UNHCR records and formal agreements	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	% territory of conflicted areas without international soldiers		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.3: Reconstructed political and social institutions	APPROPRIATE CIVIL SOCIETY PRACTICES INDICATOR (to be identified)		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	Number of functioning local NGOs	National registry	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.4: Self governance restored through local institutions providing basic services	% targeted population with access to selected basic services and infrastructure	OTI and implementing PVO records	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
	% targeted basic services restored to pre-disaster conditions	OTI and implementing PVO records	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
	% of relief proposals reflecting need for infrastructure restoration	Grantee proposals	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		



warnings is that they be heeded and that mitigative or preventative actions be taken. The second PO 2.1 indicator measures these actions over time and across vulnerable areas.

The first and second indicators, described above, addressing Program Outcome 2.1 are, basically, process output measures, i.e "programs in place", "plans formulated", "recommendations adopted" and "actions taken" are outcomes from OFDA activities designed to diminish the effects of disasters. The final indicator measuring performance on PO 2.1, "reduction in vulnerable population affected by disaster", is an impact measure. For each vulnerable area OFDA can estimate the at-risk population. In anticipation of disaster, those areas put PMP programs in place and adopt and carry out early warning recommendations. The test of the effectiveness of those actions is whether the population that had been considered as vulnerable was actually affected by the disaster. The final indicator will measure this ultimate impact from PMP activities.

### Program Outcome 2.2

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.2:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Secure environment for civilians</i>	<i>Number of demobilized soldiers and combatants enrolled in reintegration training programs</i>  <i>Per capita human rights violations</i>  <i>Miles of primary, secondary and tertiary roads made accessible</i>  <i>Other donor commitment to demining</i>  <i>Percent territory of conflicted areas without international soldiers</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

During situations of transitional crisis, whether created through natural disasters or civil disturbances, BHR's Strategic Objective is to help stabilize the situation. In transitional situations the first priority is to establish and maintain personal security in affected areas. This will be measured in five ways.

In the early stages of complex emergencies enhanced personal security generally means demilitarization. One of the main forms of demilitarization in which BHR has worked has been in demobilization and reintegration of combatants. The demobilization indicator will focus on both demobilized soldiers as well as other less formally recognized combatants and count those that have enrolled in OTI or other donor reintegration training programs and schools.

A general effectiveness measure of enhanced civilian security is a reduction in the number of reported human rights violations. In almost all transitional crises where BHR/OTI becomes involved there are also international human rights organizations also engaged at least as observers. Their records will provide the data for this variable.

An important aspect of enhanced security is freedom of movement which is generally curtailed in civil strife situations by land mines. The third indicator of enhanced security will be the number of miles of roadways free to civilian access. When people can move freely society and the economy can begin to grow once again. This information is fairly well kept by UNHCR and other military and relief organizations.

Another form of action BHR/OTI has sponsored has been to engage other foreign donors in enhancing security and this is included as an indicator.

The fifth general effectiveness indicator for enhanced civilian security is the extent to which intervening multinational military forces have been withdrawn from conflicted areas. Although there are examples of cases in the Balkans where multinational peacekeeping forces have been withdrawn for exactly the opposite reason - that their safety was threatened - OTI believes in most cases the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces indicates a reduction in personal danger.

### Program Outcome 2.3

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.3:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Reconstructed political and social institutions</i>	<i>APPROPRIATE CIVIL SOCIETY PRACTICES INDICATOR (to be identified)</i>
	<i>Number of functioning local NGOs</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

The important second stage of BHR intervention in transitional situations is the reestablishment of political and social institutions, particularly at the local level. Often during transitional situations national authority must be negotiated prior to reestablishment. It can take longer to achieve than vulnerable populations can wait for relief and return to normalcy. During the transition BHR concentrates on reestablishing local institutions through urgently needed grass roots actions. These institutions will be political, such as village committees or municipal governments, or social, such as neighborhood action groups, coops, religious organizations. BHR measures its progress through the number of functioning local non-governmental organizations (NGO). The NGO term is used in the widest sense to include all forms of community participation. The indicator looks to an increase over the transition period to the number of NGOs.

## Program Outcome 2.4

<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 2.4:</b>	<b>INDICATORS:</b>
<i>Self governance restored through local institutions providing basic services</i>	<i>Percent targeted population with access to selected basic services and infrastructure</i>  <i>Percent targeted basic services restored to pre-disaster conditions</i>  <i>Percent relief proposals reflecting need for infrastructure restoration</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

The final stage of BHR intervention in transitional situations is through the restoration of basic services. The provision of basic services is approached from two directions: the vulnerable population served and the reestablishment of basic services. These will form a check on each other because, given the particular situation, one may miss the intended result. In transitional situations populations sometimes move to new areas which did not provide the resulting necessary level of services. Consequently, restoration of services would not be an accurate measure. However, there often is the ultimate desire that populations which have moved return, making the measurement of restoration of basic services ultimately important.

An important element of the restoration of basic services is reconstruction of the infrastructure that delivers them. BHR will measure its progress in this component by the number of PVO and NGO proposals, whether to OFDA or to OTI, to improve basic infrastructure. The assumption is that during a transitional situation PVOs and their NGO partners are on the ground in all affected local areas. They know where infrastructure is still needed. Their proposals should reflect this need. The hypothesis is that the percentage of such proposals will decrease as BHR is stabilizing the situation.

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. THREE**

OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE		BASELINE DATA MOST RECENT	
			YES	NO	YEAR	VALUE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. THREE: Strengthened capacity of PVO & NGO community and international organizations to deliver development and emergency services	Impact of services delivered in core sectors:	PVO & NGO annual reports			FY95	
	Child Survival Program					
	Micro-enterprise Sector					
	Environment Sector					
	Number of ASHA grantees receiving a higher score in proposal reviews than the previous proposal submission	ASHA records			FY95	
	Organizational Development Index	Survey instrument (being prepared)				
PROGRAM OUTCOME 3.1: Increased capacity of individual PVOs, NGOs and IOs	Organizational Development Index	Survey instrument (being developed)				
	IO STRENGTHENING INDICATOR (to be developed)					
	% PMP proposals received by OFDA which are timely and targeted	BHR grant proposal reviews				
	PVO resources mobilized by BHR grantees for overseas programs	PVO/NGO financial statements			FY95	
	% PVOs with performance - based reporting capacity	Implementing PVO reports				
PROGRAM OUTCOME 3.2: Strengthened USAID/PVO, NGO, IO	% total USAID funds programmed through PVOs/NGOs/IOs	PPC			FY94	32.0%
	PVC budget levels directed to PVOs	PVC records			FY94	
	Number of formal consultative PVC sponsored groups meetings	PVC records			FY96	
	% in disaster relief resources directed at OFDA priority emergencies mobilized from the PVO community	PVO/NGO financial statements				
	Number of USAID policies, programs, and guidelines sent to PVOs for comment	PVC records				

## Strategic Objective Three

*Strengthened capacity of PVO and NGO community  
and international organizations  
to deliver development and emergency services*

A composite chart for Strategic Objective Three is shown on the following page.

### Program Outcome 3.1

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 3.1:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Increased capacity of individual PVOs, NGOs and IOs</i>	<i>Organizational Development Index</i> <i>Improved IO service delivery</i> <i>Percent PMP proposals received by OFDA which are timely and targeted</i> <i>PVO resources mobilized by BHR grantees for overseas programs</i> <i>Percent PVOs with performance-based reporting capacity</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

An Organizational Development Index is being developed by BHR/PVC which will encompass three dimensions of organization strength: technical, planning and management capacity. PVC, in coordination with FFP, OFDA and ASHA, will design an instrument and index scale which can be used to assess the relevant strengths of PVO and NGO grantees. Although this measure was included as an important indicator at the Strategic Objective level, BHR believes that this will also serve as a useful indicator of strengthened capacity at the Program Outcome level.

FFP and OFDA support emergency relief activities of international organizations such as the United Nations programs like the World Food Programme, Pan American Health Organization, the International Red Cross, and others. The nature of this support is principally in providing and delivering relief supplies and meeting critical health needs. While no assistance is directed to international organizations with the specific purpose of strengthening the capacity of these organizations to deliver emergency services, capacity may be strengthened indirectly through FFP and OFDA assistance. Impact will be observed through improvements in the timeliness and effectiveness of services delivered as measured in Program Outcome 1.1 for OFDA and FFP grantees for emergency food assistance. For development food assistance to IOs through FFP

the percent of IO programs with performance-based reporting (as in Program Outcome 3.1) will be a measurement of improved IO capacity to deliver services.

The quality of PVO and NGO grant proposals received by BHR for funding reflects grantsmanship, a key factor in resource mobilization. It also reflects an ability to conceptualize, plan, and budget, maintaining programmatic flexibility in order to meet grant standards and criteria. All of the BHR grant programs have means of ranking or scoring proposal quality and these will be used by OFDA to measure the quality of PMP proposals which are timely and targeted.

The increased ability of PVOs to mobilize funds, whether from sources other than USAID or from other parts of the Agency such as the Missions, to finance their overseas operations and programs is a standard attribute of organizational growth. BHR grantees are required to meet a 20% "privateness" test and some grants require the PVO to guarantee a 25-50% match with non-USAID funds. Beyond these requirements, it is BHR's hope that PVOs will, with increased capacity, better promote their services to other parts of USAID. This capacity of PVOs to mobilize resources other than from BHR offices will be used as another measure of PVO capacity.

Finally, a review of PVO reports to BHR will identify the extent to which PVOs are able to monitor activities against performance-based benchmarks and targets.

### Program Outcome 3.2

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 3.2:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Strengthened USAID/PVO, NGO, IO partnerships</i>	<i>Percent total USAID funds programmed through PVOs/NGOs/IOs</i>  <i>PVC budget levels directed to PVOs</i>  <i>Number of formal consultative PVC sponsored group meetings</i>  <i>Number of USAID policies, programs and guidelines sent to PVOs for comment</i>  <i>Percent disaster relief resources directed at OFDA priority emergencies mobilized by the PVO community</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

Probably the most general definition of the partnership between USAID and the PVO/NGO/IO communities is the amount of USAID's program which these communities are actually implementing. This will be measured by the amount of money USAID directs to PVOs/NGOs/IOs. Clearly, the precise ways of measuring the partnerships will be affected by the definition of partnership itself. For example, should pass through expenses such as food and equipment be included? Should PVO/NGO/IO operating expenses be included or just count end-

use funds for delivered services? Should training and technical assistance of local NGO partners be included? Despite the difficulties in measurement, BHR will include this indicator as a fundamental measure of the USAID partnership with the PVO, NGO, and IO communities.

Short of considering the total USAID budget for PVO programs and activities, however, BHR can be more certain of the measurement of the USAID/PVO partnership as the funds going to PVOs through the various PVC programs. These levels have generally been considered as a "bellwether" of USAID support to the PVO community.

Another dimension of the USAID/PVO partnership is the extent to which USAID consults with and involves PVOs in its policy and program decisions. BHR will measure the consultative/joint planning aspect of the partnership in two ways: the number of PVC-sponsored meetings and the number of occasions when PVC requests PVO comments on USAID policies, programs, and guidelines.

Finally, partnership is reflected in the degree to which USAID and the PVO/NGO/IO communities share common programmatic priorities. Evidence of these shared priorities is revealed in the responsiveness of funding requests received by OFDA from the PVO community and, more specifically, by the additional resources which the PVO community brings to OFDA priority emergencies. This definition of USAID partnership is reflected in the last indicator for Program Outcome 3.2.

## **Strategic Objective Four**

***Sustainable improvements in household nutrition  
and agricultural productivity for vulnerable groups  
served by USAID food aid programs***

A composite chart for Strategic Objective Three is shown on the following page.

### **Program Outcome 4.1**

<b><i>PROGRAM OUTCOME NO. 4.1</i></b>	<b><i>INDICATORS:</i></b>
<b><i>Sufficient health, water and sanitation infrastructure available to target groups</i></b>	<b><i>Percent targeted communities with potable water systems</i></b>
	<b><i>Percent targeted communities with access to adequate environmental sanitation</i></b>
	<b><i>Percent of targeted communities with access to adequate health facilities</i></b>

### **Indicator Rationale and Measurement**

In order for improvements in household nutrition to take place, adequate water, health, and sanitation infrastructures must exist in targeted areas.

This program outcome describes the sufficiency of essential water, sanitation and health infrastructure in targeted areas. The concept of sufficiency in terms of water quality is the measurement of "potable" meaning the absence of parasitic and other contaminants in the water supply.

The concept of a sufficient sanitation infrastructure might include on-site physical facilities such as latrines or drains, and systems organized for the removal and disposal of solid waste. The measurement of adequate environmental sanitation is complex, and involves different aspects of public health protective measures. For example, the separation of human biological waste from the population, water drainage, solid waste management and refuse disposal, and medical waste management are examples of measures taken to ensure "adequate" sanitation. A profile of adequate sanitation infrastructure will be developed by BHR to represent a range of interventions essential to public health.

Access to health facilities can be expressed in a variety of ways, although the most commonly used indicator is the number of people within a 2 km. radius of a health facility. The distance individuals must travel to access health services is a key measure of whether there are adequate health facilities available to target groups.



**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. FOUR**

OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE		BASELINE DATA MOST RECENT	
			YES	NO	YEAR	VALUE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. FOUR: Sustained improvements in household nutrition and ag. productivity for vulnerable groups served by USAID food aid programs	Proportion of household income needed to guarantee access to foods sufficient to meet the dietary needs for a healthy life	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Food insecure population as a % of total population (people that have access to sufficient foods to meet their dietary needs for a healthy life)	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	% food insecure population which has its temporary food needs met by USAID food aid programs	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Nutrition index, i.e. coverage, growth faltering, immunization and child feeding	PVO/NGO annual reports				
PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.1: Sufficient health, nutrition, water, and sanitation infrastructure available to target groups	% targeted communities with potable water systems	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	% targeted communities with access to adequate environmental sanitation	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	% targeted communities with access to adequate health infrastructure	PVO/NGO annual reports				
PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.2: Related preventive/curative services available to target groups	Utilization rates at health clinics (% increase in # visits, services provided to targeted groups, etc.)	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Utilization rates of water and sanitation systems					

**STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (cont.)**

OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE		BASELINE DATA MOST RECENT	
			YES	NO	YEAR	VALUE
<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.3:</b> Improved agricultural infrastructure for targeted groups	Km. feeder roads built and improved in target area	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Hectares under irrigation in target area	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Storage capacity (MT) in target area	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Ha. forested/terraced in target areas	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	% retail price of food attributed to on-farm and post-farm costs in target areas	PVO/NGO annual reports				
<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.4:</b> Increased use of agricultural inputs by targeted groups	Amount of improved seeds provided by PVO or purchased through PVO credit programs	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Hectares where fertilizer is applied (chemical or organic)	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	Amount of ag inputs purchased through PVO credit programs	PVO/NGO annual reports				
<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.5:</b> Food aid programs focused on food deficit countries and most food insecure groups	% Title II food aid resources going to UN list of "food insecure countries"	FFP				
	Ratio of the value of food programs in food insecure countries as compared to food secure countries	FFP				
	Percent of food insecure areas covered by food aid programs	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	% of food programs integrated into national "safety net programs"	PVO/NGO annual reports				
	% of host gov. resources contributing to social "safety net" programs for vulnerable groups	PVO/NGO annual reports				

## Program Outcome 4.2

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.2:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Related preventive/curative services available to target groups</i>	<i>Utilization rates of health clinics (visits, services provided to targeted groups, etc.)</i>
	<i>Utilization rates of water and sanitation systems</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

In order for household nutrition to improve, targeted populations must be able to take advantage of the water, health and sanitation services available.

This program outcome describes the delivery of essential water, sanitation and health (including nutrition) services to targeted populations. Utilization of health services is commonly reported across a wide range of interventions and will be aggregated to form a profile of the curative and preventive services available to targeted populations. Utilization of water and sanitation systems poses a more complicated data collection challenge. The use of proxy indicators such as the rate diarrheal disease, hepatitis, and other water borne ailments will be explored.

## Program Outcome 4.3

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 4.3:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Improved agricultural infrastructure for targeted groups</i>	<i>Km. feeder roads built and improved in target areas</i>
	<i>Ha. under irrigation in target area</i>
	<i>Storage capacity (MT) in target area</i>
	<i>Ha. forested/terraced in target area</i>
	<i>Percent retail price of food attributable to on-farm and post-farm gate costs in target area</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

These indicators measure changes in the improvement of agricultural infrastructure in the targeted area. The more feeder roads which are built and improved the easier it is to move agricultural products to market. All things being equal, irrigation, forestation and terracing are measures which are related to agricultural productivity. Storage capacity also reflected the state of the agricultural infrastructure in an area. The lower the post-farm gate costs (including transformation and distribution) of food in relation to the on-farm cost of production, the better the agricultural infrastructure in an area. One difficulty in reporting retail price data is seasonality. In order to get the most extreme difference between on-farm and post-farm gate prices, data should be collected during periods when food is scarce. Improvements during this period will be accurately

reflect the status of the agricultural infrastructure and productivity. PVOs receiving assistance from FFP will monitor and report this data.

#### Program Outcome 4.4

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME NO. 4.4</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Use of agricultural inputs by targeted groups</i>	<i>Amount of improved seeds provided by PVO grantees or purchased through PVO credit programs funded by BHR</i>  <i>Ha. where fertilizer is applied (chemical or organic)</i>  <i>Amount of credit used to purchase ag inputs, transform and distribute ag products</i>

#### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

These indicators describe the changes taking place in the use of agricultural inputs by the targeted groups. Seeds and fertilizer are frequently supplied agricultural inputs in the FFP development food assistance programs. PVOs implementing these programs may use food monetization proceeds to offer credit to vulnerable groups to enable them to purchase other agricultural inputs, or generate income through the transformation, distribution and marketing of agricultural products. The amount of credit used for these purposes is one measure of the degree of utilization of ag inputs by the targeted population.

#### Program Outcome 4.5

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME NO. 4.5</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Food aid programs focused on food deficit countries and most food insecure groups</i>	<i>Percent Title II food aid resources going to UN list of "food insecure countries"</i>  <i>Ratio of the value of food programs in food insecure countries as compared to food secure countries</i>  <i>Percent of food insecure areas covered by food aid programs</i>  <i>Percent of food programs integrated into national "safety net" programs</i>  <i>Percent of host government resources contributing to social "safety net" programs for vulnerable groups</i>

### **Indicator Rationale and Measurement**

These indicators measure the degree of host government commitment to providing services to vulnerable groups and the degree of "fitness" between BHR's food aid programs and the most food insecure areas and populations. Safety net programs might include typical Food for Work activities which provide temporary employment, community kitchens and school feeding programs. Safety net programs provide temporary, not emergency assistance to vulnerable groups.

## Strategic Objective Five

*BHR more effectively influences Agency integration of food security, disaster relief, and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs*

A composite chart for Strategic Objective Three is shown on the following page.

### Program Outcome 5.1

<i>PROGRAM OUTCOME 5.1:</i>	<i>INDICATORS:</i>
<i>Agency policy influenced agency policies</i>	<i>Number of BHR-related policies and guidelines incorporated into guidelines</i>
	<i>Number of organizational units created agency-wide to implement BHR policies and guidelines</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

BHR strives to influence the Agency regarding the particular areas of its concern: emergency relief, crisis transition, PVO/NGO strengthening and food assistance. These are areas which from time to time attract the concerted attention of the Agency but for the most part are tangential to what agency professionals feel is their primary focus: sustainable development through economic growth, democratization, the environment and health and population. BHR recognizes that the areas of its concern are interwoven with and can significantly affect sustainable development. Therefore, influencing Agency policy in order to better integrate BHR affairs into those of sustainable development is an important Bureau strategic objective. Influencing the Agency for BHR takes two fundamental approaches: affecting Agency policy and involvement in mission and regional bureau plans and programs.

BHR will measure its influence on the Agency by looking at the extent to which policies, guidelines, and other principal Agency directives have been formulated with significant input from the Bureau. This is a direct measure of the bureau's desired outcome.

BHR recognizes that a possibly more significant, and certainly profound expression of BHR influence on the Agency is the extent to which it actually restructures itself to address the concerns of the Bureau. This will be manifest in the formation of new organizational units whose purposes are to monitor, carry out, or otherwise address the areas of humanitarian assistance covered by BHR.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. FIVE

OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES	PROPOSED INDICATORS	SUGGESTED DATA SOURCES	CURRENTLY AVAILABLE		BASELINE DATA MOST RECENT	
			YES	NO	YEAR	VALUE
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE No. FIVE: Agency more effectively integrates food security, disaster relief, and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs	% of USAID missions and/or countries incorporating hazard vulnerability in their country strategies and programs	CDIE file of official strategic plans			FY95	
		OFDA/PMP program records			FY95	
	% mission/bureau budgets implemented through PVO/NGOs	USAID financial reports			FY95	
	% missions including food security in their country plans and programs	CDIE file of official strategic plans			FY95	
	Value of mission programs including food security in plans and programs as a percent of total mission programs	USAID/M official documents			FY95	
PROGRAM OUTCOME 5.1: Agency policy influenced	Number of BHR-related policies and guidelines incorporated into agency policies and guidelines	USAID/M official documents			FY95	
	Number of organizational units created agency-wide to implement BHR policies and guidelines	USAID agency reports: Congressional Presentation			FY95	
PROGRAM OUTCOME 5.2: Involvement in regional/bureau/mission strategic planning processes	% of participation in regional bureau / mission strategic planning meetings and/or efforts, including "unified" strategies	CDIE file of official strategic plans			FY95	
	Number of vulnerable USAID countries where BHR is effectively engaged with missions	Mission strategic plans			FY95	
	Number of mission strategic plans which reflect BHR priority sectors and interests	Mission strategic plans			FY95	



## Program Outcome 5.2

<b>PROGRAM OUTCOME 5.2:</b>	<b>INDICATORS:</b>
<i>Involvement in regional.bureau/mission strategic planning processes</i>	<i>Percent of participation in regional/bureau/mission strategic planning meetings and/or efforts, including development of "unified" strategies</i>
	<i>Number of vulnerable USAID countries where BHR is effectively engaged (with missions)</i>
	<i>Number of mission strategic plans which reflect BHR priority sectors and interests</i>

### Indicator Rationale and Measurement

The second way in which BHR intends to influence the Agency is at the country level in the missions and the regional bureaus. The Bureau will measure its involvement in mission and regional bureau formulation of plans directly through the various contacts it has in the process, including meetings, conferences, planning team membership - especially in the development of "unified" strategies, technical reports provided, and in other similar forms.

BHR will also focus on those countries it has identified as vulnerable and measure the extent to which the Bureau has been effectly engaged, whether in the formulation of plans and programs or direct participation in mission activities.

Finally, BHR will measure the extent to which its priority area have been reflected in mission plans. This information will be gathered largely from CDIE and its files on mission strategic plans.

## **ANNEX 2**

# **OVERVIEW OF BUREAU RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS**

## **ANNEX 2**

### **Overview of Bureau Resource Requirements**

In preparing this strategic plan BHR conducted an analysis of the resources required for each of the five strategic objectives, for the three year period between FY 95 and FY 97. This included a review of current resource levels and future needs from each of the three major sources of funding that support the Bureau's Programs: Development Assistance (DA), P.L. 480, and International Development Assistance (IDA). The Bureau developed an integrated budget which analyzed the resource needs by program, by office, and by strategic objectives. As part of this process, the Bureau analyzed how the resources of each office should be allocated in relation to the Bureau's five strategic objectives. The illustrative Tables in this Annex reflect the different planning levels requested for the FY 97 BHR budget. Five budgets are included:

- A FY 1995 Budget (Estimated)
- B FY 1996 Congressional Presentation (CP) Budget Level
- C FY 1997 Budget Proposal: CP Level plus 5%
- D FY 1997 Budget Proposal: CP Level minus 3%
- E FY 1997 Budget Proposal: CP Level minus 25%

BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE						
FY95 BUDGET ESTIMATE						
OFFICE NAME	SO #1	SO #2	SO #3	SO #4	SO #5	AMOUNT BUDGETED
AMERICAN SCHOOLS & HOSPITALS ABROAD (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$29,098,947	\$0	\$0	\$29,098,947
FOOD FOR PEACE (PL480)						
Title II -- Development	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$300,714,000	\$0	\$300,714,000
Title II -- Transition	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Title II -- Emergency	\$417,591,100	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$417,591,100
Title II -- WFP Pledge	\$79,368,235	\$0	\$0	\$67,882,665	\$0	\$147,250,900
Title II -- Section 202(e)	\$769,500	\$0	\$12,730,500	\$0	\$0	\$13,500,000
Farmer to Farmer (PL480)	\$0	\$0	\$1,642,200	\$0	\$0	\$1,642,200
Farmer to Farmer (NIS OYB TRANSFER)	\$0	\$0	\$7,545,000	\$0	\$0	\$7,545,000
DOT Reimbursement	(\$12,000,000)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$12,000,000)
OYB Adjustments*	(\$47,598,200)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$47,598,200)
Subtotal Title II	\$438,130,635	\$0	\$21,917,700	\$368,596,665	\$0	\$828,645,000
Title III -- Development	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$117,400,000	\$0	\$117,400,000
Total Farm Bill Funding	\$438,130,635	\$0	\$21,917,700	\$485,996,665	\$0	\$946,045,000
Institutional Support Grants (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$6,094,628	\$0	\$0	\$6,094,628
FFP TOTAL BUDGET	\$438,130,635	\$0	\$28,012,328	\$485,996,665	\$0	\$952,139,628
FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (IDA)						
EMERGENCIES	\$141,095,208	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$141,095,208
STOCKPILE	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE SUPPORT	\$9,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$9,500,000
PREVENT., MITIGATION & PREPARED.	\$0	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$10,000,000
RWANDA SUPPLEMENTAL (FY95)	\$18,185,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$18,185,000
DOD REIMBURSEMENT (FY95)	\$7,700,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$7,700,000
OFOA TOTAL BUDGET	\$175,960,208	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$185,960,208
PROGRAM PLANNING & EVALUATION (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$982,240	\$982,240
PRIVATE & VOLUNTARY COOPERATION (DA)						
MATCHING GRANTS TO PVOS	\$0	\$0	\$18,728,801	\$0	\$0	\$18,728,801
COOPERATIVE GRANTS TO PVOS	\$0	\$0	\$5,510,000	\$0	\$0	\$5,510,000
DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
OCEAN FREIGHT REIMBURSEMENT	\$0	\$0	\$3,200,000	\$0	\$0	\$3,200,000
OPPOR. INDUSTRIAL CENTERS INT'L	\$0	\$0	\$1,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$1,500,000
CHILD SURVIVAL	\$0	\$0	\$17,545,834	\$0	\$0	\$17,545,834
PVO CAPACITY BUILDING	\$0	\$0	\$1,185,456	\$0	\$0	\$1,185,456
PVC/PVO PROGRAM SUPPORT	\$0	\$0	\$1,370,000	\$0	\$0	\$1,370,000
NEW PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
PVC TOTAL BUDGET	\$0	\$0	\$51,539,891	\$0	\$0	\$51,539,891
TRANSITION INITIATIVES TOTAL BUDGET (IDA)	\$0	\$21,562,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$21,562,000
BHR'S TOTAL PROGRAM BUDGET	\$814,090,843	\$31,562,000	\$108,651,188	\$485,996,665	\$982,240	\$1,241,282,914
* DOD MOU \$7.3 MILLION; MARAD FY92 FUNDS \$14.9 MILLION; PREVIOUS TITLE II FUNDS \$25.4 MILLION						

BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE FY96 BUDGET @ FY96 CP						
OFFICE NAME	SO #1	SO #2	SO #3	SO #4	SO #5	AMOUNT BUDGETED
AMERICAN SCHOOLS & HOSPITALS ABROAD (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$15,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$15,000,000
FOOD FOR PEACE (PL480)						
Title II - Development	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$270,000,000	\$0	\$270,000,000
Title II - Transition	\$0	\$20,508,600	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$20,508,600
Title II - Emergency	\$352,800,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$352,800,000
Title II - WFP Pledge	\$85,062,600	\$0	\$0	\$58,237,400	\$0	\$141,300,000
Title II - Section 202(e)	\$2,700,000	\$0	\$8,100,000	\$2,700,000	\$0	\$13,500,000
Farmer to Farmer	\$0	\$0	\$1,591,400	\$0	\$0	\$1,591,400
Farmer to Farmer (NIS)	\$0	\$0	\$8,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$8,000,000
DOT Reimbursement	(\$12,000,000)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$12,000,000)
Subtotal Title II	\$428,562,600	\$20,508,600	\$17,691,400	\$328,937,400	\$0	\$795,700,000
Title III - Development	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$50,000,000	\$0	\$50,000,000
Total Farm Bill Funding	\$428,562,600	\$20,508,600	\$17,691,400	\$378,937,400	\$0	\$845,700,000
Institutional Support Grants (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$8,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$8,500,000
FFP TOTAL BUDGET	\$428,562,600	\$20,508,600	\$24,191,400	\$378,937,400	\$0	\$852,200,000
FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (IDA)						
EMERGENCIES	\$181,467,122	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$181,467,122
STOCKPILE	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE SUPPORT	\$11,032,878	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$11,032,878
PREVENT., MITIGATION & PREPARED.	\$0	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$10,000,000
OFDA TOTAL BUDGET	\$185,000,000	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$175,000,000
PROGRAM PLANNING & EVALUATION (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$600,000	\$600,000
PRIVATE & VOLUNTARY COOPERATION (DA)						
MATCHING GRANTS TO PVOS	\$0	\$0	\$17,845,000	\$0	\$0	\$17,845,000
COOPERATIVE GRANTS TO PVOS	\$0	\$0	\$5,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$5,500,000
DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
OCEAN FREIGHT REIMBURSEMENT	\$0	\$0	\$3,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$3,000,000
OPPOR. INDUSTRIAL CENTERS INT'L	\$0	\$0	\$1,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$1,000,000
CHILD SURVIVAL	\$0	\$0	\$17,545,000	\$0	\$0	\$17,545,000
PVO CAPACITY BUILDING	\$0	\$0	\$1,210,000	\$0	\$0	\$1,210,000
PVC/PVO PROGRAM SUPPORT	\$0	\$0	\$1,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$1,500,000
NEW PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE	\$0	\$0	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$10,000,000
PVC TOTAL BUDGET	\$0	\$0	\$80,100,000	\$0	\$0	\$80,100,000
TRANSITION INITIATIVES TOTAL BUDGET (IDA)	\$0	\$25,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$25,000,000
BHR'S TOTAL PROGRAM BUDGET	\$593,562,600	\$55,508,600	\$99,291,400	\$378,937,400	\$600,000	\$1,127,900,000

[illegible]

BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE						
FY97 BUDGET @ 97% OF FY96 CP						
OFFICE NAME	SO #1	SO #2	SO #3	SO #4	SO #5	AMOUNT BUDGETED
AMERICAN SCHOOLS & HOSPITALS ABROAD (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$14,550,000	\$0	\$0	\$14,550,000
FOOD FOR PEACE (PL480)						
Title II - Development	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$263,290,438	\$0	\$263,290,438
Title II - Transition	\$0	\$19,893,342	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$19,893,342
Title II - Emergency	\$344,301,854	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$344,301,854
Title II - WFP Pledge	\$84,951,100	\$0	\$0	\$58,348,900	\$0	\$141,300,000
Title II - Section 202(e)	\$2,700,000	\$0	\$8,100,000	\$2,700,000	\$0	\$13,500,000
Farmer to Farmer	\$0	\$0	\$1,543,588	\$0	\$0	\$1,543,588
Farmer to Farmer (NIS)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
DOT Reimbursement	(\$12,000,000)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$12,000,000)
Subtotal Title II	\$419,952,754	\$19,893,342	\$9,643,588	\$322,339,338	\$0	\$771,829,000
Title III - Development	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$48,500,000	\$0	\$48,500,000
Total Farm Bill Funding	\$419,952,754	\$19,893,342	\$9,643,588	\$370,839,338	\$0	\$820,329,000
Institutional Support Grants (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$8,305,000	\$0	\$0	\$8,305,000
FFP TOTAL BUDGET	\$419,952,754	\$19,893,342	\$15,948,588	\$370,839,338	\$0	\$826,834,000
FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (IDA)						
EMERGENCIES	\$181,250,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$181,250,000
STOCKPILE	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE SUPPORT	\$11,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$11,000,000
PREVENT., MITIGATION & PREPARED.	\$0	\$5,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$5,000,000
OFDA TOTAL BUDGET	\$184,750,000	\$5,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$189,750,000
PROGRAM PLANNING & EVALUATION (DA)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$582,000	\$582,000
PRIVATE & VOLUNTARY COOPERATION (DA)						
MATCHING GRANTS TO PVOS	\$0	\$0	\$17,097,000	\$0	\$0	\$17,097,000
COOPERATIVE GRANTS TO PVOS	\$0	\$0	\$5,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$5,000,000
DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
OCEAN FREIGHT REIMBURSEMENT	\$0	\$0	\$3,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$3,000,000
OPPOR. INDUSTRIAL CENTERS INT'L	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
CHILD SURVIVAL	\$0	\$0	\$17,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$17,000,000
PVO CAPACITY BUILDING	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$2,500,000
PVC/PVO PROGRAM SUPPORT	\$0	\$0	\$1,500,000	\$0	\$0	\$1,500,000
NEW PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE	\$0	\$0	\$10,000,000	\$0	\$0	\$10,000,000
PVC TOTAL BUDGET	\$0	\$0	\$58,597,000	\$0	\$0	\$58,597,000
TRANSITION INITIATIVES TOTAL BUDGET (IDA)	\$0	\$24,250,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$24,250,000
BHR'S TOTAL PROGRAM BUDGET	\$584,702,754	\$49,143,342	\$89,095,588	\$370,839,338	\$582,000	\$1,094,363,000

[illegible]



## **ANNEX 3**

# **POLICY GUIDELINES AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES**

## ANNEX 3

### Policy Guidelines and Underlying Principles

The BHR Strategic Plan has been prepared within the guiding framework of extant Agency policies including *Strategies for Sustainable Development*, *Guidelines for Strategic Plans*, *Food Aid and Food Security*, *Agency Policy Toward Private Voluntary Organizations* and other policy documents and guidelines pertaining to program direction, internal coordination and operation of programs under BHR jurisdiction. These documents reflect the growing recognition of the negative impact of complex emergencies on the development process and the intent of the Agency to dedicate resources to counteract their deleterious effects. That Humanitarian Assistance is one of the Agency's five strategic priority areas is testament to this commitment. In addition, the formulation of this Strategic Plan has been heavily influenced by several fundamental tenets enunciated either explicitly or implicitly in Agency and/or Bureau policy and briefly summarized below:

- *Humanitarian assistance is not separate from, but is integral to, an overall strategy to achieve sustainable development. This reality is increasingly evident as a result of the growing frequency of complex emergencies. As the Agency pursues its five central development objectives, much can be done both to anticipate and prevent disasters and to mitigate their effects when they occur. Close collaboration between BHR and other units within the Agency is of critical importance to sustained development progress.*
- *Humanitarian assistance has multiple objectives along a continuum that ranges from the saving of lives and the preservation of property to the re-establishment of the basic institutions of civility and governance and the maintenance of food security, and the achievement of sustainable development.*
- *As is the case with USAID's programs in democracy, environment, economic growth and population, health and nutrition, a fundamental thrust of BHR's programs is to build and strengthen indigenous capacity. This includes a capability to anticipate and deal with emergencies, maintain or return to stability during periods of transition, build a private sector capacity to deliver emergency and development services and improve availability, access and utilization of food.*
- *Modest investments in prevention, mitigation and preparedness -- through development programs as well as activities dedicated to that purpose -- can make the difference between a society rent by havoc and one maintaining the path of stability.*
- *BHR has a special concern for nations that are trying to emerge from crisis or make a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. These countries often have urgent short term political requirements that are not addressed by either traditional relief programs or programs of sustainable development.*

- *To be effective, the Bureau must pay increased attention to linkages that exist across organizational boundaries. This is particularly relevant with respect to building organizational capacity, strengthening the structures of civil society and increasing food security.*
- *Within USAID, BHR recognizes its special relationship with regional bureaus. While it works closely and collaboratively with these bureaus, BHR has its own independent policy and programmatic objectives which derive from its technical expertise and its ability to command resources from a central position.*
- *Finally, it is BHR policy that the Bureau will function as an integrated unit when there are potential complementarities and synergies that can be realized in pursuit of program effectiveness and impact.*

## **ANNEX 4**

### **SUMMARY: REVIEW ISSUES AND THEIR RESOLUTION**

## **ANNEX 4**

### **BHR STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN REVIEW ISSUES AND THEIR RESOLUTION**

Two Issues Meetings were held to discuss the BHR strategy and action plan: the first was held on 7/25/95; the second on 8/11/95. Attendance at these sessions was high and there was representation from all regional Bureaus as well as the Management and Global Bureaus at one or both of the sessions. Many issues were submitted verbally or in writing to the Bureau during this review process. This paper summarizes the issues raised and indicates how each issue was addressed during the review process. It is meant to serve as a record of the review process and is annexed to the BHR Strategic Plan.

Four categories of issues are presented below:

#### **I. Issues resolved in the 8/11/95 Issues Meeting**

This paper devotes considerable space to discussion of these issues as BHR views them as the priority issues raised in the context of this review.

#### **II. Other resolved issues**

These issues/comments were either discussed and resolved in the 7/25 Issues Meeting or were simply addressed in writing by BHR. Reviewers were invited to comment on our proposed handling of these issues; no comments were received. They are only briefly discussed in this paper since for the most part BHR considers them issues that were easily and quickly addressed.

#### **III. Issues deferred to the BHR office-level strategy process**

Given the many issues submitted for this strategy review and the fact that many directly relate to individual BHR operating units (offices), BHR proposed to reviewers that the issues in this section be addressed in the context of the BHR office level strategic planning process which is getting underway. They were not discussed at length in the context of this Bureau level review.

#### **IV. Issues outside context of BHR strategy review.**

BHR felt that some issues could simply not be addressed in the context of the BHR strategic planning process. They are either Agency or broader USG issues that need to be addressed in other fora. They were raised but not discussed at length in the context of the BHR strategy review.

## **I. BHR Issues Resolved in 8/11/95 Issues Meeting**

The issues outlined in this section comprise the priority issues raised and addressed in the context of the BHR strategy review.

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A. BHR SOs do not conform to Agency guidance on what SOs should be for operating units. They are not within BHR manageable interest and performance against them cannot be easily measured. Therefore, we will not be able to do performance based budgeting. A related issue is that BHR is in countries that have FAILED - therefore, performance based budgeting is not relevant to much of our work.

BHR Opening Comment: Because we have applied the PRISM system to a Bureau with different offices conducting varied programs, we cannot create SOs that are as narrowly defined as those of Missions and still capture what the Bureau does. The BHR strategy has some characteristics of an "operating unit", but basically we have set out broad SOs under which we will capture more narrowly defined objectives in the office level plans and in the indicators at both the Bureau and office levels. It is fair to say that performance based budgeting can be applied only partially against the BHR system and does not work across the board. For example good performance in an emergency response would not necessarily mean more money going to a specific country program if the crisis has ended or entered a different stage. Good indicators, however, can help measure performance, track the effectiveness of money spent and generally inform the budget process; (e.g., measuring the impact of OFDA/PMP or OTI programs could lead to more resources for that activity.) This is true in spite of the broad SOs.

Discussion: Various points raised led to a determination to retain the SOs as written, despite their broad nature. Those points included: a) Agency guidance is conceptually weak with regard to creating a humanitarian assistance strategy because the performance based measurement standard is difficult to apply in humanitarian emergency countries; b) the "operating units" of the Bureau are at the office level; therefore, the broadness of these SOs are not problematic. The operating units will have more narrowly defined SOs; and c.) according to some in the meeting, these SOs are precisely defined as written and within the manageable interest of the Bureau. Some readers take issue with the very premise of the criticism.

There was also considerable discussion with regard to whether or not the SOs are "support objectives" whose measurable success should be determined at the Mission level. The LAC Bureau felt strongly that SO #4 fell into that category while others felt that all of the SOs could be considered support objectives in some way. Direct grants given by the Bureau however, led others to feel that they are still direct objectives for the Bureau, as well. It was acknowledged that the concept of "support objectives" is relatively new and not yet well fleshed-out by the Agency.

Resolution: The SOs have not been revised to meet this concern. However, the text of the strategy has been amended to incorporate points A and B above. (See page 4 paras 6 and 7; original text on p. 3, B. paras 1 and 2 also addresses some of the issues raised during discussion.) In addition, the concept of "support objectives" has been added to the paper, (see page 6, para. 1) with a statement that the use of support objectives is evolving within the Agency and that while BHR will maintain the SOs as direct Bureau objectives it will continue to consider how/whether the support objective concept should be incorporated into our strategy.

B. SO #2, "Minimize the effects of disasters and stabilize selected vulnerable and transitional societies" and its performance indicators were somewhat unclear. The SO, as currently written may not provide the desired focus on BHR's early warning and prevention activities, in that "minimizing the effects" of disasters does not seem to allow for prevention of them. In addition, the distinction between "stabilizing" vulnerable populations (SO #2) and "rehabilitating" them (SO #1) is unclear, as are some of the program outcomes associated with them.

Discussion: Concern about the term "minimize the effects of disasters..." was alleviated when it was pointed out that performance indicators for this SO at the Bureau and Office levels will address prevention activities. One reviewer asked that, in refining indicators BHR be sure to have an indicator that gets at the extent to which PMP activities build local capacity, thereby reducing a country's need to call for help from the U.S. and other donors. Others pointed out that it would be too ambitious to have an objective that holds BHR responsible for preventing disasters since they are by and large outside of our control.

With regard to the second question in B, reviewers accepted the notion that the term "stabilizing" and "rehabilitating" should become more clear as the office level strategies were developed as OFDA's work (under SO #1) and OTI's work (under SO #2) are distinct in many ways.

Resolution: BHR has added a PMP indicator at the Bureau level that helps to measure the extent to which PMP activities reduce a country's need for outside intervention (see Annex 1, pages 4 and 5). SO wording has not been adjusted but the terms "stabilizing" and "rehabilitating" will be further defined as office level strategy work continues.

C. For SO #3, "Strengthened Capacity of PVO and NGO community and international organizations to deliver emergency and development services" includes NGOs, PVOs and IOs, on the one hand, and also attempts to capture development and emergencies, on the other. This makes the SO broad and vague.

BHR Opening Comment: This SO reflects the fact that both our emergency and development activities have capacity building elements. The broad and multi-

organizational nature of this SO is important to integrate four offices of the Bureau. It is expected that the office level strategic plans will more narrowly define each office's role vis a vis capacity building.

Discussion: Reviewers did not take issue with the approach outlined in BHR's opening comment. One BHR staffer noted that, in the context of capacity building, we need to look more at how to help PVOs become sustainable in terms of finding a market niche and investing wisely so that they are not so heavily dependent on USG aid. In addition, the need to review how BHR can either consolidate or better coordinate grants from various office to the same grantee was raised. This is especially needed given that each grant to the same PVO carries overhead costs, the total amount of which is never evaluated as a composite whole.

Resolution: No changes necessary in strategy text.

D. SO #5, "Agency more effectively integrates food security, disaster relief and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs" is an internal SO and while valuable, there is a question as to whether it should be included in a strategy that will become a public document.

BHR Opening Comment: Given the importance placed on the elements outlined in this SO, BHR believes it is important to keep this Bureau objective at the level of an SO. If this integration process is going to be captured and measured through some other Agency process then we can consider removing it.

Discussion: Reviewers did not take issue with the approach outlined in BHR's opening comment. No changes necessary.

E. The Strategic Plan did not include a prioritizing among BHR ongoing and proposed activities. Given the resource constraints the Agency faces, combined with the debates that traditionally take place when examining transitional assistance to countries which are not considered "sustainable development" partners, BHR might consider working with AFR and other Bureaus to establish a priority "framework" for countries in which BHR is or may be operating.

BHR Opening Comment: The budget allocations set out in the FY1997 budget submission provides priorities among programs. The allocation within the programs will be made in the Office Strategies. BHR does not want to set an overall country framework because there is much diversity in its programs. Thus, decisions on country interventions should be made at the program level. The need for unified planning is a key objective of the plan.

Discussion: AFR elaborated on the issue, noting that we are often "schizophrenic" in our approach - the Agency on one hand says that priority should go to "sustainable



development" countries, while on the other hand, preventing conflict in non-sustainable development countries is also a priority. A joint AFR/BHR country "framework" could help us work to resolve this tension. Two approaches were proposed to help address the problem: a) unified strategies at the country level would help us to consider the Agency's overall goals and total available resources on a country by country basis; b) a planning "template" might be put together which addresses such issues as entrance and exit criteria; "trigger points" for diminishing or escalating involvement in a humanitarian emergency; and criteria for determining levels of resource allocation. All recognized that the political dynamic can often alter our approach to any given country; however, the "template" and "unified" strategy approaches could help us to lay down markers.

Resolution: The group generally felt that the "unified" strategy approach was now being vigorously pursued by many in the Agency. The strategy already notes the importance of this approach and BHR, based on the above discussion, made some further changes to emphasize the importance of this approach. (See additions: page 50, paras. 1 and 3; page 55, para 3; page 75, para. 4; Annex 1-22, para 1.) The template idea will be pursued outside the context of this strategy.

F. What are the criteria for going into a country, particularly for complex emergencies? Should there be cases where we should intervene (for PMP or in response to natural or manmade disasters) without a disaster declaration?

BHR Opening Comment: Political priorities of the Agency and the USG, including the assessment of the U.S. Ambassador in country, have dictated in large part when we respond to emergencies. These will continue to be an important factor in USG humanitarian response and we will so indicate in the strategy paper. We recognize that OTI and PMP responses have been more limited due to staff and resource constraints. The question of entrance criteria should be taken up during the office level strategy reviews of both OFDA and OTI, as well as FFP.

The disaster declaration is a mechanism used by OFDA to initiate its response. We continue to believe that this is an appropriate mechanism for triggering an OFDA response. Its value should be reevaluated and revalidated if needed during the OFDA office level strategy work.

Discussion: The discussion outlined for E, above, was also relevant for this issue. Reviewers stressed that "unified" strategies at the earliest possible moment as well as the "template" approach could get at the question of criteria.

Resolution: See Resolution points, above. In addition, reviewers concurred that the question regarding the use of the disaster declaration could be appropriately handled during the office level strategic planning process for OFDA.

G. There is not enough discussion in the paper about how we handle response in countries w/o a mission. There is particular concern about natural disasters in countries in Latin America and Asia where we have no Missions. Can we/should we do PMP in these countries?

BHR Opening Comment: The comments in the previous question are relevant here. We will respond to disasters based on declarations and humanitarian/political considerations. The discussion in the paper will be expanded to explain this. For PMP activities (or environmental interventions or any others) the rules for non-presence countries are clear: no assistance except as approved by M/PPC in line with the procedures set out.

Discussion: BHR pointed out that PMP activities can be done in non-presence countries on a regional basis and that this, in fact, is taking place in the Asia region. In Latin America, BHR/OFDA's PMP program has provided support to countries without Missions and has served to build their capacity quite effectively.

Resolution: No changes necessary in strategy text.

H. How many years do you do an emergency program before it becomes "regularized" and picked up by regional bureaus? Is there "value added" to running multi-year emergency activities out of regional bureaus?

BHR Opening Comment: There are currently different models to refer to in addressing the question of how best to handle long term emergencies. ENI has an MOU with OFDA which transfers responsibilities for complex emergency response to the regional bureau. AFR, on the other hand, still looks to OFDA to manage many multi-year emergency programs. A discussion of these different approaches will be added to the strategy text, with a comment that the pros and cons of these different models needs to be further explored. This issue will be further examined in the context of office strategy reviews.

Resolution: Reviewers concurred with approach outlined above. Text has been amended (see page 25, para. 1).

I. There is no reference to the MOU between ENI and BHR which transfers responsibility for NIS complex emergencies to ENI. ENI/HR/EHA was initially created to be an OFDA-like extension within the NIS Task Force. Perhaps in this context we should revisit the MOU between the two Bureaus and reaffirm or revise as appropriate.

BHR Opening Comment: We concur that the MOU should be mentioned in the strategy paper. (see above.) Revisiting the actual MOU should be taken up as an operational issue outside the context of strategy approval.

Resolution: Reviewers concurred with approach outlined above. Text has been amended to discuss the MOU (see page 25, para 1).

J. Should there be sunset clauses for BHR programs, especially as they relate to non-emergency programs run by the Bureau?

Comment: All BHR grants and activities, except OFDA, follow the Agency sunset/close-out rules for countries. Closing out grantee partners from our support assistance makes sense and is done when they build an adequate or appropriate capacity. As the Agency expands in existing areas or moves into new areas, going back to our partners to develop new capacity is necessary. To the extent that the grantees are partners with us in the delivery of services in developing countries, sunset clauses do not make sense. An important objective in this context is building capacity of new NGO/PVO partners. NPI is one of the new initiatives to achieve this end.

Discussion: Discussion focused on grantees who receive institutional support grants from PVC. It highlighted the differences of opinion that exist within the Agency regarding whether PVOs should be completely graduated (cut off) from institutional support grants after a certain period or if PVC should strengthen long time PVO partners in new areas as the objectives of Agency programs evolve.

BHR continues to believe that institutional strengthening involves a long term and evolving relationship with key PVO partners. While they may be "graduated" from certain types of support, our reliance on them in many varied and changing programs means that institutional support should continue but change over time. BHR/PVC highlighted its efforts to develop an index to measure certain aspects of capacity building to determine when grantees have been successfully strengthened in certain key areas.

Resolution: The difference of opinion within the Agency regarding application of the term "graduation" (cutting off a PVO vs. changing our institutional support relationship with it), as well as BHR's current position on this, has been incorporated into the strategy text (see page 39, para 3).

K. How are financial and staff resources allocated between complex and natural emergencies?

Resolution: The nature of the question was uncertain. It was suggested that clarification of the question be sought and addressed in the context of the BHR/OFDA strategic review since it appears to be a question related to BHR/OFDA operations.

L. Given this Administration's interest in preventive diplomacy and transition assistance, more Bureau emphasis should be placed on SO #2. Too many BHR resources are flowing into SO #1.

Discussion: The tension between allocation of resources between SO #1 and SO #2 reflects the larger problem of lack of an overall Agency framework for preventive diplomacy and prioritizing transition countries and programs. The strategy does not make a resource allocation recommendation. By placing SO #2 at the same strategic level as emergency relief and rehabilitation, SO #1, BHR hopes to increase funding as we better understand and measure success in preventive diplomacy and transitions.

Resolution: No changes necessary in strategy text.

M. Should the strategy address AID's role in trying to improve relations between PVOs and host governments?

Discussion: Yes, it was felt that the strategy should address this point. AFR expanded on the issue, noting the growing tensions between PVOs and host governments in the Horn of Africa. It feels that the strategy talks a lot about promoting the strengthening of PVOs without regard to by negative consequences that that might have. AFR was asked to provide written feedback on where the strategy text could be amended to address this issue.

Resolution: Feedback was received from AFR and four of five proposed additions were incorporated in the text (see page 38, indents 3 and 5; page 41, para. 2, indent 3; page 42, indent 2.)

## II. Other Resolved Issues

These are issues discussed and resolved in the 7/25 Issues Meeting or addressed in writing by BHR.

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A. What manner of customer participation went into the strategy formulation process, especially in terms of Missions?

Discussion: Many of our implementing partners were involved in the strategy formulation process as were missions in some regions (e.g., the Horn of Africa.) BHR took the point that some missions were not fully engaged in the process and that more work needs to be done in this regard and we will be focussing on this during the refinement of our indicators and the development of Office strategies. In the case of

FFP, Title II for Development, SO teams are being established with Missions and PVO field staff.

Resolution: No changes in strategy text are necessary.

B. There are no budget numbers, and no way to link the Action Plan to budget decisions.

Comment: The review was held prior to preparation of BHR's budget for the '97 budget submission.

Resolution: Budget allocations are out and this issue is central to the Bureau budget review with PPC and M/Bud. The FY 1997 budget submissions are included in Annex 2 of the strategy.

C. It is AFR's understanding that OFDA requires the issuance of a Disaster Declaration for both natural and complex disasters.

Resolutions: Text has been amended in appropriate place. (qualifying phrase deleted from page 27, para 5 of original.) See also discussion in I.F above.

D. Given OFDA's track record, do they need any additional authorities?

Resolution: OFDA has full notwithstanding authority. No changes necessary in strategy text.

E. Given the significant expertise that AFR has acquired in early warning activities, including vulnerability assessments for several African countries, we urge that explicit reference to the ongoing collaboration between AFR and BHR's famine mitigation activities be included in the Strategic Plan. AFR's FEWS activity, with objectives and indicators closely linked to BHR's SO #4, could be tapped to assist in the development of indicators for this SO.

Resolution: Text has been amended (see page 32, para. 1) and we will seek linkages with FEWS during the FFP office level strategic planning process (responsible for SO4).

F. Should the ASHA program be closed down?

Comment: This is a successful grants program as measured by its political support as well as in its construction and other support to ASHA. This issue is taken up in the BHR FY 1997 budget submission and review.

Resolution: There is no change in the strategy.

G. That there is a difference between the relief-to-development transition (read Africa) and the relief-to restructuring (read NIS) transition that we are working on.

Comment: Text has been amended to note this difference (see page 22, para. 5, indent 2.)

H. The number of joint and unified strategies and policies formulated should be an indicator for SO #5. Current indicator should be reformulated to include this.

Comment: A new indicator has been added to SO#5 (see Annex 1, pages 21 and 22.)

I. Relief to development continuum is not a linear process. Relief and development can occur simultaneously.

Resolution: We have adjusted phrases in the strategy that suggest that the continuum is strictly linear (see page 12, para. 1; page 15, indent 2; page 22, para. 4, indent 2). It reflects reality better than a linear model.

J. Can we really talk about strengthening IOs?:

Comment: There was general agreement that indeed we could, particularly in the case of WFP.

Resolution: No changes necessary in strategy text.

K. SO #5 should be reworded to show that BHR will work with other parts of the Agency to more effectively integrate food security, disaster relief and PVO/NGO collaboration in Strategic Planning and Programming.

Resolution: Strategy SO has been amended and now reads "BHR more effectively influences Agency integration of food security, disaster relief and PVO/NGO collaboration in strategic planning for country programs."

L. Should there be an indicator within SO1 regarding the extent to which local resources were used to respond to emergencies?

Resolution: An indicator has been added, (see Annex 1, pages 2 and 3.)

M. Why doesn't BHR use the objectives raised in the HA Indicators Workshop related to: 1. Disaster preparedness/early warning; 2. Disaster response; 3. Transition. This approach should be front and center in your strategy.

Comment: BHR programs are much broader than the three step approach implies, including such elements as food aid development programs and capacity building of PVOs. The current SOs better reflect the work of the Bureau.

Resolution: No changes necessary in strategy text.

Resolution: No changes necessary in strategy text.

N. Two of the Assumptions for SO 2 (see page 49) are related to elements that BHR has some control over, and therefore should not be considered assumptions.

Comment: BHR/FFP reviewed the assumptions following the Issues Meeting and believes that they are appropriately lists as assumptions. The first assumption on page 48 shows BHR's recognition that PVOs have strong interests, outside resources for programming and, in addition, are politically influential. USAID does not dictate to them; rather, it is a collaborative partnership with many variables. Regarding the third assumption, while USAID promotes coordination among many players, the willingness to work together must be there at the outset for effective communication and collaboration. Not all elements of coordination are within our control.

### III. Issues Deferred to Office Strategic Plans

These issues fit within the Bureau strategy but are best handled at the office level as we develop and review the Office strategies.

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A. There were many comments about Strategy indicators. An illustrative list of those comments are below. We intend to refine indicators in the context of the Agency wide establishment of HA indicators and during the office review process.

1. The indicators "% mission/bureau budgets implemented through PVO/NGOs" and "% missions including food security in their country plans and programs" may not really indicate accomplishment of the SO that the "Agency more effectively integrates" these things. Similarly, the indicators "food insecure population as a percent of total population" and "percent food insecure population which has its temporary food needs met by USAID" may not show achievement of the SO of "sustained improvement in household nutrition and productivity for vulnerable groups", etc.]

2. As noted in the Plan, only one "impact" performance indicator is provided for SO #1, i.e., measuring the percent of the vulnerable population with critical needs met, a measurement which requires both an estimate of the vulnerable population as well as

some definition of critical needs. AFR suggest that the exit criteria outlined on page 28 could also serve as indicator of critical needs met, and ability to sustain those levels might indicate effective "rehabilitation," i.e., Program Outcome 1.2.

3. SO #2 - Performance Indicator may not be viable. A "progressive shift in the ratio of humanitarian assistance to development assistance in transitional situations in which BHR intervenes," may lead to faulty measurements. Depending upon overall Agency priorities, USG development assistance may not be available at all for given country during or after a USG humanitarian assistance intervention. In any event, true program integration should discourage measuring program outcomes by funding account -- program outcomes for a single SO may be achieved through a number of Agency resources. For example, USG development assistance in certain countries already contributes to demobilization and reintegration activities as well as infrastructure restoration activities which are cited as program outcomes indicators for SO #2.

4. SO #2 - Performance Indicator #2: The second indicator, "progress in relation to exit criteria established for specific transitional situations in connection with BHR interventions," was not entirely clear. Measurements of "progress" may need to be defined to clarify this indicator.

5. Program Outcome #2.3 - Performance Indicator #1: The indicator "number of functioning local NGOs" may be better utilized as a program outcome, though still difficult to measure absent a target number. While NGOs may be registered, this does not guarantee that they are "functioning" as a viable political, social or other kind of institution. Comparative data regarding population and previous or desired target number of NGOs would be necessary to make this a meaningful indicator or program outcome.

#### B. OTI Issues

1. Does (or should) OTI have the capacity to work in additional countries?

Comment: This is a key issue in the budget reviews. The ability to expand OTI rests on the availability of more funds.

#### C. FFP Issues

1. Does the Agency and Congressional emphasis on basic education, especially for girls, suggest a reexamination of the low priority for school feeding?
2. Does USAID use food resources for development purposes adequately?



3. What is the size of the World Food Programme voluntary set-aside based upon? Is it the best possible investment of these resources?

4. How restrictive/flexible is the focus on agricultural production as a food security strategy?

Comment: While discussion on this issue is likely to be raised, reviewers should be aware that the Food Aid and Food Security policy paper represents USAID policy and will not be reopened for discussion. It is, rather, the point of departure for the FFP strategy.

#### D. PVC Issues

1. Should matching grants be opened up to local NGOs, e.g., Grameen Bank?

2. How are PVC program award criteria coordinated with bilateral strategic objectives?

3. No discussion of leveraging of additional resources from the private sector.

#### E. OFDA Issues

1. Should IDA funds only be released after an official disaster has been declared, while emergency food aid is not bound tho the same restriction? (See also Issue Ib)

### IV. Issues outside the BHR strategic review process

These are issues that are at a higher strategic level (e.g. relating to the Agency's HA strategy and implementation guidelines) or that require a joint decision with other Bureaus or USG Agencies. An Agency or policy decision on all of the following might strengthen the BHR strategy but such decisions are not essential to BHR approval of the strategy paper.

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A. Development resources go to areas with the greatest chance of producing results while emergency funds go towards at risk populations which are often located in marginal areas. The implied question is whether we should be changing the allocation of our DAF to help reduce the risk of disaster/crisis.

Comment: This is an Agency wide issue and can not be resolved in the BHR strategy. However, we will adjust the discussion under SO #5 to highlight this dilemma and the need for coordination and analyses on this point.

B. What is an adequate response to an emergency? How do we know when the USG has done its fair share? Is there a target percentage for USG or BHR contributions to a crisis?

Comment: This issue has been a common theme in numerous Bureau and inter-Bureau discussions. BHR has agreed to take the lead in writing a "think piece" on this subject to circulate for review and discussion. It is not likely that we can resolve this in the context of finalizing this version of the strategy but we will note in the text that this is an issue that will be further reviewed and discussed.

C. Do the GAO report and the Congressional climate offer an opportunity for stretching budgets by ending shipping subsidies?

Comment: This is a larger Administration issue that has been taken up in other fora.

D. How can greater use be made of Title I for development purposes, as Sri Lanka has proposed and cannot get an answer?

Comment: USDA has jurisdiction over Title I.

E. Do we need to re-examine the appropriate balance between money put into emergencies vs. sustainable development?

F. What are the trade-offs, and documented relative effectiveness, between financing PMP activities and financing equitable growth in a given country?

Comment: This is a subject of research and cannot be addressed within the context of this strategy. It is an Agency wide issue that will have to be further reviewed, however, as we consider how best to address conflict prevention, the Agency including BHR will be changing our approaches and strategy.

G. There are systemic problems in USAID operations (in the budget process and other points) that make decision-making difficult in a strategic manner. Directives and earmarks from Congress and political realities force allocations based more on politics than strategy.

H. How do the new World Trade Organization agreements affect the medium-term prospects for food aid?

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